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I. Introduction 
( 1) Fixed rate systems are institutions with economic benefits (or damages) determined 
by their inherent economic mechanics, the so-called  "rules of  the game" (Keynes,1925). In 
a fixed rate system, the 'rules of  the game' are the result of the system's institutional design 
interacting with the prevailing conditions of the capital and foreign exchange markets.  The 
market  conditions  can  be described  as  the  relevant  environment of a  fixed  tate  system. 
According  to  Mundell's terminology,  a  fixed  rate  system's  set  of rules  is  to  its  market 
conditions  "like a constitution  (  ... ) to a political or electoral system"  (Mundell, 1972). The 
market conditions prove to be the  'modus operandi' of the rule system.  Currency crises as 
specific malfunctions of a fixed rate system are, like the systems'  functioning, the result of 
its institutional design under given market conditions. Therefore, analysing furrency crises 
and reform considerations to avoid them also has to be orientated to the system's set of rules 
and its market conditions. 
(2) The European Monetary System (EMS) is an  institutionalized fixed rate system.  Its 
rule system was established in  1978/79 by contractual agreements between the governments 
and central banks involved. Except for a few  modifications by the Basle/Nyborg-Agreement 
in  1987, the initial set of rules has  remained unchanged.  The extension of the bilateral ex-
change rate bands to  +I- 15%  as a consequence of the currency crisis of July  1993, howe-
ver,  comes  close  to  a  de  facto  suspension  of the  systems'  rules.  It also  fundamentally 
questions the way  towards  European Monetary Union scheduled in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Returning  to  the  normal  band  of the  EMS  becomes  a  necessary  precondition  for  further 
progress  of the  Maastricht  integration  strategy.  Hence it follows,  that the  second  stage~s 
main  focus  should  be  to  re-establish  the  EMS's exchange  rate  mechanism.  This  report, 
therefore,  is  to develope reform strategies for the EMS  in order to re-establish its functio-
ning during stage two of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which- on the basis of the 
Maastricht Treaty -is a prerequisite for the transition to the third stage by 1999 at the latest. ll. Fixed Rate Systems: A General Institutional Framework 
(3) The set of rules of a fixed rate system is essentially a mechanism for allocating its 
inherent monetary adjustment constraints.  The allocation of monetary adjustment burdens 
among the participating member currencies is described by the system's symmetry charac-
teristics.  A fixed rate system of uncovered paper currencies can either be designed asym-
metrically burdening hard currency countries(= 'weak currency standard') or asymmetrical-
ly burdening weak currency countries (='hard currency standard') or symmetrical(= 'com-
promise standard').  The symmetry characteristics determine the system's internal monetary 
stability  standard.  These  adjustment  constraints  are  triggered  by  market  transactions. 
However,  the  intensity  and  direction  of the  market  transactions'  impact  is  essentially 
determined  by the  specific  design  of the  rules.  The  rule  structure  can  be classified  and 
described in five different categories of rules. Besides the monetary coordination mechanism, 
these  categories  contain  the  intervention  rules,  the financing  mechanism  (consisting  of 
settlement rules and credit facilities),  the reserve  rules,  and the exchange  rate  adjustment 
mechanism.  A further structural determinant of a fixed rate system is the 'size' of a country 
as  represented by  its stock of intervention reserves and its monetary sterilization capacity. 
Within  this  structure  the  markets  serve  as  a  trigger  for  the  rule-determined  adjustment 
constraints. 
(  4) Monetar.y Coordination Mechanism: The monetary policy coordination of a fixed rate 
system  can  either be effected ex  post through  the resulting  adjustment constraints of the 
system. Coordination is then the result of the system's adjusment mechanics triggered by the 
markets. It can be described as a market coordination or indirect coordination of monetary 
policy.  On the other hand,  monetary coordination can also be effected ex ante as a direct 
monetary coordination of the responsible currency authorities. Analagous to market coordi-
nation, the direct coordination can be described as authority coordination.  As an additional 
terminological  distinction,  the  term  simple fixed  rate  system  is  used  in  the  following  in 
distinction to complex fixed  rate  systems  when no mechanism for a direct coordination of 
monetary policy is provided. 
2a (2) 
(5)  Intervention Rules:  The intervention rules of a fixed rate system should unambigu-
ously stipulate the circumstances and extent the member states are obliged to intervene in 
order to keep the system's exchange rate promise.  Besides the choice of an exchange  rate 
standard  it  is  necessary  to  define  and  establish  the  bilateral  central  rates,  fluctuation 
margins and intervention points. 
•  When choosing an exchange  rate  standard it is important to take into account the conse-
quences of the various standards for the distribution of intervention obligations among the 
member currencies. Three different types of exchange rate standards can be distinguished: 
- The first option is the key  currency standard.  Here, all participating nations are obliged to 
establish a bilateral exchange rate of their currency towards the key currency. They have to 
defend this rate in the exchange markets by means of intervention. Only the key currency is 
not subject to any intervention obligations. Therfore,  it~s monetary authorities are not forced 
to accept any monetary adjustment constraints caused by liquidity and reserve effects due to 
interventions. The remaining monetary degree of  freedom is institutionally guaranteed by rule 
to  the  key  currency  as  the  n-th  currency  of the  system.  Consequently,  a  key  currency 
standard is designed entirely asymmetrically burdening the (n-1)-countries of the system. 
-The bilateral parity grid is the second type of exchange rate standard. For a bilateral parity 
grid symmetrical intervention obligations can be expected at least in a formal sense. 
- As  a third option, the  central  rates  can  be defined  with respect to  a currency  basket  in 
which each participating currency counts for a certain weight. The symmetry characteristics 
of a currency  basket are  more  complicated  since  a currency's exchange rate towards the 
basket currency is the weighted average of its bilateral exchange rates towards the individual 
currencies  participating  in  the basket.  In  a  currency  basket  standard,  therefore,  one can 
assume  symmetry  characteristics  unilaterally  burdening  the  currencies  counting  for  the 
highest weights  in the basket and  whose exchange  rate deviates the most from  the basket 
average. 
•  Establishing bilateral  central  rates  one can  refer  to  normative models  of defining the  'correct' 
exchange rate or simply follow the given market rates. 
•  An  important aspect for defining the fluctuation margins is the criterion of overlapping bands in 
case of central rate adjustments.  Overlapping bands can help to  reduce the probability of 'one-way 
bets' of the markets. 
3a •  We speak of symmetrical intervention points if  the upper and lower point of intervention are in the 
same distance from the bilaterally defined central rate. With asymmetrically constructed intervention 
points, obligations to intervene exist either at the upper (='soft currency version')  or at  the lower 
(='hard currency version') intervention points. 
(6) Mechanisms of Intervention Financing: Analyzing the intervention rules of fixed rate 
systems it is important to examine if and to what extent the symmetry characteristics of the 
intervention rules are concealed by the corresponding financing  mechanism of the system. 
Even formally symmetrically designed intervention rules may result in asymmetrical system-
ic adjustment constraints due to the corresponding settlement rules. The finance mechanism 
of a fixed rate system consists of credit facilities and settlement obligations. 
•  In order to relax the existing budget restriction for weak currency countries intervening at their 
lower  intervention point,  a  fixed  rate  system  with  intervention  obligations  needs  corresponding 
intervention credit facilities.  Besides  the overall  amount of the credit facility  the  most  important 
conditions are the maturity, interest rate, and the denomination of repayment obligations. 
•  In contrast to credit facilities, settlement obligations do not help to finance interventions of weak 
currency countries at their lower intervention limit but stipulate the financing of interventions carried 
out by  a hard currency country reaching its  upper intervention point.  In the context of settlement 
rules weak currency reserves of hard currency central banks accumulated by obligatory interventions 
establish a claim towards the central bank of the weak currency to re-exchange the reserves into hard 
currency. With settlement obligations the weak currency central bank is obliged to finance the hard 
currency central bank's interventions. Similar to credit facilities, for designing a settlement obligation 
it is  especially important to fix  its amount,  maturity,  and the denomination of the settlement trans-
actions. 
(7) Reserve Rules:  The purchase, holding, investment, and employment of intervention 
reserves can produce liquidity and other monetary policy effects for the reserve currency• s 
central bank. Therefore, certain reserve rules should be agreed upon. Reserve rules determi-
ne in  what form  central banks are allowed  to  hold their intervention reserves  in  member 
currencies (='reserve  investment rules') and to what extent they are allowed to accumulate 
those currencies  (='reserve  limitation rules'): 
(8) Exchange Rate Adjustment Mechanism:  For each fixed rate system,  the possibility 
of an exchange rate adjustment is a sort of loophole to evade the system's adjustment con-
4a straints  or to  forestall  the  markets'  pressure  towards  such  adjustment  constraints.  The 
institutional design and operation of the exchange rate adjustment mechanism, therefore, is 
an important determinant for the degree of system inherent economic adjustment pressure 
and the credibility of the exchange rate promise from the markets'· point of view. Rule deter-
mined or discretionary exchange adjustment mechanisms are the basic design alternatives: 
•  Rule-determined adjustment mechanisms can also be described as formula .flexibility.  The changes 
in the exchange rates follow a specified rule or formula and are 'objectively'  given for all countries 
involved. 
•  As an alternative to the rule-determined formula flexibility exchange rate adjustment mechanisms 
can  follow  a  discretionary  case  by  case  strategy.  In  principle,  discretionary  adjustments  of the 
exchange rate can be carried out wi$in a 'governance structure' or without being tied to  specific 
procedural  rules.  Thereby  the  most  important  institutional  choice  alternatives  are  whether  the 
governments (=political exchange rate competency) or the central banks (=monetary exchange rate 
competency) have the exchange rate competency and in which way the institutionalized discussion and 
decision process within the 'governance structure' is organized. 
(9) Size of a Country: A country's relative size within a fixed rate system is essentially 
determined by its monetary sterilization capacity and the amount of its freely available hard 
currency intervention reserves.  Consequently, the bigger a country in terms of its steriliza-
tion capacity and its currency reserves,  the more likely it can - at least temporarily - evade 
rule-determined  liquidity  and  reserve  effects  and  the  resulting  adjustment  constraints. 
Intensity  and  direction  of rule-determined  symmetry  characteristics,  therefore,  can  be 
(over-)compensated by the relative size of the countries involved. 
( 1  0) The Part of Capital and  Foreign Exchange Markets:  The markets take the part of 
a 'judge' who has to decide which of the member currencies are weak or strong according 
to  the rules.  The  system's institutional settings are  blind to this kind of  identification pro-
blem.  A currency,  therefore,  is  by  definition  a  hard  currency  when  its  exchange  rate  is 
subject to a revaluation pressure in the foreign exchange market.  A currency is called weak 
when it is  subject to a devaluation pressure.  In case a currency is subject to  revaluation or 
devaluation pressures,  the intervention mechanism and with it the systemically determined 
liquidity and reserve effects are virtually automatically activated.  For that a revaluation or 
5a devaluation pressure of the market is the necessary and sufficient condition at the same time, 
regardless  of its  underlying degree of fundamental  rationality.  Activating  the  adjustment 
constraints is entirely the job of  the markets. 
(11)  Summary:  From the above analysis,  figure  I  can be derived which  contains an 
overall description of the 'rules of the game'. The figure shows the structural determinants 
of the system's economic mechanics 
as well as the way they are released 
by  market  transactions.  The  set  of 
rules  and  the  relative  size  of  the 
countries  involved  can  be described 
as  a  fixed  rate  system's  structural 
-determinants.  They  determine  the 
system-inherent liquidity and reserve 
effects  which  in  turn  trigger  the 
monetary adjustment constraints. 
Flour- 1:  Deter•lnanta of Mone..,y Ad,luatNnt Conatrelnta 
In lnetltutlonell.cl FIJaCI Rate 8yate  ... 
Working Conditions of Capital and Exchange Markets 
c;:>atruotural Datennlnenta + Trl.....,lng F110tor1 
However,  the system structures are activated solely by corresponding market transactions. 
The market transactions' fundamental rationality, therefore, determines at the same time the 
economic  rationality  of the  overall  adjustment  constraints  effectively  resulting  from  the 
system's structures in action. A fixed  rate system's constitution can only be as good as its 
'modus operandi' in the shape of  the markets. 
ill. The European Monetary System (EMS): 
Functioning, Symmetry Characteristics, Market Conditions 
(12) The EMS is an asymmetrically designed simple fixed rate system burdening weak 
currency countries, in which the part of the key currency is not determined by rules but is 
awarded by the capital and exchange markets. It, therefore, can be called a market-determin-
ed anchor currency system.  The economic rationality of the monetary coordination mecha-
nism within the EMS, therefore, corresponds to the degree of fundamental rationality of the 
capital and exchange markets. Following the general framework of chapter II, the elements 
6a of the institutional arrangement determining the system's adjustment constraints are analyzed 
at first.  From that the systemically determined liquidity and reserve effects are derived. The 
concluding chapter then describes the monetary adjustment constraints triggered by market 
transactions under the new conditions of fully liberalized capital and exchange markets. 
( 13) Indirect Coordination of Monetary Policy: The EMS is a simple fixed rate system. 
Mechanisms for a direct  coordin~tion.. of national monetary.p()licies-aie not assigned.  The 
coordination of monetary policy is  managed  indirectly by  means of the  system's inherent 
adjustment and coordination constraints.  As the following will  show,  these constraints are 
.  - '  - .  - '  - ~'  - .  - ~  .  '  - -·  ~ 
designed almost entirely asymmetrically for the weak currency countries and are activated 
'COl>.,., __ ,. __  ,..._  '  ..... --- -- '  -- • 
by market transactions. The monetary adjustment constraints within the EMS, therefore, are 
.. :..  --~.- - ....  -~-.~be- - -·- - - - .... 
essentially market-determined. The currencies' hierarchy in the capital and exchange markets 
determine  the  allocation  of the  remaining  degree  of freedom.  The  strongest  cun:e~cy is 
~  ...  -- --- ...... ,. ___  - .. ,.  -.  -- - -·  .,. 
awarded for the key currency role and, thereby, determines the monetary stability standard 
.. ...,... __  ,·-~  - -· 
of the overall system. As long as the markets award the most stable currency of the system, 
---
a  desirable  convergence  pressure  towards  the  stability  standard  of the  anchor  currency 
V'"""  - ,..,  ...  ~  - - - -
country develops for the weak currencies.  The EMS's success story during  the_J~80s was 
ba~~--on this convergence pressure,  when the D-Mark functioned as stability _standard  and 
credibility anchor for the monetary policy of the traditional weak currencies. However, if the 
----~--- '-~-~"~-""'-~il'-~----~-------- .,  .... 
-markets continue to devalue traditionally weak currencies with no regard to already succe-
ding adjustment policies, an inherent deflationary bias for the 'supposed to be weak-curren-
- -~ ---- ------- -
cies' may occur.  They are then  forced to compensate the markets' devaluation speculations 
by  inte~est--rate -differences-uiravoiir-of its -irrationally attacked currency.  In an economic 
downward trend with low inflation and growth rates,  such a policy may lead to considerable 
- .... 
inadequate macroeconomic adjustment costs. These market-determined inadequate adjustment 
--·-·· 
constraints  make  the  system  intolerable (from  the  point of view  of the  governments  and 
-~·  ......... ·-~---- .. ....,,.._- -- ·- - - -
cen!ral banks involved) and implausible (from the markets' point of view). 
( 14) Symmetrical Intervention Rules:  The intervention obligations are committed to the 
upper and  lower intervention points,  which  result  from  the agreed  fluctuation  margins of 
+/-2,25% around the bilateral central rates,  and they are unlimited in amount.  In  a parity 
grid of this  kind,  two  currencies  reach  their  upper  respectively  lower intervention  points 
7a simultaneously. The hard currency's bilateral exchange rate at the upper intervention limit 
exactly corresponds to the lower intervention limit of the weak currency. In this respect, at 
least the formal design of the EMS's intervention rules is entirely symmetrical. 
In contrast to  the EMS's formal  intervention obligations the  adjustment  impact  of the individual 
member country's sterilization policy is asymmetrical. Whereas hard currency countries sterilize the 
primary liquidity effects  of their interventions almost entirely, weak currency countries have only 
little  inclination  to  sterilize.  As  a  consequence  of the  asymmetrical  sterilization  behaviour  the 
monetary policy of hard currency central banks is  not weakenend by any expanding money supply 
and  interest  rate  effects  while the  restrictive  effects  for  the  weak  currencies  lead  to  adjustment 
constraints for their monetary policy to follow the stability standard of the hard currency countries. 
The formal  symmetry of the intervention rules  is  reversed  because the asymmetrical  sterilization  · 
policy dominates the interventions' preliminary money supply and interest effectS.  Within the EMS 
a symmetrical adjustment constraint towards an average stability standard can only occur when the 
sterilization  capacity  of the  hard  currency  central  bank  is  exhausted.  In  literature,  the  formal 
symmetry of the intervention obligations within the EMS has often lead to the view that the overall 
design of the  EMS  is  symmetrical  and,  therefore,  the de  facto  hegemony  of the  DM is  to  be 
attributed mostly to  external  factors  not  inherent to the  system's  institutional settings.  The most 
important reason for this misjudgement was that the system's symmetry characteristics were solely 
derived  from  the  intervention rules  and  not,  as  it  is  necessary,  from  their  interaction  with  the 
sterilization policy and the other components of the EMS's set of rules. 
(15) Asymmetrical Financing Mechanism:  Since the holding of intervention reserves in 
member currencies is  limited to  the level of agreed  on- 'working balances',  for  financing 
their interventions  at  the  lower  intervention  point  the  central  banks  have  to  rely  on  the 
system's financing mechanisms.  Core of the intervention financing mechanism of the EMS 
are the credit facilities of the very short-term financing and the settlement obligations. 
•  With the very short-term facility,  credits unlimited in amount are available to countries participa-
ting in the exchange rate mechanism.  Hence in principle all  member countries are able to comply 
with their unlimited intervention obligations at any time.  The resulting liabilities become due at the 
latest 2,5 months after the end of the month in which the facility was used. The budget restriction is 
only temporarily suspended for a maximum of 3,5 months.  ~e  mechanisms of the very sJtru:t:term 
financing are sufficient to guarantee a temporary unlimited access to member currencies for _fmancing 
iliesystem's obligatory interventions.  Therefore,  the unlimited  intervention promise of the  weak 
currency countries-1s-oiify credible for a limited period of time.  After~~r_ds,_  the~! !>udg~tre.strjction 
of limited intervention reserves is re-established by the repay~e11t obligations. 
j 
Sa •  Due to the so-called settlement rules of the EMS  a hard currency central bank's interventions at 
its upper  inte~~~t!_?n point are accounted like an intervention of a weak currency central bank at its 
lower  intervent.ion  point drawing on  its  very short-term  credit facility.  From the weak  currency 
central banks' point of view, it is obviously not important by which central bank the intervention is 
carried out in the markets.  In the end it is always the central bank of the weak currency which has 
to finance all interventions according to the procedures of the very short-term financing. The budget 
restriction of the  weak  currency  countries  is  extended  to  the  interventions of the hard  currency 
countries and, therefore, is considerably tightened.  In contrast to the formally symmetrical design of 
the intervention mechanism the finance  mechanism  is  almost entirely asymmetrical.  The system's 
reserve effects, therefore, are also asymmetrical in the end.  As a result the credibility of the central 
banks' intervention promise for  the markets is only low.  Keeping the promise in case of unlimited 
interventions is  implausible for the markets because,  after a short period of time,  all  interventions 
have to be (re-) financed by the weak currency countries. Even in times of speculative attacks of the 
markets  against fundamentally  justified exchange rates  their budget restriction is  only temporary 
suspended; however, it is not revoked in principle. 
(  16)  Restrictive Reserve  Rules:  The EMS  rules do not provide any exactly quantified 
reserve  rules.  In  practice,  however,  the  procedure  is  handled  less  restrictive.  Still,  the 
accumulation of intervention reserves denominated in member currencies remains subject to 
the consent of the issuing central bank concerned. In contrast to the more or less restrictive 
reserve accumulation rules the central banks are free in deciding on the way they prefer to 
hold  their  intervention  reserves;  they  can  either invest  them  directly  in  market assets  or  r 
deposit them at the issuing central bank involved.  As a result of this,  the institutional rules 
and procedures for the accumulation and investment of intervention reserves in the EMS do 
not seem  to be decisive determinants of its monetary symmetry characteristics. 
(17)  Political Exchange  Rate  Competency:  The exchange rate competency  within  the 
EMS  is  completely political. It is  solely assigned  to  the European Council and  not  to the 
central banks. In practice, realignment decisions are negotiated and prepared by the Moneta-
ry Committee of the European Community. In the end, however, mutual political consent of 
the  responsible  Council  of Ministers  is  require.  Therefore,  the  realignment  procedure's 
decisive characteristics are that the exchange rate competency within the EMS  is  political 
and  unanimous  mutual  consent  is  required.  Together,  the  two  characteristics  ensure  a 
political  veto  for  each  member  country  involved.  Therefore,  the  realignment  decision 
remains subject to a politically dominated. process of negotiation. 
9a (18)  Workin&  Conditions  of the  Capital  and  Foreign  Exchange  Markets:  Since  the 
mid-1980s, the international capital and exchange markets are characterized by liberalization 
and globalization trends as well as by a securitization of international credit relations. In two 
different aspects, these trends have fundamentally changed the conditions of global exchange 
markets: 
•  In international portfolios with currency diversification the exchange rate has become an autono-
mous component of the return calculation. The spot market price effects  of portfolio restructurings 
as  a result of changing exchange expectations are consequently the first channel through which the 
new conditions of the capital and exchange markets can make the central banks' effort to stabilize the 
exchange rates more difficult. 
•  The increasing importance of the exchange rate risk has simultanously lead to the development of 
derivative markets where market participants can hedge their uncovered currency positions. Derivati-
ve  financial  instruments,  however,  are  not  soleley used  for  hedging  currency  risks  but also  for 
establishing  open  currency  positions  without  the  necessity  of using  liquid  speculation  capital. 
Repercussions from  this  kind of currency  speculation  without capital  on the spot market  are the 
second channel through which the changed market conditions make it more difficult for the central 
banks to stabilize exchange rates. 
(19) Speculative Attacks:  With the exchange rate as a part of their currency portfolio's 
return and the derivative instruments of currency speculation without capital,  the markets' 
incentive for and capability of successful speculative attacks against central banks increases. 
Return-orientated speculative attacks on the exchange rate promises of institutionalized fixed 
rate systems can be performed by the capital and exchange markets in two-diff-erent ways: 
•  On-balance-sheet attacks are capital backed speculations. They are carried out directly via the spot 
m~ket~. these on-balance-sheet attacks have a twofold effect on the central b~ks  !~v?~~~~~-!-~~sf, 
as  a  result  of their  intervention obligations  they  are  forced  to  take  the  counter  position  in  the 
~-~----- ..  ·-.  __ ,  - -- ...  -- ~·-~-- ~-~-----------~. ,  ............ 
speculative spot sales of the attacked curr_enc.y ..  J11~ Uq"Qi<l_itr_~d reserve effects resulting from the 
spo!  interVentioiiS .. auiomatically  lead  to  the  corresponding  sy;t~~~inherent monetary  adjustment 
constraints.  s·ec~~diy,;the weak currency's central bank in its function as  'lender of last  res~rt' is 
or----~~--·--
forced to refinance the speculative credit expansions at an interest rate which is acceptable from the 
perspective  of the  national  economy  as  a  whole  in  order  to  maintain  orderly  conditions  iri  the 
d()mestfc-mo.ney markets. This means that the central banks are at first obliged to provide the de~an­
d~  hard currency and  at the same time have to  guarantee the speculant'.§. refinancing in the weak 
C'!!_rency at conditions which are justifiable from the domestic point of view of the national economy 
as  ;-~hole  .. ill  addition,  they  have  to  accept  the  liquidity  and  reserve  effects  and  the  resulting 
lOa (3) 
adjustment constraints as well as corresponding exchange losses from (re-) exchanging the speculative 
currency postions in case of a devalutation of the attacked currency. 
•  Off-balance-sheet  attacks  are currency speculations without underlying liquid capital  positions. 
Th~y  are_S"~!!~--~'.:!!_~Y-_f~!-~~d _sales of the weak currency in the forward markets._Their ~~mit­
tance into the spot market takes place indirectly via routinely conducted cover transactions_ of the 
·-------·-··-------·- ---- - - '  ·-----~-
bank~ contracting the  ~~~J!LC!!!ye_forward_  d~al. Again,  the central banks have to take the cou!lter 
po~!tion in the spot market and are responsible for refinancing both the spot and the swap part o~. the 
cover  transaction.  The  further  course  is  then  identical  to  an  on-balance-sheet  attack.  Since  the 
c  - -- ~- - •  "' 
establishment of uncovered forward positions is technically easier and, therefore, favourable in terms 
of  !!'~~~~!!.?n co~ts, speculators usually will switch to the spot market only if the forward markets 
become inflexible in terms of liquidity.  - -
Therefore, independent on whether the speculative attacks are carried out via the spot or the 
forward  markets,  the  central  banks  of the attacked  currencies  are the  inherent losers  all 
along the line: 
•  They  provide the  speculative! y  demanded  hard  currency  spot  amounts  by  intervening  in  the 
markets and have to face the resulting liquidity and reserve effects; 
•  as  "lender of last resort",  they refinance the weak currency's expansion of the credit volume to 
finance the speculative positions; 
•  after  a forced  realignment according to  the speculative market pressures,  they have to  take the 
currency losses and thereby finance the speculant"s profits. 
(20)  Overall Symmetry Characteristics of the EMS:  Th~  _EMS  is a market  -determined 
as~111m~trical fixed rate system.  Under the prevailing conditions its intervention promise is 
not credible for the markets. The intervention mechanism is neither sufficient to protect the 
system •  s  exchange  rates  against  speculative  attacks  nor  does  it  provide  for  an  efficient 
protection against economic irrational market valuations of certain member currencies. The 
triggering  and  direction  of the  system-inherent  macro-economic  adjustment constraints  is 
entirely  determined  by  the  markets.  The  degree  of the  system's  adjustment  constraints" 
economic rationality,  therefore,  only corresponds to  that of the capital and exchange mar-
kets. Speculative attacks of the markets lead either to economically unjustified exchange rate 
adjustments,  or to  macroeconomic costs of inadequate adjustment constraints.  The second 
alternative makes the first one all the more likely and leads to a further loss of credibility of 
the exchange rate promise. 
lla IV. Reasons for the Currency Crisis 
(21)  In  the  following,  the  EMS  crisis  is  analyzed  as  being  mainly  inherent  to  the 
system's institutional design and, therefore, as a result of its institutional structure under the 
new conditions of completely liberalized capital and exchange markets.  IU!_<!~~  a 
sys!l!__'!!~~ally dete"!'ined ~mmetry  crises following fundamentally irrational market spe,~ula­
tions.  Thereby  the  fundamental  approach  of explaning  the crisis as  a  result of economic 
convergence deficits can only play a minor part because it only applies to individual member 
countries but not for all the currencies attacked in the course of the 1992/93 crisis. 
(22)  Market  Failure:  The  conditions  of financial  markets  largely  correspond  to  the 
standards  of a  'perfect  market'.  This  is  especially  true  for  the  highly  efficient  foreign 
exchange markets.  At first,  therefore,  it seems to be unjustified to  speak of a capital and 
exchange markets' failure.  Indeed the market failure in  the course of the EMS crises does 
not  consist  in  micro-economic  malfunctions  as  a  result  of imperfect  markets  but in  the 
lacking fundamental rationality of the monetary adjustment constraints within the EMS which 
are themselve dominated by the markets. One can speak of a lack of fundamental rationality 
according to the EMS if the market valuations of the individual member currencies are not 
sufficiently orientated to the monetary stability criterion. If currencies with a high level of 
stability ( = low inflation rate) are subject to fundamentally irrational devaluation specula-
tions of the markets,  a deflationary adjustment pressure will automatically occur for those 
countries. As a consequence the attacked countries have to carry considerable macroecono-
mic costs of inadequate policy adjustment. In times of speculative attacks, the disciplinary 
mechanism of sanctioning expansive inflation policies is turned into a mechanism producing 
inadequate monetary adjustment constraints. The adjustment mechanism then has a deflatio-
nary bias.  Thereby speculative attacks grow up to asymmetry crises  of the overall system. 
~  --~----.  7  --·~~~- -~- ~  ~- -----~ -.-·- ~- -. _,  ~  • 
The market fai.lure then consists in its insufficient performance as the  'modus oper~di' of 
the system's indirect mechanism of national monetary policy coordination. A market failure 
-..,~-- ..  ..~.-.--,~-~  - ,_  - .  -~--.. ·-"·--.. -- '"'  -· 
of this kind has been observable both before and during the currency crises and has become 
·-
one of its  most  important  reasons.  Before  the  crisis,  the  market  failure  consisted· in the 
<:;:::-··-·  ···-····  ···--·-········-···· ..  _..---------·---- ••  - ..... ....  ..  . ..•.  -,  ..  ·-· 
relaxation of the system's disciplinary constraints due to the so-called 'convergence trailing' 
..  --~- -.  . - - -~  '- _,_  ..  .  - .  -.  -
in the markets.  At  that time the markets did not force any central rate adjustment. despite 
12a further accumulating monetary convergence deficits for individual currencies. The exc~ange 
~---~-~----~- -·~-·--·~--.  -~  - -
rate illusion has led to a predominant orientation of capital investment and exchange trading 
decisions to the nominal interest rate differences. Thereby it has additionally revalued or at 
...__ ___ ~·------~--~~-----...-- ·--· ...... - ,_  -.;:,; 
least  stabilized  the exchange  rate of countries  with  a  relatively  higher inflation rate  and 
. -.- . 
correspondingly higher nominal interest rates.  The nominal interest divergences within the 
EMS were no more interpreted by the markets as representing premiums for inflation-related 
devaluation  risks,  but,  while ignoring  the exchange rate risk,  as  a  real  return  advantage 
denominated in domestic currency. The 'convergence trading' was followed by a second type 
of market failure in the course of the currency crises. The re-discovery of the exchange rate 
risk led to speculative 'undershooting' phenomenons and domino effects within and outside 
the  --~ysiem~-Thereby the market failure of the 'convergence trading' was substituted by the 
market failure of fundamentally irrational speculative attacks.  The actual overvaluation of 
individual currencies during the phase of the market's 'convergence plays' was followed by 
' 
an  speculative  'undershooting' in the course of the crises.  The market failure as  the most 
important  reason  of the  crises,  therefore,  consists  at  first  in  the  failure  of the  market--., 
determined mechanism of indirect monetary policy coordination. 
(23) System Failure: On the one hand,  in speculative attacks the EMS's exchange rate 
promise has proved to be implausible for the markets. This is true for the interest as well as 
the intervention mechanism: 
•  The  use  of interest rates to  defend  exchange  rates  against  speculative attacks  stands  under  the 
priority of the domestic economy.  It becomes implausible if the interest rates necessary for defending 
the exchange rate exceeds a level acceptable for the domestic economy.  The experience of the EMS 
crises has  proved the  limited credibility of this  instrument even  in  a short-term perspective.  In  its 
core,  the exchange rate promise of the central banks, therefore,  is  an intervention promise. 
•  But also the intervention promise obviously is 'not credible in the market's judgment. The lack of 
credibility-~~; ma:irily due 'bY  the asymmetrical design of  the intervention financing mechanism with the 
settlement olifigat1onsofthe weak currency countries aS 'its·core element.  The ·settlement obligations  . 
- -·· -------~-.-.,.,.-....  "..  ..  ..  ..  ..  - - J 
lead  tQ .a further tightening of the already existing budget restrictions. for the weak currency ·central  I 
b!~ks. Concerning the markets' judgement, the settlement obligations turn the intervention riiecha- 1 
nism  of the  EMS  into  an  'elaborated  bluff of the  central  banks'.  An  additional  reason  for  the 
implausibility of the intervention promise are the intervention's direct money base effects for the hard 
currency countries. When its sterilization capacity is exhausted, the hard currency central bank may 
face considerable restrictions in its ability to control the domestic central bank money supply and the 
13a I 
I 
short term interest rates in the money markets. In such a situation the scenario of an opting out of the 
hard currency central bank from the system's exchange rate and intervention mechanism is anticipa-
ted by the markets  and  heavily weakens  the intervention promise's credibility in the course of a 
,.  speculative attack. The lack of  protection for weak currency countries against the costs of inadequate 
monetary  policy  adjustments  as  a  consequence  of speculative  attacks  is  also  a  result  from  the 
unconditional application of the settlement rules. The one-sided monetary adjustment constraints for 
the weak currency countries triggered by the settlement ob11gai1oiiS  -bec<?riie _effective  ·~~~-~P.~~t!ve of 
the particular degree of economic rationality underlying the_speculative_attack. The system's failures 
described are a  specific  result of the EMS's set of rules.  Consequently,  they  can  be avoided  by 
appropriate modifications of the rules involved. 
V. Reform Options 
(24)  Preliminary  conditions:  For being  acceptable  for  all  member  governments  and 
-- -
central banks involved, adequate reform options have to meet certain preliminary conditions. 
These conditions can directly be derived from the original econcomic and political objectives 
of the system,  the given institutional settings and strategies of the Maastricht Treaty,  and 
from the systemical reasons of the actual EMS crisis that has led to its de facto suspension 
in August 1993. 
•. Stflbility  C~~!e_~io~: 
For hard  currency  countries  it  has  to  be  ensured  that the  systemical  adjustm,ent cons_traints  are 
?_r!~niated to._the 'standard s·et by the lowest inflation rate withi~  the system. Concerning the monetary 
stability policies, the disciplinary effect of the anchor currency mechanism may not be relaxed. 
•  Erotection against Opponunism I  (=protection against  ~inflationary infection~): 
For the stability-orientated countries precautions have to be taken protecting the1n from  oppo~nistic 
behav!~llr of less stability-orientated states within the  syst~m. An  'inflationary infection' has to be 
ruled out.  At least  in case of rational market valuations of the member  currencies  ( = absence of 
speculative attacks), the asymmetry has to remain effective. 
•  Protection against Opportunism  II {=protection against speculative attacks) 
under the prevailing conditions of economical irrational exchange speculatimis attacked currencies 
have to be sufficiently protected against inadequate monetary adjustment costs. The protection  against 
'in!J~ti~nary  -inf~~i()~~  _  fo~ -the  h~ird currency countries has to  be completed by  a_  ~9mpleroentary 
prote._~tion  ~~r ~~.weak  cur~e~cy countries against deflationary adjustment  c_onstrain~s i~ t~:  ___ ~onse-
quence of speculative attacks. 
14a (25)  Direct Coordination of Monetary  Policy:  Th~_ above analysis  has  shown  that the 
E~S  as a simple fixed rate system  has  failed  under the conditions of speculative attacks. 
The market mechanism of indirect monetary policy coordination has proved to be inefficient. 
Supplementing the EMS with a mechanism of  direct monetary policy coordination, therefore, 
---· 
is  _a  f~sible starting point for  reform . .It is,  therefore,  suggested  to  combine a  common 
policy rule for direct monetary coordination within the EMI with a conditional temporary 
suspension competency of the EMS's settlement obligations. 
•  Concerning  monetary  coordination,  the  member  states  should  ex  ante  agree  on  standards for 
national''money--supply 'or -price' level targets  according  to  the above  mentioned  proposal  of the 
Co~-ncW-of-Economic-Adv1sors. the national targets should be agreed on by mutual consent within 
-------,---- -'-~-- ~-- -~  - - -
the EMI -council of autonomous central bank governors. 
•  The monetary coordination mechanism should be supplemented by the council's competency to 
suspend the settlement obligations. However, this competency remains limited to situations of clearly 
identifiable fundamentally irrational attacks of the capital and exchange markets. The ex ante agreed 
on monetary coordination targets serve as appropiate fundamental identification criteria for speculati-
ve attacks. 
In  addition,  the  proposed  combination  of an  ex  ante  coordination  of national  monetary 
policies with a conditional suspension competency of the settlement obligations meets all of 
the  above  required  preconditions  for  a  successful  EMS  reform  during  stage  two.  The 
stability criterion is met by the monetary standard agreed on in  the voluntary monetary ex 
ante coordination of national monetary targeting. A sufficient 'protection against inflationary 
infection ' is  ensured  by  the asymmetric  intervention  mechanism  of the  'old EMS' which 
remains unmodified. 
(26) European Intervention Fund (ElF): The institutional analysis of the EMS has shown 
-
that  from  the  hard currency countries'  point of view the liquidity effects of interventions 
make the intervention promise becoming unsustainable in the course of a crisis. When their 
sterilization capacity is  exhau~ted th~ interventions lead to an  irreversible expansion. ·of the 
money base_and,  therefore,  to. a considerable loss of efficiency in controlling the domestic 
monetary aggregates.  However,  the only reason  for  this  is  the  fact  that  the central  banks 
carry out their'),nterventions via the existing central bank accounts of the banks involved. 
- ' - ~:  ..... 
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Thereby,  the  interventions  have a direct expasionary  effect on  the  national  central  bank 
money  circulation.  Intervention-caused  money  base effects could be  avoided  if the  inter-
ventions are taken out of the accounts of the central banks by transferring the execution of 
interventions in  the markets  to an  external fund  established exclusively for  that purpose. 
From the accounting point of view, the fund's enforcement of interventions would not affect 
the domestic central bank money circulation.  Shifting the interventions  'out of the central 
bank's acc~unt' i~ attrl~able by founding a European Intervention Fund  (ElF),-- for example. 
":'-~  . 
As a commonly established and managed fund, the central banks would provide the ElF with 
sufficient intervention deposits or intervention credit facilities. The ElF then establishes its  -.  .  _  .... _ 
own accounts with the banks involved in  the foreign  exchange trading,  through which all 
--
interventions  would  be carried  9ut.  Such  an  arrangement  is  sufficient  to  guarantee  that 
interventions are separated from the national central bank money circulations. The expensive 
construction of such an intervention fund exclusively for the transitional phase, however, is 
an  important  disadvantage  from  the  perspective of institutional efficiency.  A  strategy  of 
central bank interventions in the forward market which is developed in the following seems 
to be much more efficient. A foward intervention strategy allows to retain the avoidance of 
expansive  money  base  effects  without having  to  accept  the disadvantages  of institutional 
inefficiencies during the phase of transition. 
(27) Interventions in the Forward Market: Central bank interventions in the spot mar~ets 
always and automatically involve direct liquidity and  r~serve effects. That is why  !JnJ!_~ited 
spot intervention promises of the central banks are inherently implausible for the  -~~~~s. 
They are perceived as being self-defeating.  Overall it has become clear, that unlimit~ spot 
intervention promises are implausible because in the worst case of speculative tests  ~y the 
markets they cause monetary policy costs which rationally are unacceptable for any of the 
cen~~  banks invol~ed._  Therefore, spot interventions cannot be credible because they ar~ not 
susta~-'!~!?Je.  In  order  to  avoid  intervention-caused  liquidity  and  reserve  effects  an4  the 
resulting loss of credibility, an extension of the central banks' intervention policy from the 
spot to the forward market is suggested. Interventions of central banks in the forward market 
have  the  important  advantage  of avoiding  any  direct  liquidity  and  reserve  effects.  Fur-
••  ~  '  • -..,J 
thermore,  forward  interventions are not underlying a budget restriction because no  liq~id 
--~-- --spot  reserves  are  necessary.  Since  they  are  also  neutral  in  terms  of liquidity,  forward 
16a interventions compared to spot interventions are the more credible strategy from the specu-
lant's perspective to guarantee an intervention promise. Only the unlimited willingnes~ of  the 
central banks to intervene in the forward  market can prove to the markets that the central 
banl{s'iliemselves  -·believe as  much in their own exchange rate promise ~- ~ey  ex~t  the 
market  participants  to  do.  In  principle,  two  different  mechanisms  are  conceivable  for 
forward interventions in order to ensure the exchange rates it the spot market: 
•  In the off-balance-sheet variant of a speculative attack, the central banks directly take the counter 
position of speculative foward  sales of $e attacked currency by intervening in the foward markelS. 
With that, the transmittance of the speculative forward sales into the spot market is interrupted. The 
central banks avoid the necessity of corresponding spot interventions which would inevitably-become 
neces;a..y  in c'ase of a speculative free  market foward  sale of the attacked currency that afterwards 
has to-tie-covered by the contracting bank and thereby is transmitted in the spot market. 
•  On-balance-sheet  attacks  are  carrieq out directly by  sales  of the  attacked  currency  in  the  spot 
J  •  ~  ~ "'  - .,._  ~  ~  - _,  • 
~~!~-~t_; h?~ever! th_ey  ~_a_n be kept off just as off-balanc_e-sheet attacks by interventions of the central 
banks in the forward market.  Whenever a currency is under pressure in the spot market, the central 
banks  ca~ ~tabiii~~-~~- sp~~-~at~ by taking a long position in the forward market.  As a resul~ of this, 
the  contracting bank  is  facing  a foward  risk which  routinely has  to  be offset.  Thereby the central 
bank's forward  intervention is transmitted into the spot market. 
Forward interventions, therefore, are the suitable strategy for the EMS to protect a de facto 
monetary  union of the  core countries  which are already  today in a  position  to  meet the 
necessary convergence criteria as agreed preconditions for entering the final stage of EMU. 
However, to establish a de facto monetary union it would be neither necessary nor useful to 
abandon the fluctuation margins. It is sufficient to ultimately fix the central rates. Therefore,· 
the old margins of +/-2,25% should be re-established while at the same time the exchange 
rate  adjustment  reservations  with  regard  to  the central  rate and  the  corresponding  inter-
vention limits are irrevocably given up.  Maintaining the fluctuation margins around the for 
ever fixed central rates facilitates a sensible installation of a forward intervention promise. 
In addition, the margins will help to guarantee a sufficiently liquid· spot market as well as a 
certain  flexibility  for  national  interest  rate  policy.  The  asymmetrical  spot  intervention  \  <  m~hanism of the  'old  EMS'  is  sup.plemented  by unlimited  and  symmetrically desi&ned  _-. 
forward intervention obligations of the central banks involved. 
17a In an  arrangement like this the credibility of the fluctuation  margins is guaranteed by the 
unlimited  forward  intervention  promises.  In  principle,  the  development  of the  spot  rate 
within  the  margin  remains  market-determined;  however,  it  may  be  influenced  by  spot 
interventions and interest rate adjustments of the central banks. The asymmetrically designed 
spot market intervention mechanism should be kept unchanged because it is domesticated by 
the foward  interventions. 
Therefore, it can serve as 
a  suitable  mechanism  of 
coordinating and discipli-
ning national interest rate 
policies.  Whenever  a 
currency is under pressu-
re  in  the  spot  markets, 
the central banks concer-
ned are at first obliged to 
support  it by  intervening 
in the spot markets.  Only 
Graphic I:  Interaction of Interest Rate  and Intervention 
Policy in Fixed Rate Systems with Forward Interventions 
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if the liquidity and reserve effects due to the spot interventions are becoming unsustainable, 
the central banks will start to support their spot intervention policy by interest rate measures. 
With credible margins, the establishment of a modest inter currency interest rate difference 
will  prove  to  be  sufficient  to  arouse  interest  arbitrage  orientated  capital  movements  and 
thereby assure the desired stabilization of the spot rate.  In the course of a speculative attack, 
with a foward intervention obligation the central banks are able to refrain from an excessive 
use of the interest instrument by allowing the forward rate falling down to the lower inter-
vention point and then absorbing the speculative attack by unlimited forward interventions. 
In addition, the central banks may  stimulate the spot supply of hard currency necessary for 
stabilizing the spot rate by  so-called aggressive forward  interventions.  The resulting cover 
and arbitrage reactions of the markets  will then  transfer the foward  supply of the attacked 
currency  into  a  spot  supply.  Even  in  the  worst  case  of a  speculative  attack,  therefore, 
unsustainable  liquidity  and  reserve  effects  can  be  avoided.  The  liquidity  effects  remain 
limited to  the broader level of the non-bank liquidity; a direct influence on  the  monetary 
base is  shut out.  In  the course of a  speculative attack the central  banks do  not face  any 
18a (4) 
constraints to give in to the markets' pressure by realigning the exchange rate in the end. 
Forward intervention strategies to guarantee exchange rate margins around ultimately fixed 
central rates, therefore, prove to be sustainable even in the worst case scenario of a specula-
tive attack. Anyway, those attacks become unlikely because, due to the forward intervention 
mechanism,  the markets'  arbitrage is  stabilizing the central bank's exchange rate promise 
instead of destabilizing it as it was likely for the spot intervention promise of the 'old EMS'. 
For speculants  to  wait  and  see  during  a  speculative  attack  is  inevitably  associated  with 
current financing costs whereas for the central banks - again in contrast to spot interventions 
- no costs in terms of unsustainable liquidity and reserve effects arise which in the end could 
force them to opt out.  From the speculant' s perspective,  no rational incentives remains to 
speculatively test the central bank's exchange rate promise because even unlimited foward 
interventions are riskless and,  therefore, sustainable for the central banks:  "The authorities 
need only keep their nerves. " 
(28) Suspension of the Settlement Rules:  Consequently, the suspension of the settlement 
obligations seems to be a suitable reform option. Suspending or even revoking the settlement 
rules  while at  the  same  time  maintaining  the other parts the  system's institutional  setting 
including  the financing  rules,  would lead  to  an  unlimited obligation for  the hard currency 
central banks to  finance  both,  the own  as  well  as  the weak  currency~s spot interventions. 
Such a mechanism of intervention financing  would be credible for the markets because the 
hard currency central bank is  the only institution which is able to create the hard currency 
intervention  reserves  in  an  unlimited  amount.  This  credibility  gain  of the  intervention 
promise,  however,  is  overcompensated  by  decisive  disadvantages  of an  unconditioned 
suspension of the settlement rules: 
•  The precondition of monetary  stability  could be violated because the  asymmetrical  adjustment 
constraints for the weak currency which is rational in the case of diverging inflation rates would be 
dropped.  An  unconditioned suspension of the settlement rules  would,  therefore,  excuse the weak 
currency countries from monetary policy adjustments even if they prove to be necessary for preser-
ving the monetary stability of the overall system. 
•  From the hard currency countries' perspective, an unconditioned revocation of the settlement rules 
would also violate the criterion of a sufficient protection against opponunistic behaviour of curren-
cies with higher inflation rates.  Following an expansive monetary policy and financing the resulting 
19a balance of payments deficits by obligatory interventions of the hard currency countries would be an 
example for  opportunistic behaviour of weak  currency countries.  As  a consequence of the  inter-
vention financing  the hard currency countries have to  face  the  risk of an  inflationary  adjustment 
deriving from the interventions' liquidity effects if those exceed their sterilisation capacity. 
Who  nevertheless  seeks  to  establish  a vital  protection  against  fundamentally  inadequate 
adjustment constraints,  a conditioned suspension  competency of  the  settlement obligations 
should  be  considered.  To  minimize  the  risks  of opportunistic  behaviour  the  suspension 
cometency could be assigned to the EMI and tied to the precondition of a prior autonomiza-
tion of the national central banks according to the institutional requirements laid down in the 
Maastricht  Treaty.  For defining  the  conditions  that have  to  be  fulfilled  for  activating  the 
suspension competency certain rules for a direct coordination of national monetary policies 
are necessary. Overall it has been demonstrated that a temporary and conditioned suspension 
of the settlement obligations is sufficient to make the system's intervention promise credible 
for the  markets.  In order to  meet all of the above required preconditions for  a successful 
EMS reform,  however,  the merits of a suspension competency depends on a corresponding 
efficient  mechanism  for  direct  monetary  policy  coordination.  Therefore,  this  proposal  is 
clearly inferior to the forward intervention strategy. With forward interventions the monetary 
coordination mechanism would remain market determined, while at the same time inadequate 
adjustment  constraints  in  case  of speculative  attacks  are  eleminated.  With  foward  inter-
ventions the establishment of a mechanism for direct monetary policy coordination during 
the  phase  of transition  as  it has  proved  to  be  necessary  for  reforming  the  system  by  in-
troducing a suspension competency could be avoided. 
(29)  Exchange  Rate Management Competency of the  Central  Banks:  Transferring  the 
exchange rate management competency  within the  EMS  to  the central  banks  would be an 
important contribution for objectifying the existing rules of the system.  The exchange rate 
adjustment mechanism could then be used more efficiently as an additional instrument of a 
direct monetary policy coordination than it was allowed for with the political exchange rate 
competency of the governments within the 'old EMS'. A credible and consistent use of the 
interest rate, intervention, and exchange rate adjustment instruments within the EMS would 
be guaranteed.  The protection against opportunistic behaviour of individual governments is 
considerably improved. From the more political point of view, this should also increase the 
20a central banks'  willingness to enhance the cooperation of national  monetary policies.  Any-
way,  for the system as a whole a considerable credibility gain is to be expected.  To avoid 
political disadvantages in terms of the Maastricht integration schedule shifting the exchange 
rate management competency to the central banks has to be limited to the ali-day manage-
ment  of central  rate  adjustments  within  the  system.  The  basic  institutional  government 
competency  of modifying  the  exchange  rate  regime  in  general  would  not  be  affected. 
Deciding  the  if,  when  and  how  of the  member  states'  return  to  the  normal  fluctuation 
margins as well as the final decision of entering the third stage remains an exclusive domain 
of national government's and parliament's involved. The suggested split of the exchange rate 
competency  (regime  competency  of the  governments  and management  competency  of the 
central  banks)  fulfils  both  the  political  integration objective of the governments  and  the 
monetary stability objectives of the central banks. The pace of monetary integration would 
still be determined politically; however,  with a divided exchange competency it would not 
be necessary  to  give  up  the  advantages  of a rate  management competency of the central 
banks. 
VI.  A Strategy for Stage Two 
(30) The following suggests a reform strategy for the European Monetary System (EMS) 
in the course of the second stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EEMU). 
Based  on  the  integration  schedule  and  procedure of the  Maastricht Treaty,  the  proposals 
facilitate  a criteria-orientated  transition  to  the  third  and  final  stage by  1999  at  the latest. 
First,  the  establishment  of a  monetary  autonomy  standard  for  Europe  is  suggested  by 
improving and strenghening the institutional framework of the European Monetary Institute 
(EMI). The autonomy standard of the EMI should be orientated to the criterion of institutio-
nal  convergence  of the  central  banks  involved  according  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  The 
monetary  autonomy  standard  will  be  supplemented  by  a  two-track  EMS.  For the  core 
countries a de facto  monetary union  can be established by  ultimately fixing  the fluctuation 
margins.  The core countries of the de facto monetary union remain tied to the countries of 
the periphery through a modified exchange rate mechanism which is considerably strengthe-
21a ned compared to the  'old EMS'.  As an  institutional link between the monetary autonomy 
standard and the two-tier European Monetary System the exchange rate management compe-
tency of the central banks is also transferred to the EMI. 
(31) Eurqpean Autonomy Standard: For our purposes it is suggested that the monetary 
autonomization of the national central banks according to the institutional standard of the 
ESCB is realized already at the beginning of stage two.  As a 'Club of Autonomous Central 
Bank  Governors',  the  EMI  would  be a  credible  forerunner  of the  ESCB.  A  european 
autonomy standard would be established. Concerning the exchange rate policy, the autonomy 
standard is  supplemented by  the exchange rate  management competency  within the  'new 
EMS' transferred to the EMI.  Defending the exchange rates in  the markets,  the EMI then 
could autonomously decide on a suitable combination of the interest rate, intervention, and 
exchange rate adjustment instruments. In order to create sufficient incentives for the national 
governments to give up the exchange rate management competency within the 'new EMS', 
its transference to the EMI, as the prior autonomization of the central banks, should become 
a precondition for the participation in one of the two institutional arrangements of the new 
two-track EMS. 
(32)  A  Two-Track  European  Monetary  System  for  the  Transitional  Stage  Towards 
Monetary Union: The integration strategy laid down in the Maastricht Treaty already implies 
a multi-track Europe for the further monetary integration on its way to monetary union. The 
strategy of a  criteria-orientated transition to the third stage inevitably determines a multi-
speed  transition  for  the  individual  countries.  In  this  respect  the  following  proposal  of a 
two-track EMS  for the course of stage two is in accordance with the scheduled multi-track 
strategy for the transition to the third stage.  The necessity of a two-track EMS is  mainly a 
consequence  from  the  still  existing  economic  convergence  deficits  in  terms  of monetary 
stability  pOlicy  for c-some  of the  member  states.  Besides  the  precondition  of institutional 
convergence with regard to the autonomy standard, the actually realized level of mo~etary 
stability should serve as  the criterion for joining the de facto monetary union of the core 
countries.  For participating in the modified exchange  rate  mechanism  of the peripheral 
.  --
countries the institutional precondition of the european autonomy standard would be suffi-
cient. 
22a (33)  De Facto Monetary  Union of the Core Countries:  In order to create a de facto 
monetary union of the core-countries it iS' not necessary that the states involved abolish the 
fluctuation  margins around the fixed  central rates.  It is sufficient to return to the narrow 
margins of the  'old EMS'.  These margins and the corresponding central rates,  however, 
-------~~~-~~ ~--- -- ~-
have to be ultimately fixed.  For a credible and sustainable intervention promise to protect 
the  d~.f~~9_!!1Q~~!MY union's ;~~h~ge--rates--in 'the--markeis --ihe" otherWise unchanged rule 
system  of the  old  EMS  has  to  be supplemented  by  a  symmetrical,  unconditioned,  and 
unlimited  intervention  obligation of the  central  banks  in  the  forward  market.  The spot 
~---- --
intervention obligations of the  'old EMS' are not to be abolished but only completed by 
obligatory forward interventions. While maintaining the existing spot intervention rules, the 
interventiori obligation in the forward markets has two different effects.  It provides for an 
~----- -----
efficiet:tt mechanism for monetary policy coordination within the de facto monetary union as 
for  a  credible  intervention  mechanism  to  protect  the  exchange  rates  against  speculative 
attacks: 
•  The latter is ensured because a forward intervention promise is  sustainable for the central banks 
and, therefore; is credible for the markets. The unlimited interventions of  tile central banks.necessary 
to- <li:scourage a -specufative- attack are··ctefused  in terms of direct expansive liquidity effects.  In the 
course of an attack, however, the speculaiits inevitably suffer exchange losses of an amount equal to 
the intramarginal inter currency interest rate differences as  indicated in the swap rates. 
•  The necessary  interest rate coordination within the de facto  monetary  union is  ensured  by the 
certain combination of spot and foward interventions. The remaining asymmetry for financing spot 
interventions,  forces  the  weak  currency  countries to  activate the symmetrically designed forward 
intervention mechanism  by  establishing an  intramarginal  inter currency  interest rate difference  in 
favour of the weak currency. The interest rate coordination mechanism, therefore, would essentially 
remain  market-determined.  However,  the risk of inadequate monetary  adjustment constraints as  a 
consequence of fundamental! y  irrational  attacks  is  reduced  to  the  establishment of intramarginal 
interest rate differences to activate the foward intervention mechanism. 
The here suggested reform meets all criteria and preconditions required in this paper for the 
implementation of a stability-orientated fixed rate system.  The transition from the de facto 
monetary  union  as  a  'core EMS'  to  the  third  stage of monetary  union  could  take place 
according to the procedure and timetable laid down in the Maastricht Treaty by 1999 at the 
latest. 
23a (34) Modified Exchan&e Rate Mechanism with the Periphery: Those countries not yet 
able to meet the preconditions of monetary stability according to the ex ante agreed inflation 
standard should be tied to the core countries' de facto union by reestablishing the exchange 
rate mechanism of the 'old EMS' in an improved and strengthened version. The institutional 
convergence of the monetary autonomy standard,including the exchange rate management 
competency of the central banks  within the rate mechanism,  is  the only precondition for 
participating in this modified exchange rate mechanism of the periphery. For countries which 
meet the citerion of institutional convergence,  the exchange rate  mechanism of the EMS 
should be re-established within the normal fluctuation margins of +/-2,25%. In order to find 
a convincing response to the far-reaching -loss  of credibility which the 'old EMS' suffered 
from the 1992/93 crisis, it is  suggested to strengthen the intervention rules by introducing 
a case-by-case suspension competency of  the settlement obligations. For reasons of institutio-
nal efficiency, the suspension competency should also be assigned to the EMI and should be 
decided by mutual consent of the central banks involved. 
(35) Final Remarks: With the extended fluctuation margins of +/-15% the convergence 
criteria of the Maastricht Treaty have proved to be prohibitive for further progress towards 
the European Monetary Union.  Therefore, in order to establish a monetary union by  1999 
at the latest an additional reform strategy outside the EEC-Treaty is necessary to re-establish 
the EMS. A 'new EMS' proves to be a precondition for the transition to the third stage. The 
above suggested reform has the advantage to facilitate such a reform outside the EEC-Treaty 
without contravening  its  principles  or requiring  any  modifications.  It meets  each of the 
required preconditions for a stability-orientated fixed  rate system.  In terms of a successful 
european integration policy, the rationality of realizing the European Monetary Union before 
the turn of the century is  met,  as  is  the central bank's rationality of preserving and even 
strengthen monetary stability. The proposal, therefore, proves to be the result of a rationality 
mix  which  is  suitable to bring back the process of european  monetary integration on  the 
track of the Maastricht Treaty. 
24a Introduction 
Fixed rate systems are institutions with economic benefits (or damages) determined by 
their inherent economic mechanics,  the so-called  "rules of  the game "
1
• 
In a fixed rate system, the 'rules of the game' are the result of the system's institutional 
design interacting with the prevailing conditions of the capital and foreign exchange markets. 
The market conditions can be described as the relevant environment of a fixed rate system. 
According  to  Mundell's  terminology,  a  fixed  rate  system's  set  of rules  is  to  its  market 
conditions  "like a constitution (  ...  ) to  a political or electoral  system "
2
•  The market condi-
tions prove to be the  ~modus  operandi~ of the rule system. 
Currency crises as  specific malfunctions of a fixed  rate system are,  like the systems' 
functioning, the result of its institutional design under given market conditions. Therefore, 
analysing currency crises and reform considerations to avoid them, also has to be orientated 
to the system's set of rules and its market conditions. 
The European Monetary System (EMS) is an institutionalized fixed rate system. Its rule 
system was established in  1978/79 by contractual agreements between the governments and 
central banks involved.  Except for a few  modifications by the Basle/Nyborg-Agreement in 
1987,  the  initial  set  of rules  has  remained  unchanged.  The extension of the bilateral ex-
change rate bands to  +I- 15%  as a consequence of the currency crisis of July 1993, howe-
ver,  comes  close  to  a  de  facto  suspension  of the  systems'  rules.  It  also  fundamentally 
questions the way towards European Monetary Union scheduled in the Maastricht Treaty. 
1
)  The term is  originally attributed to J.M.  Keynes.  In his  "Economic Consequences of Mr.  Churchill" 
(1925, p.220) Keynes describes the monetary adjustment measures of the Bank of England as "rules of the gold 
standard game";  see for corresponding references  Bloomfield (1959, p.47) and Eichengreen (1985,p.l4) and 
for systematically using the term to describe the economic mechanics of historic fixed rate systems McKinnon 
(1993). 
1
)  Mudell  ( 1972,  p. 92).  Similiarly,  he  distinguishes between currency  system and  currency  order:" An 
order, as distinct from a system, represents the framework and setting in which the system operates"; ibid,p.92. This report,  therefore,  is  to develope reform strategies  for  the EMS  in  order to  re--
establish its functioning during stage two of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EEMU), which- on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty- is a prerequisite for the transition 
to the third stage by  1999 at the latest. 
The current state of european monetary integration described in chapter I of the report 
is used as  starting point and given condition for reforming the EMS.  The second  stage's 
institutional  settings are considered,  as  are the regulations about  liberalizing capital  and 
exchange markets and other constituent principles of the Maastricht Treaty.  It is assumed 
that  the  objectives  and  strategies  of integration  agreed  on  in  Maastricht  are  given.  All 
examined reform options, therefore, refer to additional measures not concerning the Union 
Treaty. These options can be passed and implemented by the governments and central banks 
involved without the necessity of modifying the treaty. 
Chapter II works out the theoretical background for deducting various reform options. 
A general institutional setting for fixed rate systems is introduced and the various institutio-
nal  design  options  are  developed  in  detail.  The  functioning  of a  fixed  rate  systems  is 
explained by the interaction of its rule system with the conditions of the capital and exchange 
markets.  Currency crises as specific malfunctions of a fixed rate system are also interpreted 
as  a necessary result of the system's rules and market conditions.  Thereby, the theoretical 
patterns developed also become available for the analysis of  reasons for those crises (chapter 
IV) and for corresponding reform considerations to avoid them (chapters V and VI). 
However,  chapter  Ill first  describes  the  institutional  arrangement  of the  EMS  as  a 
specification of the general framework. Its functioning is explained by the interaction of the 
systems'rules which asymmetrically burden weak-currency countries and the conditions of 
initially  still  regulated,  but  since  the  late  1980s  more  and  more  liberalized  capital  and 
exchange  markets.  First,  the  systemically determined  liquidity and  reserve  effects of the 
EMS's intervention  and  credit  mechanism  are  derived  to  find  out  the  systems'  relevant 
symmetry  characteristics.  The  formally  symmetrical  constructed  intervention  rules  are 
dominated by one-sided asymmetrical reserve effects for the weak currency countries as  a 
result  of the  intervention  financing  and  settlement  mechanism.  The  part  of Mundell's 
2 (5) 
'electoral system' has been assigned to the markets. The markets alone determine whether 
a participating currency is  regarded as  being  weak or strong according to the rules.  The 
monetary  adjustment constraints,  which  asymmetrically  burden weak currency countries, 
then  result  from  the  liquidity  and  reserve  effects  of the  intervention.  These  effects  are 
triggered by the markets but the general structure setting out the burden sharing between 
hard  and  weak currencies  is  systemically  determined  by  the  specific  construction of the 
relevant rules. 
On the basis of a systematic understanding of the EMS, chapter IV  analyzes also its mal-
functions.  The reasons  for  the currency  crises of 1992/93 are analyzed  as  being  mainly 
system-inherent consequences of the EMS's 'rules of the game'. With the liberalization of 
capital  and  exchange  markets  the· system's  functioning  and  stability  became even  more 
dependent on the market conditions than it used to be during the eighties. With the liberali-
zation the rules' credibility for the markets became an indispensible condition for the EMS 
to exist.  The political failure to  make the EMS  fit for the fundamentally changing market 
conditions by  adequatly adjusting  its  rules  is  recognized  as  a principal reason  for  the in-
creasing system-inherent instability of the EMS, as well as the changed political handling of 
existing rules. Fundamentally irrational capital and exchange market speculations initially led 
to  a  'false' stabilization of fundamentally  more and  more inadequate exchange rates  until 
mid-1992 (='convergence trading'). Then,  during the currency crises since fall  1992,  the 
speculants  forced  the  de  facto  suspension  of the  EMS.  In  its  essence  the  crisis  can  be 
described as a speculative asymmetry crisis of the specific fixed rate institution EMS. 
With reference to the general institutional framework chapter V develops and evaluates 
different reform options to re-establish the EMS  during the phase of transition to European 
Monetary Union. A high degree of monetary stability within the system, the protection from 
inflationary influences from other member states, and a sufficient protection from inadequate 
monetary  adjustment  constraints  are  derived  as  indispensible  criteria  for  feasible  reform 
strategies  and  are  used  as  strict  preconditions  for  the  following  considerations.  Then, 
appropriate modifications of the EMS's set of rules are developed and analyzed with regard 
to the objective of restoring credible rules for the markets. 
3 Out of this pool of feasible reform options a detailed reform strategy is formulated  in 
chapter VI.  Besides re-establishing a 'new EMS' that might work even under the conditions 
of fully liberalized capital and exchange markets, the proposed reform strategy proves to be_ 
suitable for the transition to the third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
In its core it proposes the implementation of a European Autonomy Standard for monetary 
policy with the beginning of the second  stage.  The autonomy standard is supplemented by 
a two-track European Monetary System with a de facto Monetary Union of the core countries 
and a modified exchange rate mechanism for the periphery. Thereby,  the obstruction of the 
Maastricht Treaty within the extended exchange rate margins is removed and the scheduled 
transition mechanism is re-established without modifying the convergence-orientated moneta-
ry stability criteria stipulated in the Treaty. 
4 I. Current State of European Monetary Integration 
The European Community has entered the second stage of the Economic and Monetary 
Union. This stage, which has started January 1,  1994, is a preparatory phase for the transi-
tion to the third. With the establishment of a European Central Bank and the introduction of 
a common european currency the third is the final stage of european monetary integration 
process. 
With the beginning of the second stage the European Monetary Institute (EMI) has been 
founded.  The EMI  in  an  institutionalized  form  replaces  the  Committee of Central  Bank 
Presidents which is disbanded with the beginning of stage two. The main responsibilities of 
the  EMI  are  the  coordination  of the  member  states'  monetary  policies,  the  control  and 
management of the European Monetary System, and the necessary technical and organizatio-
nal preparations for entering the final stage. The decisive characteristic of the second stage 
as being a preparatory instead of a training phase results from  the contractual requirement 
that during the phase of transition the monetary policy competency remains completely on 
the national level of the individual member countries: 
"The EMI shall  carry out the tasks and functions  conferred upon it by this Treaty and this Statue 
without prejudice to the responsibilitiy of the competent authorities for the conduct of the monetary 
policy within respective Member States . " (Art. 3.1; Protocol on the Statue of the European Moneta-
ry Institute; Treaty on European Union) 
The Maastricht Treaty, therefore, has abstained from an institutionalized learning process 
in the course of a training phase for the future European Central Bank (ECB). 
Besides  the  preparatory  works  for  the  third  stage,  the  institutional  upgrading  of the 
Committee of Govemors
3  nevertheless explicit!  y schedules a "strengthening (of;  R. V.) the 
coordination of monetary policies with a view to ensuring price stability"  (Art.  2)  already 
3)  The ~iiUnstitutional  innovations compared to the status quo of the Committee of Governors are that the 
Co~,it_of  the EMI is headed by a "full-time" president who is not at the same time a governor of one of the 
national central banks ittvol,ved (art.  9).-__ The members of the Council act on their own responsibility and are not 
allowed to obtain or accept anr directions from agencies or institutions of the Community or from the member 
states' governments (art.8). 
5 for the course of the transitional phase. Concerning the EMS it is stipulated that, besides its 
control and management through the takeover of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(EMCF),  the  EMI  may  present  the governments council  statements  or recommendations 
concerning measures  "which might affect the internal or external monetary situation in the 
Community and, in particular, the functioning of the EMS." (Art. 5.1). 
Provided that measures of direct monetary policy coordination or modifications of the 
EMS's rule system prove to be necessary for a successful transition to the third stage,  the 
Union  Treaty  predetermines  and  entitles  the  EMI for  its conceptual preparation  and  im-
plementation. 
The beginning of the final stage is supposed to be determined in the course of stage two. 
If it is not agree<(by  .. the-eiid-o£'1997,  the third'and final  stage  wills~  .J~~a:ry-1~, 1999. 
The European Council in the composition of the heads of state ro government has to decide 
---.'  -- --~ 
by a qualified majority which countries fulfil the necessary conditions for entering  _tb~.third 
stage. The qualifying standard for participating is whether the individual member states meet 
the convergence criteria specified  in  the  treaty.  For the  design  of the  national  monetary 
policies during the second stage it is of exceptional (but normally understated) importance, 
that,  besides  the  four  macroeconomic  convergence  criteria,  the  treaty  requires  as  an 
additional  institutional  convergence  criterion  the  adjustment of the  national  central  bank 
legislation to the statutes of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) in the course of 
stage two: 
"Each Member State shall ensure, at the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB, that its 
, _ -· national legislation including the statues of its national central bank is compatible with this Treaty and 
the Statue of the ESCB."  (Art.  108, Treaty on European Union) 
" During the second stage, each Member State shall, as appropriate, start the process leading to the 
_./  independence of its central bank, in accordance with Art.  108." 
\_,-·  (Art.  109e.5, Treaty on European Union) 
Sine~  -~h~~ criterion essentially demands the timely establishment of the national central 
bank's institutional convergence with the future ESCB's a~tQ_QQUl~Lstandard specified in the 
treaty, it will subsequently be called  ~autonomy  criterion~. 
6 In order to enter the final stage, the third macroeconomic convergence criterion re-
quires a country to  keep its currency within the normal band in  the EMS's exchange rate 
mechanism  for  at  least  the  last  two  years  before  without a  devaluation  against  another 
member  curren~y: 
"The criterion on participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System 
(  ...  ) shall mean that a Member State has  respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by 
the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least 
the last two years before the examination.  In particular, the Member State shall not have devalued  ../ 
its currency's bilateral central rate against any other Member State's currency on its own initiative 
for the same period."  (Art.  3;  Protocol on the Convergence Criteria Referred to in Article 109j of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community) 
By respective EMS agreements the normal band is defined as a bilateral fluctuation margin 
of .f-/-2-,'25%4• The transition to the extended bands of +/-15% on August 1,  1993,  the~efo-
"  ~  ~  . 
re, is clearly contrary to the exchange rate criterion of the Maastricht Treaty. As long as a 
member state does not at least return to the normal band, it will be barred from entering the 
third stage5• 
The de  facto  suspension  of the  EMS  proves  to  a criteria- and,  therefore,  a contract 
inherent obstruction for the transition to the third stage. Returning to the normal band of the 
EMS  becomes a necessary  precondition for  further progress  of the  Maastricht integration 
strategy.  Hence it follows  that the second  stage's main  focus  should be to  re-establish the 
EMS's exchange rate mechanism. 
4
)  See the Agreement of March 13, 1979 between the Central Banks of the Member States of the European 
Economic  Community stipulating the  operating procedures  for  the  European Monetary System;  printed in: 
Texts concerning the European Monetary System (l985,p.25-40). The introduction of the agreement says:"Wh-
ereas under the terms of the said Resolution (of the European Council of December 5,1978 on the establish-
ment of a  European  Monetary  System;  R.V.)(  ...  ) fluctuation  margins of 2.25%  will be fixed around these 
bilateral central rates, although Member States not at present participating in the narrower margins mechanism 
may in the initial stage of the European Monetary System opt for wider margins of up to 6 per cent" ;ibid p.24. 
5)  The argument not only derives  from the  legal position cited above but also  from the economical and 
political dimension of the  'de facto  floating•  within the extended bands.  Sooner or later necessarily occuring 
exchange rate fluctuations within the 30%  margin will politically be interpreted as a proof for still insufficient 
convergence; the transition to stage three then becomes dependent on the exchange rate stability in the markets 
and  is  entirely subject to the  •dictate•  of fundamentally  irrational capital and exchange speculation.  A direct 
transition from the 'de facto floating• to the final  stage will prove to be impossible. Therefore, the return to a 
reformed and for  market participants credible EMS becomes a necessary economic and political precondition 
for  further progress toward European Monetary Union. 
7 
/ To avoid further modifications of the Union Treaty, which would need to be ratified by 
the national parliaments, the EMS reform should be implemented by using the EMI procedu-
res  and  competencies without modifying  the Treaty.  The way  of reforming  the EMS  by 
means of agreements between the governments and central banks involved is in accordance 
with  the foundation  as  well  as  the further institutional adjustments the EMS  since it was 
implemented in 1978/79. Its institutional core is based on agreements between the participa-
ting  central banks which are not part of the EEC  Treaty.  Thereby a transfer of monetary 
competencies  of the  individual  member  states  to  community  institutions  can  be avoided 
without endangering the reform essentials.  The second stage is merely extended and effi-
. ciently  used.  However,  its  character  as  a  preparatory  phase  with  furthermore  national 
monetary policy competencies remains unchanged.  Thereby, from  the central banks' point 
of view,  an  essential policy condition for supporting an  EMS  reform initiative is  already 
fulfilled. 
8 D. Fixed Rate Systems: A General Institutional Framework 
"The choice in economic policy is a choice of institutions". 
(Coase 1984, p. 230) 
The design of institutionalized fixed rate systems has essentially remained an exclusive 
issue  of practical  policy.  Only  recently  it has  become a subject of systematic  theoretical 
analysis
6
• 
Likewise the EMS is an exclusive result of policy initiatives without any worth mentio-
ning  theoretical  assistance 
7
•  Only  in  recent  years  some  theoretic  work  in  institutional 
analysis of fixed rate systems has been done.  With an improved understanding of the gold 
standard  and  the  historic  experience  with  the  Bretton  Woods  System  and  the  EMS,  the 
essentials for a systematic analysis of institutionalized exchange rate systems can be deri-
ved8.  Chapter II works out these essentials in a general framework for institutional analysis 
of fixed rate systems. The following chapters then apply the general framework to the EMS 
and deduct a systematic and theoretically sound analysis of various reform options. 
2.1 Defmitions 
Rules  and  rule  structures  are important elements of economic institutions.  Fixed rate 
systems  are  institutions  which  - as  a  politically intended  and  established  rule  system  in 
interaction with its relevant envrionment- produces certain economic results.  The relevant 
6
)  An exception  is  of course J. M.  Keynes  who  fundamentally  contributed to  the design of the world 
monetary order of the post war era with his theoretically motivated preparatory work during the Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1943/44; see Keynes (1943/69;1980,Bd.XXV +XXVI). 
7
)  "To tell the truth we have to admit,  that the politicians alone deserve the merits of the (EMS-; R.V.) 
success-story. None of the academic economists bas guarded the cradle of the EMS and when it was christened 
most  of them  have  been  critics.  Today  they  lead  the  procession  against  the  European Monetary  Union." 
Sievert,  Olaf;  Money  that  can  not  be  self-created,  in:  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung  of September 
26, 1992,p.13 (translated by R.V.). For the foundation and history of the EMS see Ludlow (1982) and from the 
perspective of the German Bundesbank Emminger (1986,p.356-372). 
8
)  See Bofinger (1987;  1989;  1991), Bofinger/Gerberding (1988) and McKinnon (1993) which contains a 
comprehensive  and  current  survey  of the  relevant  literature.  For similar  attempts  see  Hasse  (1984)  and 
Miller/Eichengreen/Portes (1989). The terminology used in this study essentially follows Bofinger (1991). 
9 environment-of fixed rate systems is mainly determined by the conditions of the capital and 
exchange markets.  Markets are also part of the economic institutional system.  A fixed rate 
system's  rule  structure  and  its  market  conditionS'  thus  prove  to  be  a  suitable  object  of 
institutional analysis: 
"If rules influence outcomes and if some outcomes are better than others it follows that to that extent 
that rules can be chosen the study and analysis of comparative rules and institutions become proper 
objects of our attention"  (Brennan/Buchanan (1987), p.XI) 
According to this basic ideas, chapter II developes a general institutional framework for 
fixed  rate  systems  and  their market conditions.  In  chapters  III and IV  this  framework  is 
applied  to  the  EMS's problems  in  question.  From  the  resulting  pool  of reform  options 
(chapter V) a suitable institutional reform strategy for the EMS  is proposed in chapter VI. 
2.2. Basic Institutional Structure 
The  set  of rules  of a fixed  rate  system  is  essential! y a  mechanism  for  allocating  its 
inherent  monetary  adjustment  constraints.  These  adjustment  constraints  are  triggered  by 
market transactions. However, the intensity and direction of the market transactions' impact 
is essentially determined by the specific design of the rules.  The rule structure can be 
classified and described in  five 
different  categories  of  rules. 
Besides the monetary coordina-
tion  mechanism,  these  catego-
ries  contain  the  intervention 
rules,  the financing mechanism 
(consisting  of settlement  rules 
and credit facilities),  the reser-
ve rules, and the exchange rate 
adjustment mechanism (s.fig.l) 
Flgurv 1: Rule Component• of a Flxad Rate Syatem 
~  Rule  Components of a Fixed Rate System Jt-
Monetary  Financing  r-- - Coordination  Mechanisms 
Mechanism  I  Credit Facllltlee  I 
"---1 
Intervention  I 
Settlement 
I  Rules  Rule• 
-
Exchange Rate 
Adjustment  Reserve Rules  -
Mechanism 
Together  with  the  financing  mechanisms  and  the  reserve  rules,  the  intervention  rules 
constitute  the  core  of a  fixed  rate  system.  It determines  the  allocation  and  intensity  of 
liquidity  and  reserve  effects  caused  by  interventions.  The  system's  inherent  monetary 
adjustment  constraints  are  essentially  resulting  from  these  effects.  Another  constituent 
10 (6) 
element is  the exchange rate adjustment  mechanism.  In  contrast  to  a de facto  monetary 
union, fixed rate systems explicitly preserve the option of regular central rate adjustments. 
Thereby member states can evade policy adjustment constraints by case to case adjustments 
of their exchange rates. 
The allocation of monetary adjustment burdens among the participating member curren-
cies is described by the system's symmetry characteristics. A fixed rate system of uncovered 
paper currencies can either be designed asymmetrically burdening hard currency countries 
(='weak currency standard') or asymmetrically burdening weak currency countries(= 'hard 
currency standard') or symmetrical ( = 'compromise standard'). The symmetry characteristics 
determine the system's internal monetary stability standard
9
• In the following, the symmetry 
term is used on different system lev.els; however, the symmetry characteristics of the overall 
system  result  only  from  the  interaction  of the  specific  symmetry  characteristics  of its 
individual rule components. The dominant rule determines the overall result. 
The symmetry characteristics of the inherent liquidity and reserve effects are resulting 
from the interaction of the several individual rule components. These rule-determined effects 
can be modified by the relative size of the member states concerning their foreign exchange 
reserves and monetary sterilization capacity. Activated by free market transactions evaluating 
the  various  member  currencies,  the  resulting  systemic  liquidity  and  reserve  effects  then 
determine  the  actually  effective  monetary  adjustment  constraints  and  thereby  define  the 
symmetry characteristics of the overall system. Following this basic structure, the individual 
rule components and their interaction is analyzed in section 2r3 .. Modified by the determi-
nants of relative size of the participating states  (section  2.4), the systemically determined 
liquidity and  reserve effects can  be described  (section  2.5).  Triggered by capital and ex-
change  market  transactions  (section  2.6),  these  effects  determine  the  actually  effective 
monetary adjustment constraints of a fixed rate system (section 2. 7). 
~Uncovered  paper currency systems are ex definitionem lacking an external stability standard. The internal 
one  is  essentially  a  monetary  policy  standard.  According  to  the  distinction between  external  and  internal 
standards we can speak of real (goods or gold standards) and nominal (paper standard) anchorage of a monetary 
system. Fixed rate systems of uncovered paper currencies only provide a nominal anchorage: the overall system 
is tied to the (nominal) monetary policy standard of individual member currencies. The structure of this "tying" 
is described by the system's symmetry characteristics. 
11 2.3. Rule Components 
Each rule component within the institutional structure of a fixed rate system contains a 
number of different design alternatives. Deducting the system's rules of the game we at first 
have to analyse the specific composition and interaction of the different rules and thereby 
taking into account their specific design details. An intervention rule A and a credit mecha-
nism Bin combination with a settlement rule C may cause different adjustment constraints 
and overall symmetry characteristics than  the same combination of intervention rules and 
credit facilities with a settlement rule D.  The different combinations of design alternatives 
can be summarized by defining various types of fixed rate systems characterized by different 
monetary stability and symmetry characteristics
10
• 
2.3.1. Monetary Coordination Mechanism 
Fixed rate systems can be described as mechanisms providing a coordination structure 
for  national  monetary  policies.  Nevertheless,  monetary  policy coordination  in  fixed  rate 
systems seems to be means and end at the same time. Obviously the first objective of  a fixed 
rate system is the stabilization of exchange rates. Coordinating the monetary policies of the 
member  states  is  only  necessary  to  the  extent  that  is  needed  to  maintain  exchange  rate 
stability. For our purpose,  the monetary coordination mechanism is described in the follo-
wing as an integrated component of a fixed rate system and not as the system itself. 
The monetary policy coordination of a fixed rate system can either be effected ex post 
through the resulting adjustment constraints of the system. Coordination is then the result of 
the system's adjusment mechanics triggered by the markets. It can be described as a market 
coordination  or indirect coordination  of monetary  policy.  On  the  other hand,  monetary 
coordination can also be effected ex ante as a direct monetary coordination of the responsible 
currency  authorities.  Analagous  to  market  coordination,  the  direct  coordination  can  be 
described as authority coordination.  As an additional  terminological distinction, the term 
1~  For such a typology of different systems see Bofinger (1991; p.153-179) and McKinnon (1993). 
12 simple fixed rate system is used in the following in distinction to complex fixed rate systems 
when no mechanism for a direct coordination of monetary policy is provided. 
Monetary coordination in simple fixed rate systems,  therefore, is solely triggered by the 
markets,  whereas complex fixed  rate systems provide rules and/or procedures for a direct 
coordination of monetary policies. The institutional design alternatives of monetary coordina-
tion  in  simple fixed  rate  systems are accordingly limited to regulations of the capital and 
exchange  markets  to  influence  and  ensure  their proper  functioning  as  an  instrument  for 
indirect monetary  policy coordination.  With  fully  liberalized capital  and exchange  move-
ments  the  indirect coordination  is  completely dominated  by  free  market  transactions and 
speculation.  The rationality  of the  monetary  coordination  mechanism  then  exactly corre-
sponds to the fundamental rationality of the markets. 
In complex fixed rate systems the central banks try to coordinate their monetary policies 
directly in order to  realize the monetary convergence necessary for the stabilization of the 
exchange  rate  relations.  With  the  ex  ante  coordination  process  they  try  to  convince  the 
markets  of this  convergence to  thereby avoid  market-determined ex post adjustment con-
straints. Designing a direct coordination process we have to choose among several alternati-
ves  in  substance and organizational detail.  In  its  substance a direct monetary coordination 
can either be conducted along certain ex ante agreed rules or follow a discretionary case to 
case  strategy
11
•  Institutionally, it can be organized either without or within a defined  'go-
vernance structure'. Ultimately any direct authority coordination remains subject to a certain 
degree of indirect control  since  it is  constantly tested  by  the  markets.  If it appears  to be 
insufficient or implausible  in  the judgement of the  markets,  it  will  not  provide  ultimate 
protection against the systemic consequences of fundamentally irrational market speculations. 
Mechanisms  for  a direct  monetary  policy  coordination  may  prove to  be necessary  for  a 
successful stabilization of exchange rates but definitely they are not sufficient. As long as the 
monetary policy sovereignty remains on the national level, any kind of monetary coordina-
tion for stabilizing exchange rates remains dependent on the judgement and acceptance of the 
markets. 
11
}  For details see the standard texts of McKinnon (1984;  1988) and Williamson/Miller (1987). 
13 2.3.2. Intervention Rules 
The intervention rules of a fixed rate system should unambiguously stipulate the circum-
stances and extent the member states are obliged to intervene in order to keep the system's 
exchange rate promise.  Besides the choice of an exchange rate standard it is necessary to 
define and establish the bilateral central rates,  fluctuation margins and intervention points. 
When  choosing  an  exchange  rate  standard  it  is  important  to  take  into  account  the 
consequences of the various standards for the distribution of intervention obligations among 
the  member  currencies.  The  distribution  of intervention  obligations  is  an  initial  formal 
determinant of the system's symmetry characteristics.  Besides the effect that a contradictory 
design of the fluctuation margins and/or the intervention points can (over-) compensate the 
symmetry  implications of the  formal  intervention  rules,  the  choice of an  exchange  rate 
standard nevertheless can be an important signal of the intended overall symmetry charac-
teristics.  Three different types of exchange rate standards can be distinguished: 
•  The  first  option  is  the  key  currency  standard.  Here,  all  participating  nations  are 
obliged  to  establish  a  bilateral  exchange  rate  of their  currency  towards  the  key 
currency.  They have to defend this rate in the exchange markets by means of inter-
vention. As an exeption of this rule the role of the key currency is characterized by 
it's passivity in defending the exchange rates in the markets. The key currency is not 
subject to any  intervention obligations.  Therfore,  it's monetary authorities are not 
forced to accept any monetary adjustment constraints caused by liquidity and reserve 
effects  due  to  interventions
12
•  The  remaining  monetary  degree  of freedom  is  in-
12)  This clearly shows, that in the Bretton Woods System the dollar has become the de jure key currency 
of the system only with the suspension of the dollar's convertability into gold in August 1971 ("closing the gold 
window'). Until then the dollar had been subject to a gold intervention obligation like the other countries had 
been subject to a foreign exchange intervention obligation. Prior to  1971  the dollar's de facto key currency 
position was  based  on the irregular passivity of the  USA  in the  foreign  exchange  markets.  This passivity, 
however,  was  accepted  by  the other  member  states.  In addition,  most  of the  (n-1)  participating countries 
generally renounced from redeeming their gold convertibility rights from the dollar reserves accumulated by 
intervening in support of the dollar.  This conduct was  an  additional guarantee of the  dollar's de facto  key 
currency position. 
14 stitutionally  guaranteed  by  rule  to  the  key  currency  as  the  n-th  currency  of the 
system13• Consequently, a key currency standard is designed entirely asymmetrically 
burdening the (n-1)-countries of the system. 
•  The bilateral parity grid is the second type of exchange rate standard. In a bilateral 
parity grid the central rates of the member currencies are established bilaterally, with 
n participating countries resulting in  n(n-1 )/2 bilateral central rates.  For a bilateral 
parity grid symmetrical intervention obligations can be expected at least in a formal 
sense. 
•  As a third option, the central rates can be defined with respect to a currency basket 
in  which  each  participating  currency  counts  for  a  certain  weight.  The  symmetry 
characteristics  of a  currency  basket  are  more  complicated  since  a currency's  ex-
change  rate  towards  the  basket  currency  is  the  weighted  average  of its  bilateral 
exchange  rates  towards  the  individual  currencies  participating  in  the  basket.  It, 
therefore,  is conceivable that contradictory exchange rate fluctuations of individual 
currencies within the system offset each other and consequently are not reflected in 
its basket rate.  In a currency basket standard,  therefore, one can assume symmetry 
characteristics unilaterally burdening the currencies counting for the highest weights 
in the basket and whose exchange rate deviates the most from the basket average
14
• 
Each  of the  various  currency  standards  including  the  basket  standard  demands  the 
explicit definition of bilateral central rates.  Establishing bilateral central rates one can refer 
to  normative  models  of defining  the  'correct'  exchange  rate  or simply  follow  the  given 
market rates.  An  important aspect for  defining the fluctuation  margins is  the criterion of 
overlapping bands in case of central rate adjustments. Overlapping bands can help to reduce 
the probability of 'one-way bets' in the markets. They reduce the predictability of the future 
13)  In  accordance with the distinction between de jure and de facto key currencies,  Matthes (1988; p.31) 
distinguishes "born"  and  "elected"  key  currencies.  For the following we always  use the term key currency 
according to  a de jure key  currency,  whereas  a market determined key currency is  described as  an anchor 
currency. 
14
)  See Kleinheyer (1987; pp.48) for more detail. 
15 spot rate within the new band because the spot rate does not necessarily have to fall below 
the lower limit of the former margin. 
A fourth design detail of intervention rules is the specific construction of intervention 
points.  If a  currency  reaches  its  intervention  point,  the  system's  intervention  rules  are 
automatically activated. The upper intervention point describes the maximum exchange rate, 
the lower intervention point describes the minimum  rate of a currency within the system. 
At the upper intervention point a country is  obliged to prevent a further revaluation of its 
currency by intervening in support of the weak currency. At the lower point of intervention, 
weak currency countries are obliged to support their own currency by purchasing it against 
the strong currency.  We speak of symmetrical  intervention points if the upper and  lower 
point of intervention are in the same distance from the bilaterally defined central rate. With 
asymmetrically constructed intervention points,  obligations to intervene exist either at the 
upper  ( =  'soft currency  version 
1
)  or at the lower  ( =  'hard currency  version 
1
)  intervention 
points.  As  an  alternative design  detail  the intervention points'  distance from  the bilateral 
central  rate can  be defined  differently  for  the  two  currencies  involved.  An  example for 
asymmetrical intervention points is a currency basket standard in which individual currencies 
count for different weights.  If such  a basket standard is  'translated' into a bilateral parity 
grid, it results in asymmetrical bilateral fluctuation margins and intervention points. 
Analyzing the intervention rules of fixed rate systems it is important to examine if and 
to what extent the symmetry characteristics of the intervention rules are concealed by  the 
corresponding  financing  mechanism of the system.  Even  formally  symmetrically designed 
intervention  rules  may  result  in  asymmetri~al systemic  adjustment constraints  due to  the 
corresponding settlement rules.  The intervention rule's formal  symmetry characteristics by 
themselves only decide on the technical implementation of the interventions in the markets 
and may prove to be insignificant  for the system's adjustment mechanics. Resulting already 
from the at first accidental distribution of intervention obligations among the central banks 
in the course of a currency crisis, it is not sufficient to stipulate only the technical aspect of 
carrying  out  the  interventions  in  the  markets.  To  prevent  an  accidential  distribution  of 
adjustment  constraints  resulting  from  the  liquidity  and  reserve  effects  of interventions a 
corresponding intervention finance mechanism is required. 
16 2.3.3. Mechanisms of Intervention Financing 
The finance mechanism of a fixed rate system consists of credit facilities and settlement 
obligations. Although we will find identical design details for these two elements, they refer 
to very different aspects of the intervention financing and, therefore, are analyzed separately. 
2.3.3.1. Credit Facilities 
In order to relax the existing budget restriction for weak currency countries intervening 
at their lower intervention point,  a fixed  rate system  with  intervention obligations needs 
corresponding intervention credit facilities.  The budget restriction of weak currency coun-
tries result from the limited funds of hard currency reserves as freely available intervention 
assets for defending the exchange rate at its lower intervention point. Intervention promises 
at the lower intervention point can only be kept and,  therefore,  be credible from the mar-
kets' point of view as long as the affected countries have access to appropriate hard currency 
intervention reserves.  Only the central bank of the hard currency itself can guarantee these 
reserves  unlimitedly.  The certain extent of loosening the budget restriction  through credit 
facilities depends on  the facilities'particular conditions.  Besides  the overall amount of the 
credit facility the most important conditions are the maturity, interest rate, and the denomi-
nation of repayment obligations: 
•  From the markets' point of view, the amount and maturity of credit facilities are the 
most important determinants for the credibility of a weak currency country's inter-
vention promise.  Any  limitations- concerning both the amount and maturity - lead 
to the re-establish the budget restriction in the course of a currecy crisis. Thereby the 
intervention promise of the  weak currency  country becomes  untrustworthy and an 
exchange  rate  adjustment  corresponding  to  the  market  pressure  will  prove  to  be 
inevitable
15
• 
15
)  However,  this does not result in the simple rule that an  intervention promise to be  credible for  the 
markets  only  requires  unlimited mutual  credit facilities.  Intervention facilities of this kind do not take into 
account the monetary consequences of the liquidity effects associated with credit-financed interventions for the 
hard currency  creditor countries. If the expansionary money base effects  due to  interventions exceeds  their 
sterilization capacities the consequences of an  unlimited intervention facility will become unsustainable from 
17 •  The interest rate and currency denomination of the repayment obligations determine 
both the credit facility's costs and the allocation of the exchange rate risk connected 
with the credit. 
Besides the credit mechanisms' importance in terms of intervention policy, it implies an 
additional financing aspect concerning the balance of payments. When intervention financing 
is demanded over a longer term it may become a credit for permanently financing fundamen-
tal balance of payments deficits. Longer maturities for international credit facilities, therefo-
re, are normally  'conditional', i.e. they are bound to economic policy measures which are 
supposed to re-establish the conditions for a market-financed balance of payments. 
2.3.3.2. Settlement Rules 
In contrast to credit facilities, settlement obligations do not help to finance interventions 
of weak currency countries at their lower intervention limit but stipulate the financing  of 
interventions carried out by a hard currency country reaching its upper intervention point. 
Interventions at the upper intervention limit are purchases in  support of the weak currency 
against the own hard  currency.  As  a consequence,  the domestic  money  base of the hard 
currency  increases  in  the amount of the intervention.  At  the  same  time,  the central bank 
accumulates  currency  reserves  denominated  in  the  weak currency.  In  the context of sett-
lement rules weak currency reserves of hard currency central banks accumulated by obligato-
ry  interventions  establish  a claim  towards  the  central  bank of the  weak currency  to  re-
exchange the  reserves  into hard currency.  The weak currency  central bank,  therefore,  is 
obliged to  redeem  the hard currency central bank's weak currency  reserves  purchased  in 
support interventions at its upper intervention point and to convert them into hard currency. 
With  settlement obligations the weak currency central bank is obliged to finance the hard 
a monetary policy perspective. The markets then will anticipate an opting out of  the hard currency central bank. 
Intervention promises,  therefore,  have to be credible for the markets from the weak currency countries' per-
spective but at the same time they have to be sustainable from the monetary policy perspective of the hard cur-
rency countries (see appendix I). 
18 (7) 
currency  central  bank's  interventionsl
6
•  Since  the  central  bank  with  the  weak  currency 
needs  hard  currency  assets  to  meet its  settlement obligations,  settlement  transactions are 
subject to the budget restriction of limited intervention reserves. They cause similar reserve 
effects  as  the  central  bank's  own  interventions.  In  the  end,  each  support  intervention, 
therefore, has to be financed by the weak currency country itself, regardless of which central 
bank involved has carried out the interventions in the market.  As  much as credit facilities 
contribute to  the relief of the budget restriction,  settlement obligations lead to its  further 
tightening. 
Similar to credit facilities, for designing a settlement obligation it is especially important 
to fix  its amount, maturity, and the denomination of the settlement transactions. 
•  Amount and  maturity  both  determine  the  course of the  budget restriction  and  the 
degree  to  which  it  is  tightened.  Besides  the  quantitative dimension  of limited  or 
unlimited settlement obligations, their qualitative dimension is of importance, i.e. the 
question  whether  they  are  independent  of or conditioned  to  certain  reasons  and 
circumstances of the interventions. 
•  Besides the allocation of the exchange rate risk,  the denomination of the settlement 
transactions determines whether other reserve assets in addition to the hard currency 
can  also  be  used  to  meet the settlement obligations.  The use  of additional reserve 
assets is a certain relief for weak currency countries since they can use the whole of 
their  currency  reserves  (including  gold  and  other  reserve  assets)  for  settling  the 
balance and not only the part of its reserves denominated in the hard currency. 
16
)  From the accounting point of view, interventions of hard currency central banks in fixed rate systems 
with settlement obligations are treated similar to a credit granted to the weak currency country. The exchange 
obligations deriving  from  the  settlement process  correspond to  the  repayment  obligation of financing  inter-
ventions by using the system's very short term credit facilities. 
19 2.3.4. Reserve Rules 
The  purchase,  holding,  investment,  and  employment  of intervention  reserves  can 
produce liquidity and other monetary policy effects for the reserve currency's central bank. 
Therefore,  certain reserve  rules  should be agreed  upon.  Reserve  rules determine in what 
form  central  banks  are allowed  to  hold  their intervention  reserves  in  member currencies 
(=~reserve investment  rules~) and  to  what  extent  they  are  allowed  to  accumulate  those 
currencies  (=~reserve limitation  rules~): 
•  Reserve investment rules are an important determinant of the liquidity effects resul-
ting  from  interventions.  Expansionary  money  base effects always  occur when  the 
currency  reserves  of the  intervening central  bank were  previously  invested  at  the 
central  bank issuing  the  intervention  currency.  In  comparison,  intervention  assets 
from  market  investments do not  affect  the central  bank money  circulation  of the 
intervention currency and remain limited to liquidity effects to the broader non-bank 
liquidity aggregates of money supply. 
•  For the individual central banks, the amount of reserves denominated in intervention 
currencies is a decisive determinant of the remaining  monetary degree of freedom 
within a fixed rate system.  By using  its intervention reserves a country can at least 
temporarily evade the system's monetary adjustment constraints or it can gain time 
for the implementation of suitable adjustment policies. 
Obviously any central bank can purchase .and invest unlimited currency reserves in the 
market by organizing their domestic  money  supply in  the way of purchasing  intervention 
currencies  and  hold  them  in  liquid  and  always  available  market  investments.  They  can 
practice  their monopoly of issuing  central  bank money  by  purchasing  foreign  exchange. 
Nevertheless, the accumulation of those intervention reserves is limited by the instrumental 
and institutional conditions of domestic money supply policies.  In principle,  however,  the 
individual central banks' scope of accumulating foreign exchange reserves is considerable. 
For an explicit limitation of this scope an agreement on reserve rules is necessary. 
20 2.3.5. Exchange Rate Adjustment Mechanism 
For each fixed  rate system,  the possibility of an  exchange rate adjustment is a sort of 
loophole to evade the system's adjustment constraints or to forestall the markets' pressure 
towards such adjustment constraints. The institutional design and operation of the exchange 
rate adjustment mechanism, therefore, is an important determinant for the degree of system 
inherent economic adjustment pressure and the credibility of the exchange rate promise from 
the markets' point of view.  Rule-determined or discretionary exchange adjustment mecha-
nisms are the basic design alternatives: 
•  Rule-determined adjustment mechanisms can also be described as formula flexibility.  The 
changes in the exchange rates follow a specified rule or formula and are 'objectively'  given 
for all countries involved. In technical detail, those adjustment automatisms are conceivable 
as  either ex ante or ex  post  rules.  Ex  ante rules  determine the course and  extent of the 
exchange  rate  development already  in  advance,  whereas  in  ex  post  rules,  they  follow  a 
certain formula in  the course of time.  Ex post rules,  therefore,  facilitate the agreement on 
economically efficient adjustment rules in  substance and not- like the ex ante rules - in an 
exclusively formal  sense.  Provided that the economic rationality of an adjustment formula 
is accepted by the markets, it substantially contributes to the credibility of the exchange rate 
promise and, therefore, to the stability of the overall system. 
•  As  an  alternative  to  the  rule-determined  formula  flexibility  exchange  rate  adjustment 
mechanisms  can  follow  a discretionary  case  by  case  strategy.  In  principle,  discretionary 
adjustments  of the  exchange  rate  can  be carried  out  within  a  'governance  structure'  or 
without being tied to specific procedural rules. Without procedural rules, each member state 
can  autonomously and  without being  forced  to  reach  a  formal  agreement with  the  other 
member countries involved adjust its central rate.  Within a 'governance structure' exchange 
rate  adjustments  follow  certain  ex  ante  determined  procedural  rules  and  competencies. 
Thereby  the  most  important institutional choice alternatives are whether the governments 
(=political  exchange  rate  competency)  or  the  central  banks  (=monetary  exchange  rate 
competency)  have  the  exchange  rate  competency  and  in  which  way  the  institutionalized 
discussion and decision process within the 'governance structure' is organized. 
21 2.4. Size of a Country 
Besides the rule-determined symmetry characteristics,  the relative size of the member 
states is important for the internal allocation of a fixed  rate system's monetary adjustment 
constraints. A country's relative size within a fixed rate system is essentially determined by 
its  monetary  sterilization  capacity  and  the  amount  of its  freely  available  hard  currency 
intervention reserves
17
: 
•  The sterilization capacity depends on the amount of a member country's domestic 
money base and the national monetary autority's capacity to control it. The more and 
flexible controllable the national money base proves to be the more easy a country 
can sterilize intervention-caused liquidity effects and avoid expansive monetary base 
effects resulting from unsterilized interventions at the upper intervention point. 
•  Intervention  reserves  provide  a  temporary  buffer  against  the  reserve  effects  of 
exchange interventions. If this buffer is exhausted, further pressure on the exchange 
rate  will  directly  cause  a  tightening  of the  restrictive  adjustment  constraints  or 
alternatively  an  adequate  exchange  rate  adjustment  according  to  the  speculative 
market pressure. 
Consequently, the bigger a country in terms of its sterilization capacity and its currency 
reserves,  the more likely it can- at least temporarily -evade rule-deterrnined liquidity and 
reserve  effects and  the resulting  adjustment constraints.  Intensity  and  direction  of rule--
determined symmetry characteristics,  therefore, can be (over-)compensated by the relative 
size of the countries involved. 
17
)  Such a  limitation to exclusively  'nominal' determinants  of a country's relative size  refering to the 
intervention and sterilization capacities and the associated neglect of 'real' economic fundamentals is all the 
more justified the stronger the goods markets are dominated by the financial markets.  Speculative attacks in 
fixed rate systems are essentially financial markets phenomena and, therefore, have to be analyzed more or less 
seperately from the developements in the goods markets as  documentated in the trade balances and national 
income statistics. 
22 2.5. Interim Summary of Liquidity and Rese"e Effects 
Institutional rules of a fixed rate system play an important, but not all-decisive part in 
determining the 'rules of the game'. At least in a formal sense, their part mainly consists in 
controling the liquidity and reserve effects' direction and intensity, which, as determinants 
of the  economic  adjustment constraints  are of great  importance  for  the  functioning  and 
monetary stability of the overall system. The adjustment constraints that become effective in 
the end, however, are not determined by the formal symmetry of the individual rule compo-
nents but only by the actually effective liquidity and reserve effects of the system in action. 
Their formal  ( = rule-determined)  symmetry characteristics can be (over-)compensated by 
sterilzing the intervention-caused money base effects or by a country's capacity of financing 
interventions from its own reserves.  For identifying the dominant rule,  we have to find out 
whether the liquidity effects resulting from the intervention and reserve rules or the reserve 
effects as a result of the financing  mechanism dominate the allocation of adjustment con-
straints, and for that, a country's size can be of significant relevance.  Figure II summerizes 
the  systemic determinants of liquidity and reserve effects in  an institutionalized fixed  rate 
system as analyzed above: 
Figure 2: Determinants of Liquidity and Reserve Effects 
in Institutionalized Fixed Rate Systems 
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23 2.6. The Part of Capital and Foreign Exchange Markets 
The above analysis has indicated that the symmetry characteristics of systemicalliquidity 
and reserve effects determine the allocation of economic adjustment constraints among hard 
and  weak  currency  countries.  The  question  of whether  a  currency  is  'hard'  or 'weak' 
according to the rules, however, remains open. The identification of hard and weak curren-
cies within the system is dominated by the markets. The markets, therefore, take the part of 
a 'judge' who has to decide which of the member currencies are weak or strong according 
to  the  rules.  The  system's  institutional  settings  are  blind  to  this  kind  of identification 
problem. A currency, therefore, is by defmition a hard currency when its exchange rate is 
subject to a revaluation pressure in the foreign exchange market. A currency is called weak 
when it is subject to a devaluation pressure. In case a currency is subject to revaluation or 
devaluation pressures,  the intervention mechanism and with it the systemically determined 
liquidity and reserve effects are virtually automatically activated.  For that a revaluation or 
devaluation pressure of the market is the necessary and sufficient condition at the same time, 
regardless  of its  underlying  degree of fundamental  rationality.  Activating  the adjustment 
constraints is entirely the job of the markets
18
• 
2.  7. The System's Overall Monetary Adjustment Constraints 
It has been shown that the internal allocation of actually effective monetary adjustment 
constraints can only be identified by the interaction of a fixed rate system's institutional rules 
with the relative size of the countries involved and the conditions of the capital and exchange 
18
)  Even if its rule system provides mechanisms for a direct coordination of national monetary policies a 
fixed rate system remains subject to the 'market's dictate'. Although ex ante coordinations of the monetary and 
interest rate policies may contribute to the stabilization of the market's expectations,  they cannot provide a 
sufficient protection against  speculative  attacks.  For example,  a  coordinated  interest  rate  policy will only 
provide suitable protection against speculative attacks if it guarantees that at any point of time during the crisis 
the exchange expectations of the speculants are (over-) compensated by the inter currency interest rate differen-
ces. However, the necessary excessive volatility of short-term money market interest rates is unsustainable for 
the central banks and, therefore, implausible for the markets. Direct coordination mechanisms will only prove 
to be sufficient if they are credible for the markets and ex ante prevent the developement of speculative attacks 
by stabilizing the market's exchange expectations. Therefore, even the effectiveness of direct monetary policy 
coordination for stabilizing exchange rates remains dependent on the market's judgement (see appendix I). 
24 markets.  From that,  figure III can be derived which contains an overall description of the 
'rules of the game'. The figure shows the structural determinants of the system's economic 
mechanics as well as the way they are released by market transactions: 
Figure 3: Determinants of Monetary Adjustment Constraints 
in Institutionalized Fixed Rate Systems 
I Set of Rules  ~  I  'Size'  of a Country  ~ 
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The set of rules and the relative size of the countries involved can be described as a fixed 
rate  system's  structural  determinants.  They  determine  the  system-inherent  liquidity  and 
reserve  effects  which  in  turn  trigger  the  monetary  adjustment  constraints.  However,  the 
system  structures  are  activated  solely  by  corresponding  market  transactions.  The  market 
transactions'  fundamental  rationality, therefore,  determines at the same time the economic 
rationality  of the  overall  adjustment  constraints  effectively  resulting  from  the  system's 
structures  in  action.  A fixed rate  system's constitution can only be as  good as  its  'modus 
operandi' in the shape of  the markets. 
25 m. The European Monetary System (EMS): 
Functioning, Symmetry Characteristics, Market Conditions 
"To understand the crisis, it is first necessary to understand the European Monetary System." 
(Eichengreen 1993) 
The EMS is an asymmetrically designed simple fixed rate system burdening weak currency countries, in 
which the part of the key currency is  not determined by rules but is awarded by the capital and exchange 
markets. It, therefore, can be called a market-determined anchor currency system.  Which member 
currency functions as the system's nominal anchor is exclusively market-determined and is 
decided according to the criteria used by the capital and exchange markets in evaluating the 
individual member currencies.  The market forces alone decide which member currency is 
charged with adjustment constraints. The economic rationality of the monetary coordination 
mechanism within the EMS, therefore, corresponds to the degree of fundamental rationality 
of the  capital  and  exchange  markets.  In  the  recent  literature on  the  EMS,  the  systemic 
reasons of its inherent asymmetric adjustment constraints have remained largely unrecogni-
zed19.  In its essence they are resulting from the specific composition of various rule compo-
nents within the EMS's overall institutional arrangement.  As an institutionalized fixed rate 
system,  the EMS  was  founded in  March  1979 by an agreement between the central banks 
involved, which followed earlier political guidelines of the European Council20•  Except for 
a  few  modifications by  the  Basle/Nyborg-Agreement of 1987  the  initial  set of rules  has 
remained  unchanged.  The system's originally scheduled transition to its  second,  so-called 
institutional phase has not been realized.  For the following the terms  'old' and  'new EMS' 
1~  Whereas the asymmetry of the EMS as empirically proved by the D-Mark hegemony has been broadly 
accepted, its explanation often remains unsatisfatory. It's not at first the size of  Germany's real economy or the 
role of the D-Mark as an international transaction and reserve currency but its market-determined position as 
a leading investment currency  and its relative size in terms  of its intervention and  sterilization capacity in 
interaction with the institutional structure of the EMS that provides the most relevant explanation for the D-
Mark hegemony within the EMS. 
~  See the Resolution of the European Council of December 5,  1978 on the establishment of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) and  the Agreement of March  13,  1979 between the central banks of the Member 
States of the  European Economic  Community stipulating the  operating procedures  for  the EMS,  in:  Texts 
concerning the European Monetary System (1985, p.13-25 and p.23-42). 
26 (8) 
are nevertheless used;  however,  they exclusively refer to the modification of the system's 
market conditions as an important reason for the actual crisis and suitable reform options to 
make the system fit for the new market conditions of fully liberalized capital and exchange 
markets21 • 
3.1. The Set of Rules 
Following the general framework of chapter II, the elements of the institutional arran-
gement determining  the system's adjustment constraints are analyzed at firsf
2
•  From that 
the systemically determined liquidity and reserve effects are derived. The concluding chapter 
then describes the  monetary adjustment constraints triggered by market transactions under 
the new conditions of fully liberalized capital and exchange markets. 
3.1.1. Indirect Coordination of Monetary Policy 
The EMS is a simple fixed rate system. Mechanisms for a direct coordination of national 
monetary policies are not assigned. Consequently, the EMS's institutional arrangement does 
not  contain  any  rules  or provisions  for  a  'governance structure'  to  coordinate  monetary 
policies.  Still,  the  EMS  in  its  core is  a  mechanism  for  monetary  policy  coordination  in 
Europe23 •  The  coordination  of monetary  policy  is  managed  indirectly  by  means  of the 
system's inherent adjustment and coordination constraints. As the following will show, these 
constraints are designed almost entirely asymmetrically for the weak currency countries and 
are activated by market transactions. The monetary adjustment constraints within the EMS, 
therefore,  are essentially market-determined.  The currencies'  hierarchy in  the capital and 
exchange markets determine the allocation of the remaining degree of freedom. The market's 
21)  Compared to the 'old EMS', the 'new EMS' is characterized by a complete liberalization of the capital 
and exchange markets within the European Community and a simultanous renunciation of periodic exchange 
rate  adjustments according  to  the  accumulated  inflation divergences  as  it used to be common practice until 
1987.  For introducing the term of the  'new EMS' see Giavazzi/Spaventa (1990) and Portes (1993). 
22)  See  for  a general  survey  Commission (1979);  Deutsche Bundesbank (1979;  1989),  Bofinger (1991), 
Kleinheyer (1989), and Ypersele (1985). For the relevant resolutions and agreements see the Texts concerning 
the European Monetary System (1985). 
23
)  See Bofinger (1989;  1992). 
27 investment  and/ or  speculation  decisions  earmark  which  of the  member  currencies  they 
consider  to  be  strong  or to  be  weak.  The  resulting  revaluation  and  devaluation  pressure 
leads, via activating the intervention mechanism through which then the system-determined 
asymmetrical liquidity and reserve effects are triggered, to unilateral adjustment constraints 
for the weak currency countries.  The strongest currency is awarded  for  the  key  currency 
role and, thereby, determines the monetary stability standard of the overall system. 
As  long  as  the  markets  award  the  most  stable  currency  of the  system,  a desirable 
convergence pressure towards the stability standard of the anchor currency country develops 
for  the  weak  currencies.  The  EMS's  success  story  during  the  1980s  was  based  on  this 
convergence  pressure,  when  the  D-Mark  functioned  as  stability  standard  and  credibility 
anchor for the monetary policy of the traditional weak currencies.  However,  if the markets 
continue  to  devalue  traditionally  weak  currencies  with  no  regard  to  already  succeding 
adjustment policies, an inherent deflationary bias for the  'supposed to be weak-currencies' 
may occur.  They are then  forced  to compensate the  markets'  devaluation  speculations  by 
interest  rate  differences  in  favour  of its  irrationally  attacked  currency.  In  an  economic 
downward trend with low inflation and growth rates,  such a policy may lead to considerable 
inadequate macroeconomic adjustment costs
24
• These market-determined inadequate adjust-
ment constraints make the system intolerable (from the point of view of the governments and 
central banks involved) and implausible (from the markets' point of view). 
3.1.2. Symmetrical Intervention Rules 
De jure the EMS has two different intervention mechanisms related to different currency 
standards: 
•  The  first  intervention  mechanism  follows  the  basic  structure of a currency  basket 
standard. It commits the interventions to divergences of the member currencies' daily 
ECU exchange rates in an amount of 75%  of the  maximum permissible fluctuation 
24
)  See for the virtually arithmetic interrelation between exchange rate expectations and their compensation 
in terms of interest rate differences Wyplosz/Eichengreen (1993; p.lOO). 
28 around their central rates defined against the ECU (:'indicator  of divergencg')".
I  The second intervention mechanism refers to the EMS's bilateral parity grid. It
commits the intervention  obligations to the maximum permissible fluctuation margin
of *l-2,25% from the bilaterd central rates.
As a consequence  of the divergence indicator, especially those currencies that diverge
the most from the system's average would be obliged to intervene. The adjustment con-
straints of such a currency standard are not sufficient to establish a standard for monetary
stability within the system in the sense of an absolute level of stability. Always those
countries are forced to adjust which deviate most from the average, regardless if the diver-
gence is in the direction of more .or of less stability. The monetary stability of a basket
standard is determined only by the average inflation rate within the system ild, therefore,
only guarantees  a relative instead of an absolute level of stability. However, the divergence
indicator was irrelevant for the actual development  of the EMS. This irrelevance can mainly
be contributed to the lack of rule-determined consequences  once a currency touches its Ecu
intervention points. Article 3.6 of the Resolution of the European  Council of December 5,
1978 only says in a non-committal  manner:
,,When a currency crosses its 'threshold of divergence',  this results in a presumption that the
authorities concerned will correct this situation by adequate measure, namely (a) diversified  inter-
vention; @) measures of domestic monetary policy; (c) changes in central rates; (d) other measures
of economic  policy.(...)" (texts concerning the European Monetary System,  p.15)
The intervention mechanism refering to the divergence  indicator, therefore, has not
influenced the actual intervention  policy within the EMS. The indicator has only played a
minor role as an informal "trigger for policy coordination"26.  This development could have
been expected since the ECU currency  basket standard of the EMS entered the agreement
r; For details concerning  the divergence  indicator  see Commission (1979, annex 3, p.88-94)  and the
dicussion in Kleinheyer  (1987 , pp.63). The normal fluctuation  rnargin of the individual curre,ncies around their
ECU ce,ntral rate are calculated in a way that their individtral weights within the ECU basket do not influence
their intervention obligations. The intervention points de,nominated in ECU are reached when an individual
currency reaches its rnaximum divergence of + l-2,25% with respect to all the other currencies. The size of the
divergence rnargin,  therefore,  decreases  and increases respectively with the individual weight of a currency  in
the ECU basket.
r) Rieke (1982, p.5).
29only as a political compromise indicating symmetry and equality within the system in an at 
least informal and non-commital way. In practice, the intervention rules of a currency basket 
standard,  which in principle cause symmetrical adjustment constraints towards an  average 
stability standard, are not acceptable for the more stability-orientated hard currency coun-
tries27. 
By the so-called 'Belgium Compromise' the in practice relevant intervention obligations 
have been tied  to the bilateral parity grid instead of the ECU indicator.  The intervention 
obligations are committed to the upper and lower intervention points, which result from the 
agreed  fluctuation  margins of +/-2,25% around  the  bilateral central  rates,  and  they  are 
unlimited in amount: 
"( ...  )These interventions shall be unlimited at the compulsory intervention rates.  (  ...  )" 
(Article 2.2 EMS-Agreement) 
In a parity grid of this kind, two currencies reach their upper respectively lower intervention 
points simultaneously. The hard currency's bilateral exchange rate at the upper intervention 
limit  exactly  corresponds  to  the  lower  intervention  limit of the  weak  currency.  In  this 
respect, at least the formal design of the EMS's intervention rules is entirely symmetrical. 
As a result of this, the preliminary liquidity effects of the interventions become effective 
in both countries. The domestic money base of the hard currency country expands, whereas 
in the weak currency country it decreases
28
•  The adjustment constraints deriving from  the 
preliminary  liquidity  effects,  therefore,  are at first  symmetrical  as  it is  indicated  by  the 
formal symmetry of the bilateral intervention obligations. However, the long-term liquidity 
effects are determined by the sterilization policy of the intervening central banks. Naturally, 
the weak currency countries' technical capacity for steriliz2 
ing  money  base  effects due  to  interventions  are  unlimited  in  aniount.  For hard currency 
2
') See for the backgrounds Ludlow (1982), Bofinger (1992), and Emminger (1985). 
~  This holds for both obligatory and intramarginal interventions as  long as  they are not financed out of 
reserves which were held in market investments prior to the intervention and as long as the reserves accumula-
ted by  interventions are not re-invested in the markets.  Only if one of these criteria is disregarded no direct 
money  base  effects  will  occur.  Obligatory  interventions  are  the  unlimited  intervention obligations at  the 
intervention ·points.  lntramarginal  interventions  are  voluntary  measures  of the  central  banks  within  the 
fluctuation margins which are supposed to prevent a currency from touching its intervention points. 
30 countries the sterilization policy is limited by their domestic sterilization capacities.  As  a 
result of this, the freedom to implement a restrictive monetary policy is for a hard currency 
central bank mainly determined by its monetary sterilization capacity and -policy but not by 
the intervention's preliminary liquidity effects as  a direct consequence of the intervention 
transactions in the markets. 
In  contrast to the EMS's formal  intervention obligations the adjustment impact of the 
individual  member country's sterilization  policy  is asymmetrical.  Whereas  hard currency 
countries sterilize the primary liquidity effects of their interventions almost entirely,  weak 
currency countries have only little inclination to sterilize
29
•  As a consequence of the asym-
metrical  sterilization behaviour the  monetary policy of hard currency central banks is not 
weakenend by  any  expanding  money  supply  and  tnterest rate effects while the restrictive 
effects for  the weak currencies lead to adjustment constraints for their monetary policy to 
follow  the  stability  standard of the hard currency countries.  The formal  symmetry of the 
intervention  rules  is  reversed  because the asymmetrical  sterilization  policy dominates the 
interventions' preliminary money supply and interest effects
30
• 
Within  the  EMS  a  symmetrical  adjustment  constraint  towards  an  average  stability 
standard can only occur when the sterilization capacity of the hard currency central bank is 
exhausted31 •  In  literature,  the  formal  symmetry  of the  intervention obligations  within  the 
EMS  has  often  lead  to  the view  that  the  overall  design  of the  EMS  is  symmetrical and, 
therefore,  the de facto  hegemony of the DM is to be attributed mostly to external factors 
~  See  the similar empirical  results of Mastropasqua (1988) and Bofinger (1992).  For the sterilization 
policy of the Bundesbank see Deutsche Bundesbank (1993). 
~We  can speak of dominance when the weak currency countries' non-sterilization policy is not voluntary 
but inherently necessary to protect their own intervention reserves. With the reserve losses due to interventions 
the weak  currency  countries are  facing  the  alternatives of devaluation or monetary  adjustment to the hard 
currency country. The restrictive money supply and interest rate effects of the interventions then become a vital 
part of their monetary adjustment strategies. 
31 )  This  inability of sterilizing  the  money  base  effects  of its  support interventions corresponds to  the 
scenario of the explicit opting out reservation of the Bundesbank in its role as  the dominant hard currency 
central bank of the EMS;  see Wyplosz/Eichengreen (1993a, pp.57). The sterilization capacity of the Bundes-
bank is approximately about 150 billion D-Mark even in the very short-term. According to its own statements 
this has proved to be sufficient to defuse the money base effects of even the worst of the EMS crisis including 
the  1992/93 crisis; see Deutsche Bundesbank (1993, pp.19). 
31 not  inherent  to  the  system's  institutional  settings.  The  most  important  reason  for  this 
misjudgement was that the system's symmetry characteristics were solely derived from  the 
intervention rules  and  not,  as  it is  necessary,  from  their interaction  with  the  sterilization 
policy and the other components of the EMS's set of rules
32
• 
Another  important  EMS  characteristic  concerning  the  functioning  of its  intervention 
mechanism is the fact that most exchange rate adjustments exceeded the unilateral fluctuation 
margins  of 2,25%.  Thus,  the  exchange  rate  adjustments  have  fulfilled  the  criterion  of 
'overlapping bands' and, therefore, have increased the probability of successful speculative 
'one-way bets' against existing margins. 
3.1.3. Asymmetrical Financing Mechanism 
Since the holding of intervention reserves in member currencies is limited to the level 
of agreed on  'working balances' and is supposed not to exceed the reserves necessary  for 
payment transactions,  for  financing  their interventions at the lower intervention point the 
central banks have to rely on the system's financing mechanisms.  Core of the intervention 
financing  mechanism of the EMS  are the credit facilities of the very short-term financing 
and the settlement obligations. 
3.1.3.1. Unlimited Credit Facilities 
Besides the very short-term financing two additional facilites are availiable to the central 
banks of the EMS  for financing their obligatory interventions: 
•  In the shon-term monetary suppon the EC central banks grant each other short-term 
foreign  exchange credits  for  financing  balance of payments deficits.  These credits 
32
)  See Mayer (1988), Giavazzi/Giovannini (1987) as well as Herz/Roger (1992) and McKinnon (1993). For 
the opposite position of systemic-intentionalasymmetry see Wyplosz (1989) as well as Bofinger (1989, 1991) 
and Matthes (1988, 1993). 
32 have a maturity of three months and can be extended twice for three months each. 
The amount of the credit limits is restricted to exactly defined debtor and creditor 
quotas. 
•  In  the  medium-term financial  suppon  the  EC  member  states'  mutual  balance  of 
payments  credit facility  have a  limited maturity  of three  to five  years.  However, 
these credits are conditioned to economic adjustment policies in order to re-establish 
a market financed fundamental balance of payments equilibrium. 
Neither facility has been used by the central banks for financing interventions since the EMS 
became effective. They, therefore, can be ignored in the further analysis. 
In practice the intervention financing is limited to the mechanism of the very short-term 
financing. There, credits unlimited in amount are available to countries participating in the 
exchange rate mechanism. Hence in principle all member countries are able to comply with 
their unlimited intervention obligations at any time: 
"To enable intervention to  be made  in Community currencies, the participating central banks shall 
open  for  each  other  very  shor-term  credit  facilities,  unlimited  in  amount,  (  ...  ). "  (Article  6.1. 
EMS-Agreement) 
The resulting liabilities become due at the latest 2,5 months after the end of the month in 
which  the  facility  was  used.  The budget  restriction  is  only  temporarily  suspended  for  a 
maximum of 3,5 months.  At the request of the debtor central bank, the credit limit can be 
extended  up  to  an  amount of twice the debtor's quota for  another three  months.  Further 
extensions  of the amount as  well  as  a  second  extension of the  maturity  for  another three 
months are dependent on the approval of the creditor central bank involved. All transactions 
of the very short-term financing are denominated in ECU and are entered in accounts with 
the  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund (EMCF)
33
•  The interest paid corresponds to  a 
weighted average of representative interest rates of the ECU-basket currencies. Repayments 
can  be  denominated  in  the  creditor's  currency,  in  'official'  ECU,  or· in  other  reserve 
components; however, repayments cannot be made in the debtor's currency. 
33
)  For details see the Decision of the Board of Governors of the  European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(EMCF); in:  Texts concerning the European Monetary System (1985, pp.49). 
33 The mechanisms of the very short-term financing are sufficient to guarantee a temporary 
unlimited access to member currencies for financing the system's obligatory interventions. 
Therefore, the unlimited intervention promise of the weak currency countries is only credible 
for  a limited period of time.  Afterwards,  their budget restriction  of limited intervention 
reserves is re-established by the repayment obligations. 
3.1.3.2. Unilateral Settlement Obligations 
Due to the so-called settlement rules of the EMS a hard currency central bank's inter-
ventions at its upper intervention point are accounted like an intervention of a weak currency 
central bank at its lower intervention point drawing on its very  short-term credit facility. 
When a hard currency central bank intervenes at its upper intervention point, the acquired 
weak currency assets are routinely transferred to the EMCF.  There,  they establish corre-
sponding ECU-assets for the hard currency central bank and ECU-liabilities for the weak 
currency central bank. This arrangement, which is decisive for the symmetry characteristics 
of the overall system,  is mainly based on the regulations of article 6.2 of the EMS-Agree-
ment: 
"The financing operations concluded  in this connection shall take the form  of spot sales and  pur-
chases of Community currencies against the crediting or debiting of accounts denominated in ECUs 
with the European Monetary Co-operation Fund (  ...  )."  (Texts  concerning the European Monetary 
System, p.27) 
The settlement of the resulting balances follows the same mechanisms as the repayment of 
drawings on the very short-term credit facility. Interventions of hard currency central banks 
are treated like credit-financed interventions of the central bank with the weak currency. 
From the weak currency central banks' point of view, it is obviously not important by 
which central bank the intervention is carried out in the markets. In the end it is always the 
central bank of the weak currency which has  to  finance all interventions according to  the 
procedures of the very  short-term financing.  The budget restriction of the weak currency 
countries is extended to the interventions of the hard currency countries and,  therefore,  is 
considerably tightened.  In  contrast to  the formally  symmetrical design of the intervention 
mechanism  the finance  mechanism  is  almost entirely asymmetrical.  The system's reserve 
34 (9) 
effects, therefore, are also asymmetrical in the end. The mechanism of the very short-term 
credit facility merely leads to a temporary suspension of the asymmetric financing obliga-
tions.  From the markets' point of view, however, this suspension stands under the reserva-
tion of a limited maturity of at most 3,5 months. 
As a result the credibility of the central banks' intervention promise for the markets is 
only  low.  Keeping  the promise in  case  of unlimited  interventions  is  implausible for  the 
markets because, after a short period of time, all interventions have to be (re-) financed by 
the weak currency countries.  Even in  times of speculative attacks of the  markets against 
fundamentally justified exchange rates their budget restriction is only temporary suspended; 
however, it is not revoked in principle. 
3.1.4. Restrictive Reserve Rules 
The EMS  rules do not provide any exactly quantified reserve rules.  While it is lacking 
any  reserve  investment  rules,  at  least  a  certain  procedure  has  been  agreed,  how  to  fix 
reserve limitation rules as upper limits for the holding of intervention reserves in  member 
currencies: 
"The central banks may hold working balances in Community currencies within the limits laid down 
by the Committee of Governors. These limits may be exceeded only with the consent of the central 
bank concerned." (Article 15,  EMS-Agreement) 
A strict limitation of reserve holdings in member currencies to working balances would have 
meant a considerable tightening of the budget restriction of limited intervention reserves. 
Thereby the intervention promise of the weak currency countries would  have been subject 
to an  additional loss of credibility. In practice,  however,  the procedure is handled less re-
strictive as one may expect from  article 15.  Still, the accumulation of intervention reserves 
denominated in member currencies remains subject to the consent of the issuing central bank 
concerned. 
In contrast to the  more ·or less restrictive reserve accumulation rules the central banks 
are  free  in  deciding  on  the  way  they  prefer to  hold  their intervention reserves;  they can 
either  invest  them  directly  in  market  assets  or deposit  them  at  the  issuing  central  bank 
35 involved.  The investment decision  is an  important determinant of the  money  base  effects 
deriving  from  interventions  financed  out  of existing  reserve  holdings.  Only  in  case  of 
intervention reserves previously deposited at the hard currency central bank the interventions 
of the weak currency country at its lower intervention point bring about expansive money 
base effects  for  the hard  currency.  With  intervention  reserves  directly  invested in  market 
assets the interventions do not affect the hard currency's central bank money circulation at 
all34• Therefore,  in the extreme case of an exhausted sterilization potential of a hard curren-
cy central bank the weak currency countries may have the ability of increasing the symmetry 
of the system's adjustment constraints by financing interventions out of reserves previously 
deposited  at  the  central  bank of the  hard  currency35
•  Analogously,  the  intervention  of a 
hard currency central bank at its upper intervention point will influence the money base of 
the weak currency only if it invests the thereby accumulated weak currency reserves at the 
central  bank  issuing  the  weak  currency.  The  resulting  restrictive  money  base  effects, 
however, can be sterilized routinely and unlimited in amount. Therefore, they are irrelevant 
for the system's monetary adjustment constraints. 
As  a result  of this,  the  institutional  rules  and  procedures  for  the  accumulation  and 
investment of intervention reserves in the EMS do not seem to be decisive determinants of 
its  monetary  symmetry  characteristics.  However,  by  tying  the  accumulation  of reserves 
denominated  in  member  currencies  to  the consent of the  issuing  central  bank concerned, 
article 15 has the effect of tightening the asymmetrically designed financing mechanisms and 
the resulting asymmetrical reserve effects of the system. 
3.1.5. Political Exchange Rate Competen~y 
The relevant  resolution  of the  European  Council  explicitly provides  for  discretionary 
adjustments of the bilateral central  rates.  Nevertheless,  the agreement between ·the central 
34
)  See chapter 3 .1.  2. 
35
)  It is assumed that the sterilization capacity of the hard currency country is exhausted before the weak 
currency country reaches its budget restriction of limited intervention reserves.  This assumption is extremely 
unrealistic for the EMS because the sterilization capacity of the traditional anchor currency D-Mark by far 
exceeds the intervention capacity of the weak countries. 
36 banks does not contain any  further arrangements on the rules and procedures for deciding 
such central rate adjustments in practice.  Thereby it is already indicated that the exchange 
rate competency within the EMS is completely political. It is solely assigned to the European 
Council and not to the central banks. For details of the political exchange rate competency, 
the Council's resolution merely states: 
"Adjustments of central rates will be subject to mutual agreement by a common procedure which will 
comprise all countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism and the Commission." (Article 
3. 2. of the Resolution of the European Council of December 5, 1978) 
The EMS  rules, therefore, do provide neither definite economic criteria nor binding proce-
dural  regulations  for  a decision  on  discretionary  exchange rate adjustments.  In  practice, 
realignment  decisions  are  negotiated  and  prepared  by  the  Monetary  Committee  of the 
European  Community.  In  the  end,  however,  mutual  political consent of the  responsible 
Council of Ministers is required
36
• 
Therefore, the realignment procedure's decisive characteristics are that the exchange rate 
competency within the EMS is political and unanimous mutual consent is required. Together, 
the two characteristics ensure a political veto for each member country involved. Therefore, 
the realignment decision remains subject to a politically dominated process of negotiation. 
Appendix on the Basle/Nyborg Agreement 1987 
On  September 8,  1987,  the Committee of Governors of EC  Central Banks decided on 
certain modifications of the intervention rules and financing procedures within the EMS. The 
general  intention  was  to  increase  the  cooperation  among  central  banks.  The agreement's 
main objective was  to  enhance the EMS's resistance against disturbing influences of short 
term money movements by improving the coordination of interest and intervention policies. 
It can be described as an attempt to adjust the EMS's rule system according to the rapidly 
changing market conditions of more liberalized capital and exchange markets within the EC 
and  toward  the  US-Dollar.  Therefore,  the  focus  was  on  providing  improved  protection 
36
)  See for a detailed description of the realignment decisions Kees  (1987). 
37 against  speculative attacks  of the  markets.  Therefore,  the  following  three aspects  of the 
EMS's intervention and financing rules were adjusted37: 
•  To improve the finance mechanism it was agreed to extend the settlement maturity 
from 2,5 to 3,5 months. In addition, the amount for an automatic extension of repay-
ment maturities in  the settlement procedure was  doubled  to  twice the level of the 
respective debtor quota. 
•  As  another measure  to  facilitate  settlement procedures,  it was  agreed  that debtor 
central banks can repay up to 100% of their intervention liabilities in 'official' ECU. 
The original rules obliged the creditor central banks to accept only a maximum of 
50%  of the settlement payments in ECU. 
•  For a more efficient design of the intervention rules,  access  to the the very short--
term facility was extended to the financing of intramarginal interventions, as long as 
the creditor central banks concerned do not explicitly object and the drawings do not 
exceed twice the debtor quota of the intervening country. Intramarginal interventions 
are  carried  out  for  preventive purposes  before  the  central  rates  have  reached  an 
intervention point at which the central banks would be obliged to intervene. 
To summarize  the  results,  the  Basle/Nyborg  Agreement  has  contributed  to  a  more 
efficient design  of the intervention procedure  within  the  EMS.  Especially  the  preventive 
intramarginal interventions were strengthened. The system's basic symmetry characteristics, 
however,  remained unchanged38• 
3
)  See for the corresponding adjustments of article 6.1 of the EMS-Agreement the press statement of the 
EC  central  bank governors  and  the  EMCF  in:  Texts  concerning  the  European  Monetary  System  (1985, 
supplement). For a detailed description and comment see Deutsche Bundesbank (1987, p.66-72). 
38)  The same holds for the money base effects of intramarginal interventions. As far as they are financed 
by drawing on the very short term facility the resulting liquidity effects are at first symmetric.  In the end 
however,  intramarginal interventions remain dependent on the consent of the creditor central bank involved 
and, therefore, can be denied if the creditor's sterilization capacity is exhausted. 
38 3.1.6. Interim Summary of Liquidity and Reserve Effects 
As  long  as  the  analysis  is  limited  to  the  intervention's preliminary liquidity  effects 
directly  deriving  from  the  central  bank's  intervention  transactions  in  the  markets,  the 
systemically determined money base effects seem to be assymmetrically burdening the hard 
currency countries. This view however, considers neither the compensating liquidity effects 
of credit repayments and settlement obligations nor the reserve investment and sterilization 
policy of the central banks involved. Limiting the analysis to the formal rules, therefore, is 
insufficient and leads to the misjudgement of asymmetrical or at least symmetrical liquidity 
effects of EMS interventions for the hard currency countries. In contrast to that, an adequate 
analysis of the overall liquidity eff~ts shows that the formal symmetry is dominated by the 
hard currency countries' sterilization capacities, as well as by the - at least partial - reversal 
of the preliminary money base effects in the settlement process. As a result, interventions in 
the EMS  will only cause expansive monetary adjustment constraints for the hard currency 
country if the intervention volume financed through drawings on the very short-term facility 
exceeds its sterilization capacity
39
• 
With  a  short  delay,  the  reserve  effects  asymmetrically  burdening  the  weak currency 
countries become effective. Those reserve losses are not only resulting from the repayments 
of their own credit-financed interventions but also from  the settlement obligations deriving 
from  the  hard  currency  country's interventions.  As  long  as  the  hard  currency  countries' 
sterilization capacity exceeds the intervention reserves of the weak currency countries, the 
adjustment constraints are dominated by  the reserve effects.  Because of this dominance of 
the reserve effects,  the EMS  is a systemically asymmetrical fixed  rate system.  The adjust-
ment constraints are asymmetrically burdening the currencies valued in the markets as being 
weak. 
3~ For a detailed analysis of the intervention-related liquidity effects within the EMS see Bofinger (1991). 
39 3.2. Working Conditions of the Capital and Foreign Exchange Markets 
3.2.1. Recent Developments 
Since the mid-1980s, the international capital and exchange markets are characterized by 
liberalization  and globalization  trends as  well as by a securitization  of international credit 
relations.  These  trends  have  considerable  consequences  for  the  problem  of stabilizing 
exchange rates within an institutionalized fixed  rate system.  In two different aspects,  they 
have fundamentally changed the conditions of global exchange markets: 
•  In international portfolios with currency diversification the exchange rate has J>ecome 
an autonomous component of the return calculation. Already marginal fluctuations of 
the exchange rates can decisively change the return of a foreign currency portfolio 
calculated in the domestic currency and can (over-)compensate existing interest rate 
divergences. Besides interest rates and prices ( = bond rates), exchange rate gains are 
a  profit  component of their  own  in  international  portfolio  investments.  Portfolio 
restructurings  as  a  result  of changing  currency  preferences,  therefore,  can  at  the 
same time become both a reason for and a result of exchange rate fluctuations.  The 
spot market price effects  of portfolio restructurings as a result of changing exchange 
expectations are consequently the first channel through which the new conditions of 
the capital and exchange markets can make the central banks' effort to stabilize the 
exchange rates more difficult. 
•  The increasing  importance of the exchange rate risk has  simultanously lead  to  the 
development of derivative markets where market participants can hedge their unco-
vered currency positions.  Derivative financial instruments, however, are not soleley 
used  for  hedging  currency  risks  but also  for  establishing  open  currency  positions 
without the necessity of using liquid speculation capital. Repercussions from this kind 
of currency  speculation without capital on  the  spot market are the  second channel 
through which the changed market conditions make it more difficult for the central 
banks to stabilize exchange rates. 
40 With the exchange rate as a part of their currency portfolio's return and the derivative 
instruments of  currency speculation without capital, the markets' incentive for and capability 
of successful speculative attacks against ¢entral banks increases. 
3.2.2. Speculative Attacks 
Return-orientated speculative attacks on the exchange rate promises of institutionalized 
fixed  rate  systems can be performed by the capital and exchange markets in two different 
ways: 
•  On-balance-sheet  attacks  are  capital  backed  speculations.  They  are  carried  out 
directly via the spot markets. The speculators hold their uncovered currency positions 
as hard currency deposits or investments. The hard currency is directly purchased in 
the spot market.  For financing the spot purchases,  weak currency assets are sold or 
·----~------- ' 
additional  weak currency credit facilities  are used.  These on-balance-sheet attacks 
have  a twofold effect on  the  central banks  involved.  At  first,  as  a result of their 
intervention obligations they are forced to take the counter position in the speculative 
,__..--.  - -- -
spot sales of the attacked currency.  The liquidity and reserve effects resulting from 
-
the spot interventions automatically lead to the corresponding system-inherent mone-
tary  adjustment  constraints.  Secondly,  the  weak  currency's  central  bank  in  its 
function as  'lender of last resort' is forced to refinance the speculative credit expan-
sions  at  an  interest  rate  which  is  acceptable  from  the  perspective  of the  national 
economy as a whole in order to maintain orderly conditions in the domestic money 
markets. This means that the central banks are at first obliged to provide the deman-
ded hard currency and at the same time have to guarantee the speculant's refinancing 
in  the weak currency at conditions which  are justifiable from  the domestic point of 
view  of the  national  economy  as  a  whole.  In  addition,  they  have  to  accept  the 
liquidity  and  reserve  effects  and  the  resulting  adjustment  constraints  as  well  as 
corresponding  exchange  losses  from  (re-)  exchanging  the  speculative  currency 
postions in case of a devalutation of the attacked currency
40
• 
40
)  See for a detailed description of speculative on-balance-sheet attacks appendix I of this study. 
41 •  Off-balance-sheet attacks are currency speculations without underlying liquid capital 
positions. They are carried out by forward sales of the weak currency in the forward 
markets. Their transmittance into the spot market takes place indirectly via routinely 
conducted cover transactions of the banks contracting the speculative  forwar~  -~~· 
Again, the central banks have to take the counter position in the spot market and are 
responsible for refinancing both the spot and the swap part of the cover transaction. 
The further course is then identical to an on-balance-sheet attack. The single differen-
ce between the two is that in an off-balance-sheet attack,  the speculative position is 
not established in the spot market but in the forward market. Since the establishment 
of uncovered  forward  positions  is  technically easier and,  therefore,  favourable  in 
terms of transaction costs,  speculators usually will switch to the spot market only if 
the forward markets become inflexible in terms of liquiditf
1
• 
Therefore, independent on whether the speculative attacks are carried out via the spot or 
the forward markets, the central banks of the attacked currencies are the inherent losers all 
along the line: 
•  They provide the speculatively demanded hard currency spot amounts by intervening 
in the markets and have to face the resulting liquidity and reserve effects; 
•  as  lender of last resort,  they refinance the weak currency's expansion of the credit 
volume to finance the speculative positions; 
•  after a forced realignment according to the speculative market pressures,  they have 
to take the currency losses and thereby finance the speculant's profits. 
3.3. Overall Symmetry Characteristics of the EMS 
The E~-~~i_s ~-tn.CU"ket-determined asymmetrical fixed rate system.  Under the prevailing 
conditions its intervention promise is not credible for the markets. The intervention mecha-
nism is neither sufficient to protect the system's exchange rates against speculative attacks 
nor does it provide for an efficient protection against economic irrational market valuations 
41
)  For details, see ibid. 
42 of certain  member currencies.  The triggering  and direction of the system-inherent macro--
.c----~  -- - ------.-.--- ·- ·~~- -
economic  adjustment constraints  is entirely determined by  the markets.  The degree of the 
system'sJl~j~~~me(lt_~nstraints' economic rationality, therefore, only corresponds to that of 
the capital and exchange markets. Speculative attacks of the markets lead either to economi-
cally  unjustified  exchange  rate  adjustments,  or  to  macroeconomic  costs  of inadequate 
adjustment constraints.  The  second  alternative  makes  the first  one all  the  more likely and 
leads to a further loss of credibility of the exchange rate promise. 
The general analysis of the 'rules of the game'  in the EMS Jtas revealed systemic and, 
therefore fundamental shortcomings of the EMS'  institutional setting.  This directly leads to 
an adequate analysis of reasons for the currency crises which is more closer to reality than 
the previous convergence discussions (section IV) and at the same time reveals appropriate 
ideas for reform (section V + VI). 
43 IV. Reasons for the Currency Crisis 
For deducting  adequate reform options,  it is  indispensable to conduct an  analysis  of 
reasons  for  the  crisis  of the  'old EMS'  which  is  in  touch  with  the  markets'  reality;  a 
successful therapy always requires a correct diagnosis.  In the following,  the EMS crisis is 
analyzed as  being  mainly inherent to the system's institutional design and,  therefore,  as  a 
result of its institutional structure under the new conditions of completely liberalized capital 
and exchange markets. It is described as a systemically determined asymmetry crises follo-
wing fundamentally  i"ational market speculations.  Thereby the fundamental  approach of 
explaning the crisis as a result of economic convergence deficits can only play a minor part 
because it only applies to individual member countries but not for all the currencies attacked 
in the course of the 1992/93 crisis. 
4.1. Convergence Crisis 
Assuming  fundamental  rationality  of the  markets,  currency  crises  are  by  definition 
convergence crises.  They then would be a welcome result of fundamental economic diver-
gences revealed by the markets and obviously 'no reason to moum'
42
• 
The European  currency crisis of 1992/93  has  also  been  described  as  a convergence 
crisis
43
• It was said that the capital and exchange markets' speculation had merely revealed 
existing  fundamental  divergences  among  the  member  states  and  thereby  had  forced  go-
vernments and  central  banks  to  actually face  the necessary  adjustment policies.  The fun-
damental convergence necessary for giving up exchange rate adjustments within the EMS, 
it was  said,  has been realized only insufficiently. Existing differences of national inflation 
rates and mentalities in the individual member states were still too large
44
•  In the following, 
it will be demonstrated that the fundamental approach is at best of secondary importance for 
the EMS  crisis of 1992/93. The convergence hypothesis lacks both theoretical backing and 
42)  Blanchard et al (1993). 
43
)  For such an interpretation see Tietmeyer (1992), Kriiger (1992), and Scharrer (1992). 
44
)  See Kriiger (1992) as well as an early opposite position Vehrkamp (1992). 
44 empirical  evidence.  The  EMS  crisis  was  mainly  the  result  of speculative attacks  of the 
markets. According to the economic rationality inherent to the EMS of orientating necessary 
exchange rate adjustments to the state and development of existing national inflation diver-
gences the economic rationality of the market's speculative attack remains at least questiona-
ble for most of the member currencies45• 
The basic difficulty of the convergence approach is the lack of an unambiguous defini-
tion of the underlying criteria for economic convergence. For the analysis of currency crises 
it usually refers to certain fundamental economic data as for example growth, inflation and 
the balance of payments. It is said that a divergent development of certain fundamentals lead 
to corresponding exchange rate fluctuations and within fixed rate systems to either discretio-
nary official central  rate adjustments or to currency crises.  Usually,  however,  neither an 
obvious and conclusive interaction of certain fundamentals  with  the exchange rate is des-
cribed  nor an  explanation  of the  actual  transmittance of fundamental  convergence diver-
gences in the exchange markets is provided. 
In exchange rate theory, the macro-economic pluralism of different models is sufficient 
to give ex post explanations for almost any exchange rate fluctuation. Therefore, fundamen-
tal  exchange analysis  usually  misses the point because it neglects refering to the reality of 
the markets. Often, they are only used to add to the microeconomic rationality of speculative 
capital and exchange markets the same degree of macroeconomic rationality. However, the 
microeconomic rationality of profit maximizing speculation does not automatically follow a 
macroeconomic rationality of the same degree (see chapter 4.2.). 
In  this  context  it has  to  be pointed  out  that  the  economic  rationality  of the  Maastricht 
convergence criteria is  also based on  the assumption of fundamentally rational capital and 
exchange markets.  The first two criteria of inflation convergence and the deficit quotas are 
normative  standards  in  the  sense of fundamental  economic convergence.  Its fulfillment is 
required as a prerequisite for the transition to the third stage.  In contrast to the fundamental 
criteria, the other criteria of interest and exchange rate convergence are market-determined. 
The four criteria as a whole will only be consistent if the markets are rational according to 
the  fundamental criteria.  This  means,  that the markets  have to  orientate their interest and 
exchange rate determination to the development of inflation divergences and budget targets: 
45
)  See  Vehrkamp (1992) as  well as  Wyplosz/Eichengreen (1993). 
45 Provided that these conditions are met the four convergence criteria prove to be consistent; 
however, they obviously prove to be redundant.  The fulfillment of the market criteria is a 
derivative of the fundamental criteria. 
On the other hand,  in case of fundamentally irrational speculations the criteria prove to be 
inconsistent and,  therefore,  prohibitive  for  the  transition  to  the  third  stage.  The  market 
judgement  alone  decides  independently  of an  explicitly  defined  fundamental  rationality 
standard on the beginning of stage three. 
Only if irrational speculative attacks as a determinant of interest and exchange rates can be 
ruled out for the EMS by an ex ante credible exchange rate and intervention mechanism, the 
criteria  inconsistency  could  be  dissolved.  The  market  criteria  would  still  be  redundant; 
however,  they  would  not be able to prevent as  a fundamentally  irrational barrier for  the 
transition to the third stage. In the 'old EMS', this condition of a credible ex ante protection 
against speculative attacks by a credible exchange rate and intervention mechanism is  not 
met.  A  direct  consequence  of this  is  the  formal  blockade  of the  Maastricht  integration 
strategy by the extended fluctuation  margins.  Again,  returning to the narrow margins in a 
'new EMS'  with  a  credibly  designed  intervention  mechanism  proves  to  be a  necessary 
prerequisite for a further progress towards European Monetary Union
52
• 
Despite the macro-theoretical ambiguity in identifying suitable fundamental convergence 
indicators for exchange rate fluctuations, the economic exchange rate criterion is unambigu-
ously determined within the EMS.  The market-determined coordiliation  mechanism of the 
national monetary policies requires the markets to  refer to the inflation criterion.  For the 
EMS, the criterion of inflation divergences as a suitable standard for the exchange rates does 
not  only  result  from  the  relative  purchasing  power  parity  as  a  normative  standard  for 
exchange rate adjustments but directly from the system's market mechanism of the indirect 
monetary policy coordination. Compared to inflation divergences, however, it turns out that 
the fundamental approach of explaning the EMS  crises is limited to  only a few  individual 
currencies involved53• 
52)  See  the  analysis  of the  criteria-orientated  integration strategy  of the  Maastricht  Treaty  in Bofmger 
(1993b) and Petschnigg (1993). 
53
)  For more empirical details see Vehrkamp (1992). This analysis has been confirmed by the ministers and 
central  bank  governors  of the  European  Community.  In their joint communique  on  the  extension  of the 
fluctuation margins to +I  -15% of August 2,  1992 it is said: "This limited measure is a reaction to the specula-
tions which are  exceptional  in both their amount and  their type.  Considering the economic  situation in the 
Member States of the European Monetary System, the current parity grid is absolutely justified. The ministers 
and central bank governors,  therefore,  confirm that they support the current parities and trust in the market 
rates  coming  closer  to  these  parities.  Communique  of the  European  Community  of August  2,  1993;  in: 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1993a, p.20). 
46 It follows that, at least compared with the criterion of fundamental rationality deriving 
from the indirect monetary coordination mechanism within the EMS, the currency crisis was 
the result of market failure. 
4.2. Market Failure 
The conditions of financial  markets  largely correspond  to  the standards of a  'perfect 
market'. This is especially true for the highly efficient foreign exchange markets.  At first, 
therefore, it seems to be unjustified to speak of a capital and exchange markets' failure. 
Indeed the market failure in  the course of the EMS  crises does not consist in micro--
economic  malfunctions  as  a  result  of imperfect  markets  but  in  the  lacking  fundamental 
rationality  of the  monetary  adjustment  constraints  within  the  EMS  which  are  themselve 
dominated by the markets.  One can speak of a lack of fundamental rationality according to 
the EMS  if the market valuations of the individual member currencies are not sufficiently 
orientated to the monetary stability criterion. If currencies with a high level of stability ( = 
low  inflation  rate)  are  subject to  fundamentally  irrational devaluation  speculations of the 
markets, a deflationary adjustment pressure will automatically occur for those countries. As 
a consequence  the  attacked  countries  have  to  carry considerable  macroeconomic  costs of 
inadequate policy adjustment. In times of speculative attacks, the disciplinary mechanism of 
sanctioning  expansive inflation policies is  turned  into  a mechanism  producing  inadequate 
monetary adjustment constraints. The adjustment mechanism then has a deflationary bias48 • 
Thereby  speculative  attacks  grow  up  to  asymmetry  crises  of the  overall  system49•  The 
market failure then consists  in  its insufficient performance as  the  'modus operandi' of the 
system's indirect mechanism of national monetary policy coordination. 
48
)  Inadequate adjustment constraints within the EMS  are as  a direct consequence of the system's asym-
metry are always deflationary. The system, therefore, grants sufficient protection against inflationary infection 
but  not  against  deflationary  adjustment  constraints as  a  consequence  of speculative  attacks.  For a  further 
discussion of this see chapter 5. 1  .. 
4~ For the term 'asymmetry crisis' see Matthes (1992). 
47 A market failure of this kind has been observable both before and during the currency 
crises  and  has  become one of its  most  important  reasons.  Before  the  crisis,  the  market 
failure consisted in the relaxation of the system's disciplinary constraints due to the so-called 
'convergence trading' in the markets. At that time the markets did not force any central rate 
adjustment despite further accumulating monetary convergence deficits for individual curren-
cies50.  The exchange rate illusion has led to a predominant orientation of capital investment 
and  exchange  trading  decisions  to  the  nominal  interest  rate  differences.  Thereby  it  has 
additionally revalued or at least stabilized the exchange rate of countries with a relatively 
higher  inflation  rate  and  correspondingly  higher  nominal  interest  rates51.  The  nominal 
interest divergences within the EMS were no more interpreted by the markets as  represen-
ting premiums for inflation-related devaluation risks, but, while ignoring the exchange rate 
risk,  as  a  real  return  advantage  denominated  in  domestic  currency.  The  ~convergence 
trading'  was  followed  by  a  second  type of market  failure  in  the  course of the  currency 
crises. The re-discovery of the exchange rate risk led to speculative 'undershooting' pheno-
menons and domino effects within and outside the system. Thereby the market failure of the 
'convergence  trading'  was  substituted  by  the  market  failure  of fundamentally  irrational 
speculative attacks. The actual overvaluation of individual currencies during the phase of the 
market's 'convergence plays' was followed by an speculative 'undershooting' in the course 
of the crises. 
The market failure as the most important reason of the crises, therefore, consists at first 
in the failure of the market-determined mechanism of indirect monetary policy coordination. 
The systemically determined consequences of this for the working of the overall system are 
described in the following section. 
4.3. System Failure 
On the one hand, in speculative attacks the EMS's exchange rate promise has proved to 
be implausible for the markets and,  on the other hand,  the rules did not provide sufficient 
~  See International Monetary Fund (1992, p.S-11) and Group of Ten (1992, pp.ll). 
51 )  For an early analysis of this problem see Deutsche Bundesbank (1989). 
48 protection against inadequate monetary adjustment constraints as a consequence of market 
speculations. Both deficiancies are described as failures of the specific fixed rate institution 
EMS.  The credibility deficits of the exchange rate promises result from  the fact that the 
various instruments to defend the exchange rates in the markets are not credible. This is true 
for the interest as well as the intervention mechanism: 
The use of interest rates to defend exchange rates against speculative attacks stands under the 
priority of the domestic economy. It becomes implausible if the interest rates necessary for 
defending  the  exchange  rate  exceeds  a  level  acceptable  for  the  domestic  economy.  The 
experience of the EMS crises has proved the limited credibility of this instrument even in a 
short-term perspective52•  In its core, the exchange rate promise of the central banks, there-
fore,  is an intervention promise. 
But a)so the intervention promise obviously is  not credible in the market's judgment. The 
lack of credibility is  mainly due to  the asymmetrical design of the intervention financing 
mechanism with the settlement obligations of the weak currency countries as its core ele-
ment.  All interventions have to be financed  soleley by the attacked weak currency central 
bank 3,5 months after the end of the intervention  month  at the latest;  the same goes for 
interventions which at first were carried out by a hard currency central bank. The settlement 
obligations lead to  a  further  tightening  of the already  existing  budget restrictions  for  the 
weak currency central banks. Concerning the markets' judgement, the settlement obligations 
tum  the  intervention  mechanism  of the  EMS  into  an  "elaborated  bluff of the  central 
banks"
53
•  An  additional  reason  for  the  implausibility of the  intervention  promise are  the 
intervention's direct money base effects for the hard currency countries. When its steriliza-
tion capacity is exhausted, the hard currency central bank may face considerable restrictions 
in  its ability to control the domestic central bank money supply and the short term interest 
rates  in  the  money  markets.  In  such  a situation  the  scenario of an  opting out of the hard 
currency  central  bank  from  the  system's  exchange  rate  and  intervention  mechanism  is 
52)  For the  swedish experience with an  excessive  use  of the  interest rate instrument to  fight speculative 
attacks see Sveriges Riksbank (1993). 
53
)  A market participant as quoted by the Neue Zurcher Zeitung of September 29/30,  1992. 
49 anticipated by the markets and heavily weakens the intervention promise's credibility in the 
course of a speculative attac~. 
The lack of protection  for  weak currency  countries  against  the  costs  of inadequate 
monetary policy adjustments as a consequence of speculative attacks is also a result from the 
unconditional application of the settlement rules.  The one-sided monetary adjustment con-
straints  for  the  weak currency  countries  triggered  by  the  settlement  obligations  become 
effective irrespective of the particular degree of economic rationality underlying the specula-
tive attack.  It is not feasible nor desirable for any of the participating currencies to submit 
to economical inadequate adjustmen_t  constraints for a longer period of time.  Thereby the 
exchange rate promise becomes  more and  more implausible in  the course of a crisis and 
leads to a self-aggravating loss of credibility for the system. 
The system's failures described are a specific result of the EMS's set of rules.  Conse-
quently, they can be avoided by appropriate modifications of the rules involved. The same 
is true for  the policy failure that is analysed as  the fourth  important reason  for the EMS 
crisis in 1992/93. Policy failure is of importance because in a core element of its institutio-
nal structure, the system has remained subject to political negotiation processes. 
4.4. Policy Failure 
Although the rules of the EMS as agreed between the national central banks guarantee 
a considerable objectivity of the system's functioning, the political exchange rate competency 
remains  in  the sphere of direct  influenc~ of the national  governments.  In  addition  to  the 
management failures of the central banks involved, the political exchange rate competency 
has proved as an additional source of  political mismanagement of the system's rules especial-
ly in the course of the most recent EMS crisis. 
Obviously, the individual governments' power to veto a realignment negotiation has con-
tributed  to  the development that  fundamentally justified adjustments of individual  central 
54
)  See Wyplosz/Eichengreen (1993) and Emminger (1986). 
50 rates did not occur. Appropriate adjustment requests of the central banks involved have been 
declined by the governments of both the potential devaluation and the potential revaluation 
countries. The governments' obstruction of  exchange adjustments in time has been determin-
ed by a mixture of countable economic rent seeking and psychological prestige considera-
tions concerning the own currency's image. In connection with the Maastricht exchange rate 
criterion as a prerequisite for the third stage of European Monetary Union, prestige conside-
rations concerning the own currency's standing in the markets have played an important part 
especially in several weak currency countries.  For the potential revaluation currencies,  the 
occuring exchange rate adjustments  were postponed by  the governments involved largely 
because of elections for  the national parliament taking  place at the same time.  Some go-
vernments of weak currency countries were also interested in maintaining convergence trade 
related  capital  imports  to  facilita~e the  external  financing  of the growing  internal budget 
deficits. The thereby accumulating need of adjustment for some currencies then spilled over 
to other member currencies solely due to crisis-inherent domino effects that finally brought 
about a situation in which the de facto suspension of the exchange rate and intervention rules 
had become unavoidable. 
By leading to an inconsistent distribution of the adjustment instruments between the go-
vernments and central banks, the political exchange rate competency leads to an additional 
loss of credibility. Whereas the exchange rate adjustment mechanism is subject to political 
negotiation procedures,  the interest rate and intervention instruments are controlled by the 
central banks. More credible according to a consistent distribution of the adjustment pressure 
between the three available instruments would be to concentrate them in one hand. 
The main management failure of the central banks was the repeatedly occuring stimula-
tion  of the  market's  speculative  phantasy  by  uncoordinated  and  sometimes  even  adverse 
public statements of central bank officials. The German/English discords directly associated 
with  the crisis of the British pound are only the most distinct example for this.  Inadequate 
policy coordination in the course of a crisis is encouraged by the lack of a sufficient mecha-
nism  of direct coordination among  the central banks;  they could have been avoided  much 
more easily within a more explicit 'governance structure' as it is now provided by the EMI. 
51 Summary 
The crisis of the EMS in 1992/93 can in its essence be described as a speculation-caused 
asymmetry crisis.  It was the necessary result of fundamentally irrational market speculation 
in interaction with the systemically determined asymmetrical monetary adjustment constraints 
for  the  weak  currency  countries  and  - from  the  markets'  point  of view  - the  system's 
exchange rate and  intervention promise being not credible nor sustainable in  the course of 
a speculative attack. 
As  a  minimum  requirement  for  suitable  reform  options,  the  system's  institutional 
structure has to be extended for certain precautions against deflationary effects of inadequate 
adjustment constraints as  well  as  for  an  intervention  mechanism  which  is credible for  the 
makets. 
52 V. Reform Options 
5.1. Preliminary conditions 
For being acceptable for all member governments and central banks involved, adequate 
reform options have to meet certain preliminary conditions. These conditions can directly be 
derived  from  the original econcomic and  political objectives of the  system,  the given in-
stitutional settings and strategies of the Maastricht Treaty, and from the systemical reasons 
of the actual EMS crisis that has led to its de facto suspension in August 1993. 
The main objective of establishing the system in  1979 was a zone of monetary stability 
in  Europe.  The EMS  was  supposed to contribute both to  the stability of the national price 
levels in  the countries involved and to  the exchange rate stabilization among them.  Achie-
ving exchange rate stability on the expense of the stability of national price levels, therefore, 
has  been  explicitly  ruled  out  from  the  start.  This  obvious  priority  for  the  objective  of 
monetary stability also corresponds to the monetary policy standard agreed on in the Maa-
stricht Treaty as a precondition for the transition to the third stage of the European Monetary 
Union.  Furthermore,  the  necessity  to  protect  weak  currency  countries  frcm  inadequate 
macroeconomic adjustment costs as  a consequence of systemically determined  speculative 
asymmetry crisis is an additional precondition for successfully reforming the 'old EMS'. 
The following three preliminary conditions can be summarized: 
•  Stability  Criterion: 
For hard currency countries it has  to be ensured that the systemical adjustment constraints 
are orientated to the standard set by the lowest inflation rate within the system. Concerning 
the monetary stability policies, the disciplinary effect of the anchor currency mechanism may 
not  be  relaxed.  Since the  EMS  as  an  exchange  rate  regime of uncovered  national  paper 
currencies  does  not  provide  a  real  anchorage,  the  'nominal  anchor'  of the  most  stable 
currency has  to dominate the stability standard of the system as a whole. 
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/ •  Protection against Opportunism I (=protection_ against  'inflationary infection'): 
For the  stability-orientated countries  precautions  have  to  be taken  protecting  them  from 
opportunistic behaviour of less stability-orientated states within the system. An  'inflationary 
infection' has to be ruled out.  At least in case of rational market valuations of the member 
currencies ( = absence of speculative attacks), the asymmetry has to remain effective. 
•  Protection against Opponunism II (=protection against speculative attacks) 
Under  the  prevailing  conditions  of economical  irrational  exchange  speculations  attacked 
currencies have to be sufficiently protected against inadequate monetary adjustment costs. 
The protection  against  'inflationary infection'  for  the  hard  currency  countries  has  to  be_ 
completed by a complementary protection for the weak currency countries against deflationa-
ry adjustment constraints in the consequence of speculative attacks. 
Besides  the  stability  criterion,  the  protection  from  'inflationary  infection',  and  the 
protection from speculative attacks, an EMS reform has to consider the transition to the third 
stage by 1999 at the latest as scheduled by the Maastricht Treaty. Following the additional 
criterion  of institutional  efficiency,  the  required  EMS-reform  in  the  phase  of transition 
should use the given institutional structure of stage two. The core institutional innovation of 
the second stage is the EMI as the nucleus of the future ECB. 
Corresponding to the above analyzed market and system failure,  the market conditions 
and the EMS's set of  rules  may serve as appropriate starting points for reform options. The 
analysis so far has shown that the market and system failures are not only interdependent but 
prove to be even self-aggravating in the c~urse of a crisis. This interaction has to be taken 
into account for reviewing the various reform options.  The fact that the market conditions 
of speculative attacks  have proved  to  be one of the  reasons  for  and  at  the  same  time a 
consequence of the system failure may justify the focus on institutional reform options in the 
following.  Re-establishing credible system rules,  therefore, is an  important contribution to 
improve the market conditions. For reforming the EMS, the adjustment of its rule system to 
the market conditions of fully liberalized capital and exchange markets proves to be necessa-
ry and sufficient at the same time. With a credible and sustainable system a re-regulation of 
the markets will become superfluous. 
54 5.2. Direct Coordination of Monetary Policy 
The above analysis  has shown that the EMS  as a simple fixed rate system has  failed 
under the conditions of speculative attacks.  The market mechanism of indirect monetary 
policy coordination has  proved  to be inefficient.  From the point of view of the attacked 
currencies,  a  sufficient  protection  against  fundamentally  irrational  monetary  adjustment 
contraints as a systemic consequence of market speculations is not guaranteed. 
Supplementing  the  EMS  with  a  mechanism  of direct  monetary  policy  coordination, 
therefore,  is a feasible starting point for reform.  The market coordination could be supp-
lemented or even being replaced by a direct coordination of the authorities. 
Proposals on a direct coordination of monetary policies within the EMS have to provide 
solutions for at least two different problems: 
•  A suitable institutional a"angement has to be implemented; 
•  Efficient policy  rules  for conducting  the direct coordination in  every day practice 
have to be agreed. 
Both the institutional as well as the policy aspect of a direct coordination should follow the 
criterion of efficient institution and rule formation. Establishing new institutions or monetary 
policy concepts exclusively for the limited duration of stage two, therefore, would prove to 
be inefficient. Any direct coordination of the national monetary policies within a 'new EMS' 
consequently should evolve from  the given institutional arrangement of the EMI agreed on 
in the Maastricht Treaty and already established at the beginning of stage two. 
In defining the institutional framework for a direct monetary policy coordination one has 
to decide weather a certain institutionalized 'governance structure' proves to be helpful and 
weather the all  day conduct of policy coordination  should follow  a certain policy rule or 
should be handled discretionary. 
55 A discretionary  coordination  without governance  structure  is  almost identical  to  the 
conditions of the indirect market coordination within the 'old EMS'. Without explicit rules 
and procedures, the monetary coordination will only be accepted by the markets if the (n-1) 
member states are unconditionally accepting the resulting hegemonic coordination structure 
dominated  by  the de facto  key  currency  of the  system.  In  a  structure of this  kind,  the 
(n-1)-inember states would have to give up their monetary policy autonomy in favour of the 
remaining degree of freedom for the key currency country. In contrast to an asymmetrically 
designed fixed rate system like the EMS, a hegemonic structure is not market  -determined but 
based  on voluntary  coordination  obligations  of the  individual  countries.  The  hegemonic 
coordination  is  likely  to  increase a  system's credibility although  a· common  'governance 
structure' does not exisf
5
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However, tying one's hands by submitting to a hegemonic coordination structure implies 
certairl  risks  concerning  the  hegemonic  policy  standard  set  by  the  key  currency.  If for 
example the  key  currency  is  for  domestic  reasons  performing an  expansionary  monetary 
policy and thereby dragging the system's anchor or, in the opposite case,  is performing an 
exessively restrictive policy the (n-1) countries are forced to follow irrespective of their own 
domestic situation. A hegemonic coordination structure, therefore, is completely dependent 
on  the key currency's performance and policy decisions.  Besides this,  neither the absolute 
stability  standard  of the  system  nor  the  credibility  of the  voluntary  adjustment  for  the 
markets  is  guaranteed.  Like  any  other procedure  of direct coordination,  the  hegemonic 
coordination  structure  remains  subject  to  the  markets'  judgment.  As  long  as  different 
national monetary policies exist~ no direct coordination procedure can guarantee a complete 
protection for the exchange rates against the market's dictate. 
Still, a direct coordination of the  monetary policy  in  the  EMS  is desirable  for  other 
reasons concerning the intervention policy. A direct coordination of exchange interventions, 
interest rates, and liquidity management by the central banks would increase the probability 
55)  Successful  examples  of a  hegemonic  coordination  structure  without  a  corresponding  'governance 
structure' are the monetary policy concepts of Austria outside the EMS and of the Netherl~ds  within the EMS. 
Both countries have achieved an almost perfect stabilization of their exchange rates through unconditionally 
tying their interest rate and liquidity policy to the policy of the anchor currency central bank. 
56 and credibility of a consistent use of these instruments to  discourage speculative attacks. 
However~· ror  ··r-easons of institutional efficiency one should abstain from a gradual transfer 
of national  monetary  competencies.  A  monetary  training  period  for  the  ECB  is  neither 
necessary nor desirable. To assure an in time transition to the third stage, one should refrain 
from complicating and extending the second. An early monetary autonomization of national 
central banks would serve as a significant credibility gain for a direct monetary coordination 
procedure within the given 'governance structure' of  the EMI. Through its increased cxedibi-
lity,  the  EMI  as  a  ~council of  Autonomous  Central Bank  Governors~ could  significantly 
reduce the monetary adjustment costs of a discretionary COOJ;"dination._ The loss of reputation 
...------ ~ ___  , ___  -- ~--
for individual central banks unwilling to cooperate would serve as an  indir~t$.allctioning 
mechanism for a direct monitoring and coordination of national monetary polici~~~ within the 
....---------·  -~------·--· ,. 
EMI. Additionally equiped with the exchange rate management competency within the EMS, 
the EMI will  evolve towards a  ~European Autonomy  Standard~ in which the credibility of 
exchange rate promises can be restored,  too
56
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As  well  as  the  'governance structure'  the  definition of a  suitable policy  rule for  the 
direct policy coordination is subject to the criterion of institutional efficiency. Introducing 
new  monetary policy procedures for the phase of transition has  to be ruled out for being 
inefficient57•  The policy rule of monetary coordination within  the EMS  should,  therefore, 
refer to a likely monetary concept of the future ECB. Common money supply and price level 
standards as  well as corresponding procedures of the interest rate and liquidity management 
would be conceivable
58
: 
•  The  McKinnon  rule  (1984)  suggests  a  common  monetary  targeting  for  the  entire 
currency area.  The central  banks involved should follow  national  targets  which in 
their  aggregate  are  compatible  with  the  common  target.  In  order  to  ensure  the 
56)  For more details see chapter 6. 1. 
57
)  For such proposals on a european minimum reserve conception for the transitional phase see Ciampi 
(1989) and Gros (1990) as well as  the dicussion of the proposals in Bofinger (1993a). 
58)  See  for  the  basics  McKinnon (1984) and  the Council of Economic Advisers (1976).  For a detailed 
discussion of the proposals see Bofinger (1991, p.203-267; 1993, pp.167) 
57 compatibility of the common monetary target with national intervention obligations, 
McKinnon suggests a sterilization ban and corresponding reserve investment rules. 
Thereby entirely asymmetrical and, with regard to the aggregate, self-compensating 
liquidity effects of the interventions are guaranteed.  The common meta  monetary 
targeting is not disturbed by liquidity effects of exchange interventions. 
•  The  German  Council  of Economic  Advisors  (1976)  has  proposed  a  coordination 
procedure in which the national central banks have to manage an identically defined 
money supply (e.g., monetary base) according to ex ante agreed targets.  In contrast 
to the McKinnon rule, the determination of the national targets does not result from 
disaggregating a meta rule but with respect to different national industrial production 
capacities, different growth rates and so-called unavoidable national inflation rates. 
The  intervention  obligations  are  supposed  to  be designed  in  a  way  assuring  that 
liquidiy effects do not endanger the achievement of the national targets, otherwise, 
the intervention obligations are to be suspended. 
With regard to the integration of direct monetary policy coordination mechanisms in the 
EMS  during  stage  two,  however,  both  of the  above  mentioned  coordination  rules  have 
serious shortcomings. Whereas the McKinnon rule assumes a common monetary target and 
is  thereby  violating  the  national  monetary  policy  autonomy  explicitly  guaranteed  in  the 
Maastricht Treaty, the coordination procedure of the Council of Economic Advisors does not 
provide for a credible intervention mechanism to curb speculative attacks. 
In order to establish a credible interv~ntion mechanism while simultaneously maintaining 
national monetary autonomy it is therefore suggested to combine a common policy rule for 
direct  monetary  coordination  within  the  EMI  with  a  conditional  temporary  suspension 
competency of the EMS's settlement obligations59: 
Concerning monetary coordination, the member states should ex ante agree on standards for 
national money supply or price level targets according to the above mentioned proposal of 
5~ For a more detailed discussion of this proposal see chapter 6.1. 
' 
58 the Council of Economic Advisors. Thereby neither the agreement of a common monetary 
policy conception is required nor is the autonomy of national monetary management being 
restricted. It is only necessary to mutually accept the specific national targets on a common 
level as  providing a  suitable guarantee for  the  monetary  stability  within  the  system  as  a 
whole. The national targets should be agreed on by mutual consent within the EMI-council 
of autonomous central bank govemors
60
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The monetary coordination mechanism should be supplemented by the council's compe-
tency to  suspend the settlement obligations.  However,  this competency remains limited to 
situations of clearly identifiable fundamentally irrational attacks of the capital and exchange 
markets. The ex ante agreed on monetary coordination targets serve as appropiate fundamen-
tal  identification criteria for speculative attacks.  If a country meets its ex ante targets and 
nonetheless becomes subject of a speculative attack, the EMI may decide the suspension of 
the settlement obligations for support interventions in favour of the attacked currency. The 
resulting unlimited intervention obligation of the hard currency countries without correspon-
ding  settlement  mechanisms  burdening  the  attacked  currencies  provides  for  a  credible 
intervention  mechanism  to curb speculative attacks once they  occur or even prevent their 
emergence from the start. The suspension competency may be combined with a sterilzation 
ban and corresponding reserve investment rules following the McKinnon concepf1• 
In addition,  the proposed combination of an ex ante coordination of national monetary 
policies with a conditional suspension competency of the settlement obligations meets all of 
the  above  required  preconditions  for  a  successful  EMS  reform  during  stage  two.  The 
stability criterion  is met by the monetary standard agreed on in the voluntary monetary ex 
ante coordination of national monetary targeting. A sufficient 'protection against inflationary 
infection ' is  ensured by  the asymmetric  intervention  mechanism of the  'old EMS' which 
remains unmodified. As  an additional reform innovation the conditional suspension compe-
tency of the settlement obligations provides sufficient protection against speculative attacks 
~  The rule of mutual consent corresponds to the rule of unanimity, in which all members have to agree; 
see Bofinger (1991, pp.l92). 
61
)  For an application of such a reform strategy see chapter 6.2.2  .. 
59 and their systemical consequences of inadequate adjustment constraints. In such a scenario 
additional institutions are not necessary for the transitional phase, whereby the criterion of 
institutional efficiency  is  also satisfied.  The already existing institutions are  merely supp-
lemented and more efficient!  y used. 
5.3. European Intervention Fund (ElF) 
Together  with  the  foundation  of the  EMS  in  1978/79,  a  European  Monetary  Fund 
(EMF) was scheduled to be found as the core element of the so-called institutional phase two 
already two years after the system's implementation. In its concluding notes the European 
Council conference of July 6 and 7,  1978 says in point 4 of the annex: 
"Not later than two years after the start of the scheme, the existing arrangements and institutions will 
be consolidated in a European Monetary Fund." 
The European Council's resolution of December 5, 1978 laid down that the second phase as 
the final stage of the system should entail besides the establishment of the European Moneta-
ry Fund the unlimited utilization of the ECU as a reserve asset and as a means of settlement. 
The fund's most important objective was the institutional integration and consolidation of the 
existing credit mechanisms within the system.  For years there has been a broad discussion 
based on these statements of intention about the design of the final institutional stage of the 
EMS.  Despite the clear allowances, the discussion came to nothing for political reasons.  It 
failed  mainly because the governments were not ready to admit a supra-national institution 
with monetary competencies within the EC besides the national central banks. In accordance 
to  that,  neither the Maastricht Treaty  provides  for any  transference of national  monetary 
sovereignty  to  a  supra-national  institution.  Our  criterion  of institutional  efficiency  has 
confirmed this strategy as being rational. Still, tlie idea of a European Monetary Fund should 
be reconsidered  with  regards  to  a  more credible design and  performance of intervention 
policies within the EMS. 
The institutional analysis of the EMS has shown that from the hard currency countries' 
point of view the liquidity effects of interventions make the intervention promise becoming 
unsustainable  in  the course of a crisis.  When  their sterilization capacity  is  exhausted  the 
interventions  lead  to  an  irreversible  expansion  of the  money  base  and,  therefore,  to  a 
60 considerable loss of efficiency in controlling the domestic monetary aggregates.  However, 
the only reason for this is the fact that the central banks carry out their interventions via the 
existing  central  bank accounts of the banks  involved.  Thereby,  the interventions  have a 
direct expasionary effect on the national central bank money circulation62• 
Intervention-caused money base effects could be avoided if the interventions are taken 
--
out of the accounts of the central banks by transferring the execution of interventions in the 
markets to an external fund established exclusively for that purpose.  From the accounting 
-- -
point of view, the fund's enforcement of interventions would not affect the domestic central 
bartxmoney-circulation.-
Shifting the interventions 'out of the central bank's account'
63  is attainable by founding 
""-~- _,-.:;:..,.~,~  ---.  ..... - -·  -
a European Intervention Fund (ElF), for example. As a commonly established and managed 
fun(f: -the,_central--banks  would  provide  the  ElF with  sufficient  intervention  deposits  or 
.. 
intervention  credit  facilities.  The  ElF then  establishes  its  own  accounts  with  the  banks 
involved in the foreign exchange trading, through which all interventions would be carried 
out. Such an arrangement is sufficient to guarantee that interventions are separated from the 
national central bank money circulations. 
Of course, such an intervention fund would also involve liquidity effects for the banking 
system  as  a whole.  The important difference to conventional central bank interventions is 
that the fund •  s liquidity effects become effective not on the basic level of the central bank 
money supply ( = money base) but only on the broader level of the non bank liquidity. Inter-
ventions by the ElF would be completely neutral  for  the central bank money  supply and, 
62
)  In our context, central bank money is the equivalent of the commercial bank's deposits at the central 
bank.  Central bank money circulations are institutionally self-contained deposit circulations which are entirely 
subject to the central bank's control.  The overall amount of central bank money is  adjustable only through 
direct transactions with the central bank. The commercial banks can trade central bank money among themsel-
ves (=money market transactions), but they cannot extend its volume. The demand of the commercial banks 
for central bank money is controlled by the central bank's reserve rules. The central banks, therefore, dominate 
both the supply and demand of central bank money. This power to control the central bank money markets is 
in fiat money systems the basis of the central bank's ability to conduct a monetary targeting. To the degree a 
central bank is obliged to  intervene in the exchange markets its control over the money markets is loosened 
because the interventions are accounted via the banking system's central bank money deposits. 
63
)  See Deutsche Bundesbank (1993, p.23). 
61 therefore, do not restrict the efficiency of domestic money supply control. 
The expensive construction of such an intervention fund exclusively for the transitional 
phase, however, is an important disadvantage from the perspective of institutional efficiency. 
A strategy of central bank interventions in  the forward  market which  is developed in  the 
following seems to be much more efficient. A foward intervention strategy allows to retain 
the avoidance of expansive money base effects without having to accept the disadvantages 
of institutional inefficiencies during the phase of transition. 
5.4. Interventions in the Forward Market 
"  ...  there is much to the argument that pure speculation, completely unjustified by any adverse 
fundamentals in trade and normal capital movements, could not defeat a bold, resolute, and 
if necesary unlimited forward support policy." (Yeager;  1976, p.281) 
"Aile Beteuerungen der Wihrungsbehorden eines  Landes,  da6  die Pari  tit seiner Wihrung 
unter  keinen  Umstinden  verindert  werde,  klingen kaum  sehr  glaubhaft,  wenn  man  sich 
gleichzeitig weigert, die Terminkurse durch offizielle Interventionen zu stiitzen." (Sohmen; 
1971, p.131) 
Central bank interventions in the spot markets always and automatically involve direct 
liquidity and reserve effects. That is why unlimited spot intervention promises of the central 
banks are inherently implausible for the markets. They are perceived as being self-defeating. 
With~n the EMS this mainly results from the expansive liquidity effects of spot interventions 
for  the  hard  currency countries  and  from  the budgedt  restrictions  of financing  the  inter-
ventions for the weak currency countries: 
•  Unlimited  spot  intervention  promises  of a  hard  currency  central  bank  are  only 
credible as  long  as  the  expansive  money  base  effects of the  interventions do  not 
exceed its sterilization capacity and thereby dominate its central bank money supply. 
Willi it's sterilization capacity being exhausted, further exchange interventions would 
lead  to  an  ultimate loss of the central bank's control over domestic  money  market 
conditions.  FQr  the entire system the nominal stability anchor is dragging and, due 
""  ' 
to  speculation,  the  monetary  adjustment constraints  become  more  symmetrical  or 
even  asymmetrical for the  intervening  hard currency country.  In  such  a  situation, 
__..------,·~~~-- <"-~ 
62 market participants realistically anticipate an opting-out of the hard currency central 
b~~. The attacked  currency  will  unavoidably  be devalued  in  the  markets.  The 
speculants  then  will have the possibility to re-exchange  their speculative currency 
positions  with  the central  banks  and  thereby  take  considerable  exchange profits. 
Therefore, unlimited spot intervention promises of the hard currency countries tend 
to  be  self-defeating by  even  aggravating  the  market's speculations  instead of de-
pressing them. 
•  At the same time unlimited spot interventions of weak currency countries become 
fishy  when their budget restriction of limited hard currency intervention reserves is 
reached or anticipated by  the  markets for  the near future as a consequence of the 
mounting  settlement  and  repayment  obligations.  The  shorter  the  repayment  and 
settlement  maturities,  the  faster  the credibility loss  will  occur.  In  addition,  inter-
ventions of weak currency countries do also cause expansive liquidity effects for the 
hard currencies provided they are financed out of reserves which had previously been 
deposited at the  hard currency central bank or by  drawings on  the hard currency 
country's credit facility. 
Overall it  has become clear,  that unlimited spot intervention promises are implausible 
because in  the  worst case of speculative tests by  the markets  they  cause  monetary policy 
costs which rationally are unacceptable for any of the central banks involved65•  Therefore, 
spot interventions cannot be credible because they are not sustainable. 
In order to avoid intervention-caused liquidity and reserve effects and the resulting loss 
of credibility,  an  extension of the central banks'  in~I"\'~n~~_<?.n.J>9licy_~from the  spot to the 
64
)  This is called to be realistic, because the opting-out behaviour of the Bundesbank as the traditional hard 
currency  central  bank of the  EMS  is  following such  a pattern.  Already  the  final  suspension of the  dollar 
intervention obligation of the Bretton Woods System in March 1973 has been justified by the Bundesbank with 
its unacceptable expansive liquidity effects. The transition to flexible exchange rates, therefore, is also a direct 
result of an opting-out of the Bundesbank forced by speculations. For this and the explicit opting-out reservea-
tion of the Bundesbank within the  EMS  see  Emminger (1986,  pp.361).  For the empirical relevance of this 
during the EMS•s  1992/93 crisis see Wyplosz/Eichengreen (1993, pp.57). 
65
)  This is confirmed by the already cited market judgement describing the EMS•s intervention mechanism 
as  an  "ellaborated bluff of the central banks".  See Neue Ziircher Zeitung September 29/30, 1992, p.14. 
63 forward market is suggested66• Interventions of central banks in the forward market have the 
impo~t advantage  of avoiding  any  direct  liquidity  and  reserve  effects.  Furthermore, 
forward interventions are not underlying a budget restriction because no liquid spot reserves 
are  necessary.  Since  they  are  also  neutral  in  terms  of liquidity,  forward  interven.tions 
compared  to  spot  interventions  are  the  more  credible  strategy  from  the  speculant's  per-
spective to guarantee an intervention promise,.  Only the unlimited willingness of the central 
banks to intervene in the forward  market can prove to the markets that the central banks 
~-
themselves believe as much in their own exchange rate promise as  they expect the market 
participants to do. 
In  principle,  two  different  mechanisms  are conceivable  for  forward  interventions  in 
order to ensure the exchange rates it the spot market: 
•  In the off-balance-sheet variant of  a speculative attack, the central banks directly take 
~-
the counter position of speculative foward  sales of the attacked currency by.  inter-
vening in the _foward markets. With that, the transmittance of the speculative forward 
sales  into the spot  market is  interrupt~. The central banks avoid the necessity of 
•· 
corresponding spot interventions which would inevitably become necessary in case of 
a speculative free market foward sale of the attacked currency that afterwards has to 
be covered by the contracting bank and thereby is transmitted in the spot markef
7
• 
•  On-balance-sheet attacks are carried out directly by sales of the attacked currency in 
the spot market;  however,  they can be kept off just as off-balance-sheet attacks by 
interventions of the central  banks in  the  forward  f!larket.  Whenever a currency is 
under pressure  in  the spot  market,  the central banks can  stabilize its  spot rate by 
" 
taking a long position in the forward market. As a result of this, the contracting bank 
is facing a foward risk which routinely has to be offset. Thereby the central bank's 
66)  For the  theory of foward interventions see the discussion of the relevant literature in Yeager (1976, 
p.279-285) and Sohmen (1973, p.83-131). 
67)  This is confirmed by the IMF's analysis of the mechanics of speculative attacks within the EMS: "If a 
central bank's foward purchase matches a foward sale of some other customer in the banking system, all the 
/  swap and spot transactions of the banking system will cancel; specifically, spot exchange sales will be matched 
with puchases at the parity exchange." International Monetary Fund (1993, p.41). 
64 forward intervention is transmitted into the spot marker
8
• 
Crucial  objections against forward  interventions are the possibly greater intervention 
volumes compared to a strategy of direct interventions in the s~t  ~arket and the argument 
~-----~ ~..-------~- -----~- ---~-~-~-...,_.---~---.  ~----· 
that- the liquidity and reserve effects of spot interventions are not really avoided but only 
/  delayed-~~~~~WritY-~~ of the  forward  contract69.  Both  objections,  however,  are 
flawed because they continue to assume the possibility of an exchange rate adjustment. Their 
releVance ts; therefore, limited to the case of forward interventions in flexible exchange rate 
.,..._  -- --
systems  respectively fixed  rate systems  with explicit central rate adjustment reservations. 
Here, however, it is proposed to use forward interventions as an instrument to guarantee a 
de facto core currency union in which the fluctuation margins for the spot rates continue to 
.. ~~M·-••  >  ~  •  ' 
exist but the bilateral central rates are irrevocably fixed. Forward speculation against central 
banks is only rational from the speculants' point of view in so far they can expect the future 
- ---- ,  ---~-,-~·--
spot rate to be lower than the central bank's forward intervention rate. If fluctuation margins 
and eeritral rates remain unchanged, however' the delivery of speculative forward contracts 
will always  and automatically involve speculative losses of an  amount equal  to  the  inter 
-
currency interest rate difference as it is represented in the swap rate. The speculants them-
selves have to take the~  losses.  Si~ce forward interventions- unlike interventions in the spot 
- ~- -·~  ·- .. - ~ 
market - do not force central banks to give up their exchange rate guarantee as a consequen-
ce of excessive liquidity and reserve effects, the central banks' promise to keep central rates 
and  fluctuation .margins  unchan,ged  remains  credible even  in  times of speculative attacks, 
because  the  speculants. are  punished  with  unavoidable  occurring  losses  and  are  thereby 
discouraged from the start. 
Forward interventions, therefore, are the suitable strategy for the EMS  to protect a de 
facto monetary union of the core countries which are already today in a position to meet the 
necessary convergence criteria as agreed preconditions for entering the final stage of EMU. 
However, to establish a de facto monetary union it would be neither necessary nor useful to 
abandon the fluctuation margins. It is sufficient to ultimately fix the central rates. Therefore, 
68
)  For a detailed description see appendix I. 
~  For a discussion of this argument see Fischer-Erlach (1991, p.82-88). 
65 the old margins of +/-2,25% should be re-established while at the same time the exchange 
rate adjustment  reservations  with  regard  to  the central  rate and  the corresponding  inter-
vention limits are irrevocably given up.  Maintaining the fluctuation margins around the for 
ever fixed central rates facilitates a sensible installation of a forward intervention promise. 
In addition, the margins will help to guarantee a sufficiently liquid spot market as well as a 
certain  flexibility  for  national  interest  rate  policy
70
•  The asymmetrical  spot  intervention 
""'-- --
mechanism  of the  'old EMS'  is  supplemented  by  unlimited  and  symmetrically  designed 
forward intervention obligations of the central banks involved. 
In an arrangement like this the credibility of the fluctuation margins is guaranteed by the 
unlimited  forward  intervention  promises.  In  principle,  the  development  of the  spot  rate 
within  the  margin  remains  market-determined;  however,  it  may  be  influenced  by  spot 
interventions and interest rate adjustments of the central banks. The asymmetrically designed 
spot market intervention mechanism should be kept unchanged because it is domesticated by 
the foward  interventions.  Therefore,  it can serve as a suitable mechanism of coordinating 
and disciplining national interest rate policies. Whenever a currency is under pressure in the 
spot markets, the central banks concerned are at first obliged to support it by intervening in 
the spot markets.  Only if the liquidity and reserve effects due to the spot interventions are 
becoming unsustainable, the central banks will start to support their spot intervention policy 
by  interest  rate  measures.  With  credible  margins,  the  establishment  of a  modest  inter 
currency  interest  rate  difference  will  prove  to  be  sufficient  to  arouse  interest  arbitrage 
orientated capital movements and thereby assure the desired stabilization of the spot rate (for 
further details see box I). 
In  ~_e ~ourse of a speculative attack,  with a foward intervention obligation the central 
banks are able to- ~ef~~n from  an  excessive use of the interest instrument by allowing the 
forward rate falling down to the lower intervention point and then absorbing the speculative 
attack by unlimited forward interventions.  In addition, the central banks may stimulate the 
~  This  argument was  already  mentioned by  J.M.  Keynes  who,  as  the  founder  of the  foward  theory, 
proposed in his Tract interventions in the foward market in order to extend the marginal leeway for a national 
monetary and interest rate policy even  in a gold standard with fully liberalized capital and  exchange trans-
actions.  See Keynes (1923, p.94-ll5). 
66 I 
Interaction of Interest Rate and Intervention Policies 
in Fixed Rate Systems with Forward Interventions 
In  a  'new EMS' following the suggested refonn strategy, the spot intervention mechanism of the  'old EMS' 
serves as an efficient instrument to coordinate the intramarginal interest rate policies within the system, while the 
additionally  introduced  unlimited  and  symmetrically  designed  forward  intervention  obligations  will credibly 
guarantee the  fluctuation  margin~. The interaction of interest rate and intervention policies in  the course of a 
speculative attack can be described as follows: 
1. Phase: In the beginning a stable equilibrium is assumed in which the spot rates more or less correspond to the 
bilateral central rates. Slight deviations of the spot rates around the central rates are purely caused by 'nonnal' 
transactions,  a  speculative  pressure of the  markets  does  not  exist.  Because of the  stability  of expactations 
concerning the future exchange rates the spot rates are equal to the foward rates: the inter currency interest rate 
difference tends to be zero; a unifonn interest rate prevails for all currencies involved. 
2. Phase: As result of an exogenous destabilization of the exchange expectations speculative pressure occurs in 
the spot market. At firSt,  the central banks concerned will try to damp down the pressure by spot interventions. 
If those intramarginal spot interventions prove to  be insufficient to stabilize the spot rates, the strategy will be 
supplemented by establishing an  intramarginal inter currency interest rate difference in  favour of the weak 
currency. The attacked currencies are even forced to do so because the spot intervention mechanism of the 'old 
EMS  asymmetrically  burdens  the  weak  currency  countries.  Already  the  unavoidable  reserve  effects  as  a 
consequence of spot interventions are sufficient to  force the weak currency countries to  use the intramarginal 
interest rate policy as a defence mechanism against the speculative market pressure. 
3. Phase: If the intramarginal inter 
currency  interest  rate  difference 
does  prove  to  be  insufficient  to 
stimulate interest arbitrage motivat-
ed  capital movements in  favour of 
the  weak  currency,  foward  inter-
ventions will become necessary for 
ultimately  combating  the  atttack. 
With  the  forward  rate dropped to 
the  lower  intervention  point,  the 
unlimited  and  symmetrically  desi-
gned  forward  intervention  obliga-
tion  is  activated.  A  further  falling 
of both,  the  spot  and  the  foward 
rate is  thereby stopped.  The inter-
Graphic 1: Interaction of Interest Rate and Intervention 
Polley In Fixed Rate Systems with Forward Interventions 
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vention strategy does not incur any  28 '--t---t---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--' 
costs for the central banks because  2  3  4  5  e  7  8  9  10 
with  forward interventions no  liquidity and reserve effects are conected. Maturing foward contracts, however, 
inevitably lead to exchange losses for the speculants in an amount equal to the swap rate. Besides that, the central 
bank can stimulate the spot supply in  hard currency necessary for sterilizing the liquidity effects in  the conse-
quence of maturing  foward  interventions  by  simply  prolongating  their  foward  positions  in  the  market.  By 
aggressive! forward interventions slightly above the lower intervention point the central banks can even activate 
covered interest arbitrage already before the interventions become obligatory at the intervention point. 
4. Phase: With the increasing losses of the speculants the market pressure diminishes: ... 'the central banks need 
only keep their nerves'. Their intervention strategy is  not associated with  any 'costs' in tenns of unsustainable 
liquidity  and  reserve  effects  and,  therefore,  is  credible  for  the  markets.  With  the  restabilization  of market 
expactations covered interest arbitrage is  strengthened and leads toward a new equilibrium. 
S.  Phase: When the stabilization process is  finished,  the initial equilibrium is  restored. The successful fight of 
the attack prevents its  reemergence because the system is  self-stabilized by the 'learning' of rational speculants. 
67 spot supply of hard currency necessary for stabilizing the spot rate by so-called aggressive 
forward interventions
71
•  The resulting cover and arbitrage reactions of the markets will then 
transfer the foward  supply of the attacked currency into a spot supply.  Even in  the worst 
case of a  speculative attack,  therefore,  unsustainable liquidity and  reserve effects can be 
avoided. The liquidity effects remain limited to the broader level of the non-bank liquidity; 
a direct influence on the monetary base is shut ouf
2
•  In the course of a speculative attack 
the central  banks do not face any constraints to give in  to  the markets'  pressure by rea-
ligning the exchange rate in the end. 
Forward intervention strategies to guarantee exchange rate margins around ultimately 
fixed central rates,  therefore, prove to be sustainable even in the worst case scenario of a 
speculative  attack.  Anyway,  those  attacks  become  unlikely  because,  due  to  the  forward 
intervention mechanism, the markets' arbitrage is stabilizing the central bank's exchange rate 
promise instead of destabilizing it as it was likely for the spot intervention promise of the 
'old EMS'. For speculants to wait and see during a speculative attack is inevitably associated 
with current financing costs whereas for the central banks - again in contrast to spot inter-
ventions - no costs in terms of unsustainable liquidity and reserve effects arise which in the 
end could force them to opt out. 
Consequently, an EMS forward intervention promise would be credible and sustainable 
at the same time.  It is,  therefore,  the suitable strategy to  protect and guarantee ultimately 
fixed exchange rate margins. For the hard currency countries forward intervention promises 
have the advantage of minimizing the monetary policy risks in terms of liquidity effects of 
spot interventions. For weak currency countries the budget restriction of limited intervention 
reserves is eliminated and the maximum use of the interest rate instrument is limited to the 
71
)  Agressive foward interventions can also be described as being intramarginal because the central banks 
are intervening at a rate slightly above the lower fmward intervention point. This kind of foward interventions 
offer riskl~ss profits to the interest arbitrage. It also ensures the transmittance of the foward intervention into 
the spot market even for the unlikeley case of foward interventions at the lower intervention point alone are 
proving to be insufficient to stabalize the spot rates. 
~  For the mechanics of  speculative attacks within an EMS supplemented by unlimited foward interventions 
see the discussion in ap~dix  II. 
68 establishment of minimal inter currency interest rate differences within the margins. Excessi-
ve risk premiums due to economic irrational market speculations are cut down to intramargi-
nal  interest  rate differences  for  motivating  arbitrage capital  flows.  From  the  speculant' s 
perspective, no rational incentives remains to speculatively test the central bank's exchange 
rate  promise  because  even  unlimited  foward  interventions  are  riskless  and,  therefore, 
sustainable for the central banks:  "The authorities need only keep their nerves. "
73 
S.S Suspension of the Settlement Rules 
The above analysis of the EMS's rule system (see chapter III) has demonstrated that the 
systemical asymmetry for the weak currency countries is mainly resulting from the system's 
settlement obligations.  Under the conditions of speculative attacks the settlement produces 
costs in terms of inadequate policy adjustment constraints and massive reserve losses only 
for the attacked currencies. The criterion of sufficient protection against inadequate monetary 
policy adjustments as  a consequence of irrational market speculations  ('protection against 
opportunism II') is not fulfilled for the attacked countries. 
In  the course of a crisis a loss of credibility for the entire system automatically occurs 
because its core of keeping the exchange rate promise by unlimited interventions in the spot 
markets becomes implausible. The implausibility of the intervention promise mainly results 
from  the settlement obligations anticipated by  the  markets.  For the markets,  the unlimited 
intervention  promise of an  attacked  central  bank which  has  to  finance  not  only  its  own 
reserve- and credit-financed interventions but also the interventions carried out by the hard 
currency central bank is implausible from  the start. 
Consequently, the suspension of the settlement obligations seems to be a suitable reform 
option. Suspending or even revoking the settlement rules while at the same time maintaining 
73)  Yeager ( 1976, p. 280). Further it reads: "Honoring a massive volume of  contracts made under the foward 
support policy would prove costly to the authorities if they lose their nerve and fmally devalue. In effect, then, 
they lose their freedom to devalue; but, on an optimistic view, this nearly ironclad guarantee against devalua-
tion and itself further deters speculation." Ibid, pp.280. This optimistic view is the only realistic for the case 
of ultimately fixed rates in a de facto  monetary union. 
69 the other parts the system's institutional setting including the financing rules, would lead to 
an unlimited obligation for the hard currency central banks to finance both, the own as well 
as the weak currency's spot interventions  74• 
Such a mechanism of intervention financing would be credible for the markets because 
the hard currency central bank is the only institution which is able to create the hard curren-
cy intervention reserves  in  an  unlimited amount.  This credibility gain of the intervention 
promise,  however,  is  overcompensated  by  decisive  disadvantages  of an  unconditioned 
suspension of the settlement rules: 
•  The precondition of monetary stability could be violated because the asymmetrical 
adjustment constraints for the weak currency which is rational in the case of diver-
ging inflation rates would be dropped. An unconditioned suspension of the settlement 
rules would,  therefore,  excuse the weak currency countries from  monetary policy 
adjustments even if they prove to be necessary for preserving the monetary stability 
of the overall system.  During  the  1980s,  the settlement obligations have been the 
crucial mechanism forcing the countries with high inflation rates to ward a nominal 
convergence with the anchor currency.  For that reason,  one should not in principle 
refrain from the potentially disciplining settlement obligations. 
•  From the hard currency countries' perspective,  an unconditioned revocation of the 
settlement  rules  would  also  violate  the  criterion  of a  sufficient  protection  against 
opportunistic  behaviour  of currencies  with  higher  inflation  rates.  Following  an 
expansive monetary policy and financing  the resulting balance of payments deficits 
by obligatory interventions of the hard currency countries would be an example for 
opportunistic  behaviour  of weak  currency  countries  75•  As  a  consequence  of the 
74
)  For a discussion of case by case suspensions of the settlement obligations see Bofinger (1991, p.373-
376; 1993b) and Collignon (1993, p.170-173). The proposals of a mutual holding of EMS currencies made by 
Balladur (1987) and the French Commisariat General du Plan (1993) as well as the strategy of broadening the 
anchor through additional and unlimited long-term credit facilities suggeseted by Collignon (1993) de facto also 
imply the suspension of the settlement rules. For a discussion see ibid (1993, p.167-169; p.l70-173; pp.174). 
75
)  This problem also arises with a de facto  suspension through introducing an additional and unlimited 
long-term intervention facility as suggested by Collignon. The proposal explicitly leads to unlimited bilateral 
credit facilities for financing interventions. Thereby a country could finance its balance of payments deficits. 
70 intervention  financing  the hard currency countries  have  to  face  the risk of an  in-
flationary adjustment deriving from the interventions' liquidity effects if those exceed 
their sterilisation capacity.  The danger of opportunistic behaviour in the absence of 
settlement  obligations,  therefore,  is  a  result  of at  the  same  time  remaining  unre-
stricted autonomy of the national monetary policies. 
Who nevertheless seeks to establish a vital protection against fundamentally inadequate 
adjustment constraints, a conditioned suspension competency of the settlement obligations 
should  be considered
76
•  To  minimize the risks  of opportunistic behaviour the  suspension 
competency could be assigned to the EMI and tied to the precondition of a prior autonomiza-
tion of the national central banks according to the institutional requirements laid down in the 
Maastricht Treaty.  For defining  the conditions that have to be fulfilled  for activating  the 
suspension competency certain rules for a direct coordination of national monetary policies 
are necessaryn.  Furthermore it is obvious, that if the hard currency central bank can veto 
or even revoke a suspension decision, the probability of opportunistic behaviour among the 
central banks involved will be minimized.  In detail  the suspension competency should be 
organized as  follows: 
a)  The  temporary  and  conditioned  suspension  competency  is  assigned  to  the  EMI. 
Within the EMI  it is tied to the precondition of the institutional autonomy standard 
for monetary policy laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. The suspension competency 
can be activated only in mutual consent of the central banks involved and can unilate-
rally be revoked at any time. 
b)  In  terms  of monetary  stability the suspension competency remains limited to  situa-
tions  of clearly  identifiable speculative attacks.  The degree of meeting  the  money 
A  monetary  adjustment  constraint to  assure  interest rate  conditions sufficient to  finance  the deficits  in the 
markets without suffering market pressures on the exchange rate would no longer exist; see Collignon (1993, 
pp.l74). 
76)  See Vehrkamp (1992, pp.645). 
77
)  For a discussion of the interrelation between a suspension of the settlement obligations and a direct 
monetary coordination see chapter 5. 2. 
71 supply and price level targets mutually agreed as part of the ex ante direct monetary 
policy coordination within the EMI serves as a suitable identification criterion for the 
speculative character of market pressures on exchange rates within the given mar-
gins. 
Overall it has been demonstrated that a temporary and conditioned suspension of the 
settlement obligations is sufficient to make the system's intervention promise credible for the 
markets.  In order to  meet all of the above required  preconditions for a  successful  EMS 
reform,  however,  the  merits  of a  suspension  competency  depends  on  a  corresponding 
efficient mechanism  for direct monetary  policy coordination.  Therefore,  this  proposal  is 
clearly inferior to the forward intervention strategy discussed in chapter 5.4.  With forward 
interventions the monetary coordination mechanism would remain market determined, while 
at the same time inadequate adjustment constraints in case of speculative attacks are elemina-
ted. With foward interventions the establishment of a mechanism for direct monetary policy 
coordination during the phase of transition as it has proved to be necessary for reforming the 
system by introducing a suspension competency could be avoided. 
5.6. Exchange Rate Management Competency of the Central Banks 
Transferring the exchange rate management competency within the EMS to the central 
banks would be an important contribution for objectifying the existing rules of the system. 
The exchange rate adjustment  mechanism could  then  be used  more efficiently as  an  ad-
ditional instrument of a direct monetary policy coordination than it was allowed for with the 
political exchange rate competency of the governments within the 'old EMS'. The exchange 
rate management competency could become an integrated part of the governance structure 
for direct monetary policy coordination. As a result of that, a credible and consistent use of 
the interest  rate,  intervention,  and exchange rate adjustment instruments within the EMS 
would be guaranteed. The protection against opportunistic behaviour of individual govern-
ments  is considerably improved.  From the  more political point of view,  this  should also 
increase  the  central  banks'  willingness  to  enhance the  cooperation  of national  monetary 
policies.  Anyway, for the system as a whole a considerable credibility gain is to be expec-
ted. 
72 To avoid political disadvantages in terms of the Maastricht integration schedule shifting 
the exchange rate management competency to the central banks has to be limited to the ali-
day  management  of central  rate  adjustments  within  the  system.  The  basic  institutional 
government competency of modifying  the exchange rate regime in  general  would  not be 
affected. Deciding the if, when and how of the member states' return to the normal fluctua-
tion  margins as well as  the final decision of entering the third stage remains an exclusive 
domain  of national  government's  and  parliament's  involved.  The  suggested  split  of the 
exchange rate competency (regime competency of  the governments and management compe-
tency of  the central banks) fulfils both the political integration objective of the governments 
and the monetary stability objectives of the central banks. The pace of monetary integration 
would still be determined politically; however, with a divided exchange competency it would 
not be necessary to give up the advantages of a rate management competency of the central 
banks
78
• 
78)  For the integration strategy presented in chapter VI such a splitting the exchange rate competency means 
that  the decision of entering the third stage  remains  political,  whereas  the central rate  management  for  the 
course of stage two is transferred to the central banks. 
73 VI. A Strategy for Stage Two 
The following suggests a reform strategy for the European Monetary System (EMS) in 
the course of the second  stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EEMU). 
Based  on  the integration schedule and  procedure of the Maastricht Treaty,  the proposals 
facilitate a criteria-orientated transition to the third and final stage by 1999 at the latest. 
First, the establishment of a monetary autonomy standard for Europe is suggested 
by  improving  and  strenghening  the  institutional  framework  of the  European  Monetary 
Institute (EMI). The autonomy standard of the EMI should be orientated to the criterion of 
ins~itutional convergence of the central banks involved according to the Maastricht Treaty. 
The monetary autonomy standard will be supplemented by a two-track EMS.  For the core 
countries a de facto  monetary  union can be established by ultimately fixing  the fluctuation 
margins. The core countries of the de facto monetary union remain tied to the countries of 
the periphery through a modified exchange rate mechanism which is considerably strengthe-
ned compared to  the  'old EMS'.  As  an  institutional link between the monetary autonomy 
standard and the two-tier European Monetary System the exchange rate management compe-
tency of the central banks is also transferred to the EMI. 
6.1. European Autonomy Standard 
As  laid down in the Maastricht Treaty,  the monetary policy autonomy of the national 
central banks is a prerequisite for entering the third stage. Its implementation, therefore, is 
scheduled for the course of the second stage. In addition to the four macroeconomic conver-
gence  criteria,  we  can  speak of a  fifth  criterion  of institutional  convergence.  Even  the 
standards of the required autonomization are already given by the statute of the ESCB and 
are, therefore, also a vital part of the Treaty. 
For our purposes it is suggested that the monetary autonomization of the national central 
banks according to the institutional standard of the ESCB is realized already at the beginning 
74 of stage two.  As  a  'Club of Autonomous Central Bank Governors', the  EMI would be a 
credible forerunner of the ESCB.  A european autonomy standard would be established. 
The proposal is based on the considerable advantages of an early institutional conver-
gence for each individual country.  The credibility gain of a stability orientated monetary 
policy associated with the institutional convergence would considerably reduce the economic 
costs of its realization especially for the former weak currency countries. Furthermore, the 
european  autonomy  standard  would  provide for  an  efficient  'governance structure'  for  a 
more credible direct coordination of national monetary policy within the 'new EMS' and, 
thereby,  could also  serve as  a conceptual  preparation of the  third  stage of the  monetary 
union. 
Concerning the exchange rate policy, the autonomy standard is supplemented by the ex-
change rate management competency within the 'new EMS' transferred to the EMI. There-
by, the three available instruments for keeping the exchange rate promise would be concen-
trated within the  EMI.  Defending the exchange rates in  the  markets,  the EMI then  could 
autonomously  decide  on  a  suitable  combination  of the  interest  rate,  intervention,  and 
exchange  rate  adjustment  instruments.  The  probability  of a  consistent  and,  therefore, 
credible use of these instruments would be maximized and problems of political coordination 
could  be avoided.  In  order to  create sufficient incentives for  the national  governments to 
give up the exchange rate management competency within the 'new EMS', its transference 
to the EMI, as the prior autonomization of the central banks, should become a precondition 
for the participation in one of the two institutional arrangements of the new two-track EMS. 
6.2. A Two-Track European Monetary System for the Transitional Stage Towards 
Monetary Union 
The integration strategy laid down in the Maastricht Treaty already implies a multi-track 
Europe for the further monetary integration on its way to monetary union. The strategy of 
a  criteria-orientated transition to the third stage inevitably determines a multi-speed transi-
tion  for  the individual countries.  In this respect the following proposal of a two-track EMS 
for  the course of stage two is in  accordance with the scheduled multi-track strategy for the 
transition to the third stage. 
75 The  necessity  of a  two-track  EMS  is  mainly  a  consequence  from  the  still  existing 
economic convergence deficits in terms of monetary stability policy for some of  'the member 
states.  Besides  the precondition of institutional convergence with  regard  to the autonomy 
standard, the actually realized level of monetary stability should serve as the criterion for 
joining the de facto monetary union of the core countries. A price level rule in terms of an 
absolute inflation target has proved to be an economic rational precondition for joining the 
de facto  union.  Such a rule would  require that each individual state has  not exceeded the 
absolute inflation standard  (e.g.  3%) for  the average of an  agreed period of time (e.g.  3 
years)  before joining the de facto  union.  For participating in the modified exchange rate 
mechanism  of the  peripheral  countries  the  institutional  precondition  of the  european 
autonomy  standard  would  be  sufficient because  continuing inflation divergences can  fur-
thermore be balanced by occasional exchange rate adjustments. 
6.2.1. De Facto Monetary Union of the Core Countries 
In order to create a de facto monetary union of the core countries it is not necessary that 
the  states  involved  abolish  the  fluctuation  margins  around  the  fixed  central  rates.  It is 
sufficient to  return to the narrow margins of the 'old EMS'. These margins and the corre-
sponding central rates,  however, have to be ultimately fixed.  For a credible and sustainable 
intervention promise to protect the de facto monetary union's exchange rates in the markets 
the· otherwise  unchanged  rule system  of the old EMS  has  to  be supplemented by  a sym-
metrical,  unconditioned,  and  unlimited intervention obligation of the central banks  in  the 
forward market.  The spot intervention obligations of the 'old EMS' are not to be abolished 
but only completed by obligatory forward interventions. 
While maintaining the existing spot intervention rules,  the intervention obligation in the 
forward  markets  has  two  different  effects.  It  provides  for  an  efficient  mechanism  for 
monetary  policy coordination within the de facto  monetary  union  as  for a credible inter-
vention mechanism to protect the exchange rates against speculative attacks: 
The latter is ensured because a forward  intervention promise is  sustainable for the central 
banks and, therefore, is credible for the markets. The unlimited interventions of the central 
76 banks necessary to discourage a speculative attack are defused in terms of direct expansive 
liquidity  effects.  In  the  course  of an  attack,  however,  the  speculants  inevitably  suffer 
exchange losses of an amount equal to the intramarginal inter currency interest rate differen-
ces as indicated in the swap rates. 
The necessary interest rate coordination within the de facto monetary union is ensured by the 
certain combination of spot and foward interventions.  The remaining asymmetry for finan-
cing  spot interventions,  forces  the weak currency countries  to  activate the symmetrically 
designed  forward  intervention  mechanism  by establishing an  intramarginal inter currency 
interest  rate  difference  in  favour  of the  weak  currency.  The  interest  rate  coordination 
mechanism,  therefore,  would essentially  remain market-determined.  However,  the risk of 
inadequate  monetary  adjustment  constraints  as  a consequence of fundamentally  irrational 
attacks is  reduced to the establishment of intramarginal interest rate differences to activate 
the foward intervention mechanism. 
Therefore  the  suggested  reform  meets  all  criteria  and  preconditions  required  in  this 
paper for the implementation of a stability-orientated fixed rate system (see chapter 5.1.). It 
is sustainable and,  therefore, credible at the same time.  It guarantees for an exchange rate 
stabilization around the level of the ultimately fixed central rates.  The system's interest rate 
standard is  set by the market-determined anchor currency of the system.  Although fluctua-
tion  margins continue to exist,  this part of the  'new EMS' can be described as a de facto 
monetary union. 
The transition from  the de facto  monetary union as a 'core EMS' to the third stage of 
monetary union could take place according to the procedure and timetable laid down in the 
Maastricht Treaty by  1999 at the latest. 
6.2.2. Modified Exchange Rate Mechanism with the Periphery 
Those countries not yet able to  meet the preconditions of monetary stability according 
to  the ex ante agreed inflation standard should be tied to the core countries' de facto union 
by  reestablishing  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  of the  'old  EMS'  in  an  improved  and 
77 strengthened version. The institutional convergence of the monetary autonomy standard, 
including the exchange rate management  com~tency of the central  banks within  the rate 
mechanism, is the only precondition for participating in this modified exchange rate mecha-
nism of the periphery. 
For countries which  meet the citerion of institutional convergence,  the exchange rate 
mechanism of the EMS  should be re-established within the normal  fluctuation  margins of 
+1-2,25%.  In  order to  find  a convincing  response to the  far-reaching  loss of credibility 
which  the  'old EMS'  suffered from  the  1992/93 crisis,  it  is  suggested  to  strengthen  the 
intervention  rules  by introducing a case-by-case  suspension  competency of the settlement 
obligations. The extended EMS should not in principle refrain from the settlement rules as 
an efficient coordination mechanism of monetary policies in case of furthermore diverging 
inflation standards. During the 1980s, it has proved to be the decisive mechanism to discipli-
ne  national  policies in  line with  the  monetary  standard  of the anchor currency.  Still,  the 
criterion of protection against the costs of inadequate monetary policy adjustment caused by 
speculative attacks requires the introduction of a suspension competency of the settlement 
obligations at least in cases of clearly identified speculative attacks. For reasons of institutio-
nal efficiency, the suspension competency should also be assigned to the EMI and should be 
decided by mutual consent of the central banks involved. 
In interaction with the exchange rate management competency of the EMI a consistent 
and, therefore, credible use of the interest rate, intervention, and exchange rate adjustment 
instruments would be ensured for the protection of the in  principle furthermore adjustable 
fluctuation margins. The modified exchange rate mechanism would already be more credible 
than in the 'old EMS' because it is institutionally strengthened by the autonomy standard for 
national monetary policies. The transition from the modified exchange rate mechanism to the 
de facto monetary union should depend on a sufficient fulfillment of the monetary stability 
criterion and can be decided individually. 
78 Final Remarks 
With  the  extended  fluctuation  margins  of  +/-15%  the  convergence  criteria  of the 
Maastricht Treaty have proved to be prohibitive for further progress towards the European 
Monetary Union. Therefore, in order to establish a monetary union by 1999 at the latest an 
additional reform strategy outside the EEC-Treaty is necessary to re-establish the EMS.  A 
'new EMS' proves to be a precondition for the transition to the third stage. 
The above suggested reform has the advantage to facilitate such a reform outside the 
EEC-Treaty without contravening its principles or requiring any modifications. It meets each 
of the  required  preconditions  for  a  stability-orientated  fixed  rate  system  from  the  hard 
currency  countries'  perspective  ('stability  criterion I  and  protection  against  ~inflationary 
infection')  as  well  as  from  the  weak currency countries'  perspective  ('protection  against 
speculative attacks 
1
).  In its essence,  merely an earlier implementation of certain measures 
which are anyway scheduled for the course of the second stage is proposed.  In terms of a 
successful  european integration policy,  the rationality of realizing the European Monetary 
Union before the turn of the century is met, as is the central bank's rationality of preserving 
and even strengthen monetary stability. The proposal,  therefore, proves to be the result of 
a rationality mix  which is suitable to bring back the process of european monetary integra-
tion on the track of the Maastricht Treaty. 
79 Appendix 1: 
The Anatomy of Speculative Attacks 
80 The Anatomy of Speculative Attacks 
The EMS  is  a fixed  rate  system  with  symmetrical fluctuation  margins  of +I-2, 25% 
around the bilateral central rates and a politically determined central rate adjustment mecha-
nism.  In such a system speculative one-way bets tend to occur when the market participants 
anticipate central rate adjustments in an extent which ensures,  that the upper intervention 
point of the  new  margin  will  be fixed  below  the  lower intervention point of the  former 
margin, and that the financing costs of the speculation do not overcompensate the expected 
devaluation profits.  To perform a speculative attack,  the speculants predominantly use the 
traditional  exchange trading  instruments  in  the  spot  and  swap  markets
1
•  Two alternative 
ways of performing a speculative attack can be distinguished
2
: 
1. Off-Balance-Sheet Attacks 
Off-balance-sheet attacks  are forward  speculations.  The  market  participants  sell  the 
attacked currency against a hard currency in the foward  markets.  lf the currency has been 
devalued before the maturity date of the forward deal, the speculants can expect to be able 
to purchase the spot amount of the weak currency necessary to meet the forward obligation 
at a rate which is cheaper than the agreed forward price. 
2. On-Balance-Sheet Attacks 
On-balance-sheet  attacks  are spot  speculations.  Market  participants  sell  the  attacked 
currency in  the spot market against hard currency.  When the currency has been devalued, 
they  might expect to  purchase  it  at  a  rate  which  is  far  enough  below  the  former  rate  to 
overcompensate the financing costs of the speculative spot position. 
1)  This  is  confirmed  for  the  1992/93  EMS  crisis  by a  G-1 0  report  based  on  interviews with  ~ket 
participants: "Options and other derivatives do not appear to have played a special role in the episode. ( ...  )Most 
of the action was  in traditional spot,  swap,  and outright forward  instruments,  and was the direct result  of 
concious decisions to alter exposures in currencies viewed as devaluation risks." G-10 (1993, p.17). 
~)  See  International  Monetary  Fund (1993),  especially  the  appendices  IV  an  V  on the  mechanics  and 
economics of speculative attacks during the EMS-crisis 1992/93, p.40-43 and p.44-48. 
81 In both variants, the central banks, according to their spot intervention obligations, are 
forced  to  take the counter position of both  the  speculative spot and/or forward  sales  by 
intervening in  the spot markets.  Furthermore,  they  have to  refinance the non-bank credit 
expansion necessary to finance the speculative investments.  In order to demonstrate that it 
is insignificant for the central banks in which variant the markets are performing a speculati-
ve attack the following will give a detailed describtion of both. The description is illustrated 
by corresponding accounting charts. 
A)  The Dynamics of an Off-Balance-Sheet Attac~ 
Step 1: The speculant sells the attacked currency (100 FF) forward to bank A for hard 
currency (30 DM): 
Tab.  lA-1  Speculant  Bank A 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
l.Step: 
Speculative forward deal  30DM  100 FF  100 FF  30DM 
one month forward sale of 100 FF  (in one molllh)  (in one amnth)  (in one monlh)  (in one amnth) 
against 30 DM to bank A 
Without using any liquid capital, the speculant has established his uncovered foreign curren-
cy  position denominated  in  the currency  which  he  suspects  to  be revalued.  For him,  no 
direct financing costs in terms of interest payments arise.  In order to realize a speculative 
exchange profit it is sufficient that the future spot rate, at which the speculant will cover his 
forward position prior to the maturity date, is cheaper than the agreed forward rate
4
•  Profit 
and risk of the speculant, therefore, are based on the expected difference of the future spot 
3)  See the summary of the following individual accounting charts in table  lA of this appendix. 
4
)  For the foward speculant indirect financing costs arise because his foward rate deviates from the effective 
spot rate  in an  amount that equals the inter currency interest rate difference,  because the so-called covered 
interest rate arbitrage always guarantees the exact equalization of the swap rate,  as  the difference between the 
spot and the foward rate,  with the inter currency interest rate difference.  The indirect financing costs of the 
foward speculant, therefore, are equal to the direct financing costs of a spot speculant who first raises a credit 
in the attacked currency and then invests the amount of the credit in hard currency.  Concerning the overall 
profits,  spot and foward  speculations,  therefore,  lead to  exactly the  same  results.  Selecting  the  instruments 
during  a speculative attack  mainly  depends  on  the  criteria of availability and  liquidity, and  not  on return 
calculations. 
82 rate to today' s forward rate.  By  contracting the speculative forward deal a corresponding 
currency risk inevitably arises for bank A. 
Step 2: Unintentional arising  uncovered currency positions in the banking system are 
routinely  covered  by  the  individual bank involved.  Covering  a  forward  position  can  be 
reached by combining a contrary spot- with a swap transaction: 
Tab.  IA-2  Bank A  BankB  Central Bank 
Receipt  Paymmt  Receipt  Paymmt  Receipt  Payment 
l.Step: 
CovgingbankA.  300M  100 FF  100 FF  300M 
a) spot purcbue of 30 DM against  (iltwo..,.)  (iltwo..,.,  (iltwo..,.,  til two..,., 
100 FF from the central bank  -- -- -- --
100 FF  300M  300M  100 FF 
b) swap with bank B:  (iltwo.,.)  (iltwo..,.)  (iltwo..,.)  (iltwo..,.) 
spot sale of 30 DM against 100 FF  300M  100 FF  100 FF  300M 
in two days and re-purchase in one month  (il-.-11)  (il-.-11)  (il-.-11)  (il-.-11) 
First,  the  short  spot position  is  offset in  terms  of the currency  risk  involved  by a  spot 
purchase  of the  hard  currency  (30  D  M)  against  the  currency  which  is  suspected  to  be 
devalued (100 FF). The remaining maturity inconsistency is balanced by an additional swap 
transaction. The purchased spot amount in hard currency is exchanged against a correspon-
ding forward position. In that way, bank A is balanced in terms of both, uncovered curren-
cies  in  amount  and  maturity.  According  to  the  spot  intervention obligations,  the central 
banks  have  to  match  the  spot  transaction  whereas  the  swap  is  routinely  contracted  with 
another bank B.  As  a consequence of the spot intervention the central banks are facing the 
systemically determined liquidity and reserve effects
5
• They at first activate the correspon-
ding asymmetrical monetary policy adjustment constraints and finally,  if the liquidity and 
reserve effects become unsustainable from the central banks' perspective, unavoidably lead 
to a devaluation of the attacked currency. 
5
)  Within the  EMS  interventions usually  imply  symmetrical  liquidity effects  (=expansive money  base 
effects  in  the  hard currency  versus  restrictive money  base effects  in the weak  currency)  and asymmetrical 
reserve  effects  for  the  weak  currency  central  bank  (=direct loss  of hard  currency  intervention reserves 
respectively  repayment  or settlement obligations deriving  from  drawings on the system's credit facilities  or 
interventions carried out by the hard currency country). In our example, the expansive DM- and restrictive FF-
money  base  effects  due  to  the  spot  interventions  arise  simultaneously at  bank  A  because,  for  reasons  of 
simplification, one can refrain from both, distingushing between the DM- and FF-banking system and between 
the  DM- and  FF-central  banks.  The  simplification seems  to  be suitable because  otherwise  the  analysis  is 
considerably complicated, however, it would not alter its results. 
83 Step 3: As a consequence of its swap transaction bank B needs to earn interest on the 
hard currency spot amount received in the spot leg of the transaction. The bank, therefore, 
invests the spot amount for the duration of the forward: 
Tab.  lA-3  BankB  BankC 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
3.Step: 
Investment bank B  30DM  30DM  30DM  30DM 
a) investment of 30 DM for one month 
(m <me momh)  (m two days)  (in two days)  (in <me  mcnlh) 
Bank B,  therefore, is also balanced in terms of maturity. 
Step 4:  With the liquidity effects of the central banks' spot interventions,  the central 
banks are faced to sterilize the intervention-related expansive OM- and restricitve FF-money 
base effects. Besides they have to refinance the central bank money demand of the banking 
system resulting from the speculative OM-investments. Therefore, the hard currency central 
bank has to contract a restrictive open market transaction equal to the spot intervention (30 
OM) with  bank A.  With that,  the expansive money base effect of the spot intervention is 
completely sterilized.  For the FF-central bank an expansive open market transaction in the 
same amount as the intervention with bank B is necessary in order to sterilize the restrictive 
FF-money base  effect  of the  intervention.  For the  purpose  of satisfying  the  additional 
demand for OM-central bank money arising from the additional OM-investment of bank B 
(see footnote 6), the OM-central bank has to contract an expansive open market transaction 
with bank C in an amount equal to r(30 DM): 
Tab.  lA-4  Bank A/C  Central Bank 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
4.Step:  30DM  30DM  30DM  30DM 
Sterilization and refinancing  (ref.  UICis)  (c.b. mmcy)  (c.b. mmcy)  (ref.  UICis) 
a) ster. of the expansive DM m.b. effect(**)  100 FF  100 FF  100 FF  100 FF 
b) ster. of the restrictive FF m.b. effect (***)  (c.b.~y)  (ref.  uaets)  (ref.  IS8Ct8)  (c.b.~y) 
c) ref. of the DM investment(****) 
r(30 DM)  r(30 DM)  r(30 DM)  r(30 DM) 
(c.b. mmcy)  (ref.  IWCts)  (ref.  uaelll)  (c.b. money) 
(**) Intervention-caused expansive DM money base effects automatically arise when the interventions are directly carried out 
by the DM  central bank or the FF central bank's intervention reserves have previously been deposited at the OM central 
bank.  (***)  Intervention-caused restrictive FF money  base effects automatically arise when the interventions are directly 
carried out by the FF central bank or the DM central bank's intervention reserves have previously been deposited at the FF 
central bank. (****) An additional demand for DM central bank money arises from  the DM investment only in case of the 
DM central bank has failed  to sterilize the expansive DM money base effects. 
84 If the  sterilization of the intervention-related expansive OM-money base effect is  cleared 
with  the  additional  central  bank  money  demoand  of the  banking  system  from  the  OM--
investment, a net amount of (30-r30)0M remains for the OM-central bank to be sterilized
6
• 
Therefore,  additional to  the expansion  of the  non-bank liquidity equal to  the speculative 
investments, the currency attack leads to an expansion of the bank liquidity ( = money base) 
equal  to  r(300M)  for  the  OM-central  bank even  after  the  sterilization  and  refinancing 
transactions are finished7• While the expansion of the non-bank liquidity has to be accepted 
as  inevitable  from  the  central  bank's  perspective,  it  could  refrain  from  refinancing  the 
speculative investments. However, if the hard currency central bank refuses to refinance the 
speculative investments, the resulting increases of the domestic money market interest rates 
will automatically lead to an aggravation of the speculative attack. The thereby reduced inter 
currency interest rate in favour of the attacked currency decreases the financing costs of the 
speculants and,  therefore, further increases the incentive to speculate.  For that reason,  the 
OM-central  bank is  realistically  forced  to  refinance  the  non-bank liquidity expansion.  A 
corresponding de facto obligation to  sterilize can be derived for the liquidity effects of the 
interventions.  In  case  of unsterilized  spot  interventions,  the  hard  currency  ~ntral bank 
would, in terms of interest rate and liquidity policy, completely lose its control over dome-
stic  money  markets8•  However,  its  ability  to  fulfil  the  de  facto  obligation  to  sterilize  is 
limited to  the amount of its sterilization capacity. 
Corresponding to the above analysis the weak currency central banks are liable to a de 
facto obligation to sterilize the intervention's restrictive money base effects. If a central bank 
would  refuse  to  do  so,  at  first  the  interest  rates  in  the  weak currency's domestic  money 
market are likely  to  increase.  Thereby  the financing  costs of the  speculants are  increased 
6)  A uniform reserve quota for all bank liabilities is assumed; due to the short-term view, multiplier effects 
are not considered. 
7
)  For this distinction between the effects on the bank liquidity (=money base) and the non-bank liquidity 
see  Deutsche Bundesbank (1993, p.l9-34). 
8)  For a further discussion see chapter 5.4  .. The actual sterilization obligation can already be derived from 
the fact that otherwise an unlimited intervention promise of the hard currency central bank is not credible for 
the markets because the central bank would give up its monetary policy autonomy. A complete renunciation of 
sterilization policy, therefore, is extremely implausible from a perspective following the theory of bureaucratic 
behaviour. Central banks are not likely to voluntary commit political sucide. 
85 which might help to lessen the attack because the devaluation expectations of the speculants 
are over-compensated by their interest costs.  However,  the extremely  high  interest  rates 
necessary  for  that  become  implausible  even  in  the  short- and  medium-term  because  no 
central  bank  can  passively  accept  the  deasastrous  consequences  of speculative  exessive 
interest rates for the economy as a whole. In the end, the central bank as the lender of last 
resort has  to  guarantee economically acceptable interest rates,  and  this is  what the market 
participants anticipate
9
• 
Summary: The result  of intervening  in  the  spot  markets  to  fight  a  speculative  off-
balance-sheet attack is unsatisfying for the central banks in every respect: 
For the hard currency country,  the speculative increase of the  non-bank liquidity and  the 
expansive money base effects of the interventions lead  to  a gradual loss of policy control 
over the domestic  money  markets.  Historical experiences with  speculative currency crisis 
clearly show that the hard currency central bank will opt out and permit a devaluation of the 
attacked currency at the latest when its sterilization capacity is  exhausted.  The speculative 
attack has then been successful for the speculants. 
Besides  the  reserve  losses  the  weak currency country is  facing  severe economic costs  in 
terms of increasing interest rates in the domestic money market. These interest rate increases 
directly result from the restrictive monetary base effects of the spot interventions, at least as 
long as they are not sterilized. On the horns of a dilemma, the central bank either aggravates 
the  speculative attack through  the  sterilization  policy by  keeping  the interest costs  of the 
speculants  low,  or it passively accepts  the economic costs of exessive interest rates.  Both 
alternatives improve the prospects of a successful attack for the speculants and,  therefore, 
lead to an aggravation of the speculants' market pressure.  The historical experience proves 
that with the accumulating reserve losses even the weak currency central banks are forced 
to opt out.  From this perspective,  again,  the speculative attack is  in  the end successful for 
the speculants. 
~ See the basic and still valid explanations of Bagehot (1873). 
86 After the forced devaluation of the attacked currency the speculative currency positions 
are re-exchanged with the central banks.  Again,  from the perspective of the central banks 
involved,  one can  speak of a de facto  obligation to re-exchange the speculative positions. 
This obligation results from the policy objective of re-establishing normal conditions for the 
domestic money markets,  from the necessity of replenishing the intervention reserves and, 
last but not least,  from  the intervention obligations at the devalued currency's upper inter-
vention point of the new  margin.  All this leads us to the perverse consequence that in the 
end  the  central  banks  have  to  finance  the  speculants'  exchange  profits10•  Therefore,  in 
speculative attacks the central banks become the exploitable resource of the system
11
• 
B)  The Dynamics of an On-Balance-Sheet Attack
12 
Step 1:  The  speculant  sells  the  attacked  currency  against  hard  currency  in  the  spot 
market.  The counter position  of the  speculative  spot  transaction  is directly  taken  by  the 
central banks following their intervention obligations: 
I  Tab.  JB-1  I  Speculant  I  Central Bank  I 
I  I Receipt  I 
Payment  I 
Receipt  I 
Payment 
l.Step: 
Speculative spot deal  300M  100 FF  100 FF  300M 
spot sale of 100 FF against 30 D  M  (in two days)  (in two days)  (in two days)  (in two days) 
to the central bank 
The speculant intends to  hold  his uncovered spot position in  hard currency until he is able 
to  profitably sell  it after a devaluation of the attacked currency for the new  spot rate (e.g. 
30 DM against 110 FF). As long as the thereby realized exchange profit exceeds the interest 
costs from  financing the speculative currency position, the speculation has been profitable. 
For  the  central  banks,  the  spot  interventions  cause  corresponding  liquidity  and  reserve 
1~  The distribution of the overall loss among the member central banks mainly derives from the denomina-
tion rules of the settlement procedure;  for details see Committee of Governors (1993, p.6). 
11
)  This already results from the foreign exchange trading as a closed system being a zero-sum game;  the 
profit of the one is the loss of another.  In  speculative one-way bets the central banks inherently have to take 
the loss position. See Grabbe (1991, p.287). 
12
)  See the summary of the accounting charts in table  IB) of this appendix. 
87 
I effects. The overall result exactly corresponds to the first and second steps of an off-balan-
ce-sheet attack.  The only difference  is,  that  the  transmittance of the  speculative  foward 
transaction into the spot market is not necessary because in an on-balance-sheet attack the 
central bank is directly contracting the spot position with the speculant. 
Step 2: The speculant invests his speculative hard currency spot amount in order to earn 
interest: 
I  Tab.  JB-2  I  Speculant  I  BankB 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
2.Step: 
Investment b~ the Sfl.eculant  30DM  30DM  30DM  30DM 
a) investment of 30 DM for one month  (in CDC IDOIIlh)  (in two days)  (m two days)  (in CDC molllh) 
The thereby realized interest returns help to reduce his direct financing costs from borrowing 
in the attacked currency to the inter currency interest rate difference
13
• They, therefore, are 
exactly equal to the indirect financing costs of a forward speculant as being represented by 
the swap rate. 
Step 3: For the central banks,  the sterilization and  refinancing requirements resulting 
from a spot intervention are the same as in case of a forward speculation: 
I  Tab.  JB-3  I  Bank A/B  I  Central Bank 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
3.Step:  30DM  30DM  30DM  30DM 
Sterilil.ation and refinancing  (ref. asects)  (c.b.  rDCJney)  (c.b.mooey)  (ref.  IWCIS) 
a) ster. of the expansive DM m.b. effects (*)  100 FF  100 FF  100 FF  100 FF 
b) ster. of the restrictive FF m.b. effects (**)  (c.b. mcJIIeY)  (ref. assets)  (ref.  asects)  (c.b.  mcJIIeY) 
c) ref. of the DM investment(***) 
r(30 DM)  r(30 DM)  r(30 DM)  r(30 DM) 
(c.b. money)  (ref.  IWCIS)  (ref.  IWCIS)  (c.b. mcJIIeY) 
I 
I 
(*) Intervention-caused expansive OM money base effects automatically arise when the interventions are directly carried out 
by the OM central bank or the FF central bank's intervention reserves have previously been deposited at the OM central 
bank.  (**)  Intervention-caused restrictive  FF money  base effects automatically  arise when  the  interventions  are directly 
carried out by the FF central bank or the OM central bank's intervention reserves have previously been deposited at the FF 
central bank.  (***) An additional demand for  OM central bank money arises from the OM  investment only in case of the 
OM central bank has failed to  sterilize the expansive OM money base effects of the interventions. 
13
)  See footnote 4 of this appendix. 
88 The  only  difference  is  that  with  spot  speculations  the  speculative expansion  of the  hard 
currency's non-bank liquidity is a direct consequence of the speculant's transactions, where-
reas  in  case  of an  off-balance-sheet  attack  it follows  from  the  swap  contracting  bank's 
investment of the swap's spot amount. 
For the central banks the implications of a spot intervention obligation are identical for 
on-balance-sheet  and  off-balance-sheet attacks.  In  both  cases  the  central  banks  take  the 
counter position of the  speculants  by  intervening  in  the spot  market.  The corresponding 
liquidity  and  reserve  effects  at  first  trigger  the  almost  entirely  asymmetrical  monetary 
adjustment constraints  for  the  weak currency countries.  Due to  the  accumulating  reserve 
losses  the  budget  restriction  of limited  intervention  reserves  forces  the  weak  currency 
countries to shift their efforts in fighting the attack from the intervention to the interest rate 
instrument.  An  opting-out of the  weak  currency  countries  becomes  unavoidable  when  a 
further  use  of the  interest  rate  instrument  becomes  unsustainable  for  the  economy  as  a 
whole. In case that both, intervention and interest rate instruments have become implausible, 
the only  way  out is a devaluation  according  to  the  speculative  market pressures.  For the 
weak  currency  countries,  the  inherent  implausibiltiy  of the  unlimited  spot  intervention 
promise directly result from  their budget restriction of limited hard currency intervention 
reserves.  The  very  short-term  financing  in  the  EMS  does  only  temporarily  suspend  this 
budget restriction and with the asymmetric settlement obligation for the weak currencies it 
is even extended to the interventions carried out by the hard currency countries. 
The  intervention  promise  of a  hard  currency  country  becomes  implausible  for  the 
markets  when  its  sterilization  capacity  is  exhausted  and  the  hard  currency  central  bank, 
therefore,  loses  its  monetary policy control over domestic money  market conditions.  With 
the  sterilization capacity exhausted,  the  symmetry characteristics of the entire system  are 
changing.  The  monetary adjustment constraints  become  more  symmetrical or even asym-
metrical for the hard currency countries which are then forced to adjust to the interest rates 
and monetary policy of the weak currency country. The market participants, therefore, will 
anticipate an opting-out of the hard currency central bank at the latest when its sterilization 
potential is exhausted. 
89 Final remarks: The mechanics of speculative attacks show that exchange rate promises 
within the  'old EMS' are inherently  implausible because the instruments for keeping  the 
promises  are  lacking  credibility.  The  markets  anticipate  that  both,  the  intervention  and 
interest rate instruments are not sustainable.  Consequently, the one-way bets of speculative 
attacks seem to be promising even when the exchange rates are in accordance with economic 
fundamentals. The inherent implausibiltiy of the system alone has proved to be sufficient to 
provoke speculative attacks of the markets. Following their profit-maximizing rationality the 
markets sooner or later realize the potential profit of a speculative attack. Anybody who gives 
exchange rate promises has to guaranatee them by means and instruments being credible for 
the markets.  This condition is not fulfilled for the 'old EMS'. 
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 Appendix II: 
Forward Interventions in Speculative Attacks 
93 Forward Interventions in Speculative Attacks 
Compared to interventions in the spot markets, forward interventions have the decisive 
advantage not to involve any direct liquidity and reserve effects for the intervening central 
bank. The following will show that those effects can be avoided even if the central bank's 
forward transactions actually have to be delivered. Besides that, it will be demonstrated that 
it is  irrelevant  for  the  effectiveness  of forward  interventions  if the  speculative attack  is 
performed as  an on-balance-sheet attack or as an off-balance-sheet attack.  Forward inter-
ventions prove to be an efficient defence mechanism against both of them
2
• In both cases the 
credibility problems inherent to spot intervention strategies can be avoided. 
A)  The Dynamics of Forward Interventions in Off-Balance-Sheet Attacks 
Variant 1: In the first variant of a forward intervention strategy, the intervening central 
bank directly takes on the counter position of the speculant's forward  sale of the attacked 
currency: 
I  Tab. 2A-1  I  Speculant  I  Central Banks  I 
I  I Receipt  I 
Payment  I 
Receipt  I 
Payment  I 
1.  Variant 
l.Step: 
S[l!I.culative fpward deal  30DM  100 FF  100 FF  30DM 
one month foward sale of 100 FF 
(in ODC  DIOIIIh)  (in ODC  IDCJIIIh)  (in ODC  IDCJIIIh)  (in on:: month) 
against 30 D  M to the central bank 
If the central bank has managed to contract its foward intervention directly with the specu-
lant, the currency position of the commercial bank system is not affected by the speculative 
attack.  Thereby  the  transmittance of the  speculative foward  deal  into  the  spot  market  is 
already interrupted at the speculant's initial transaction. For the central banks, therefore, no 
liquidity or reserve effects arise from interventions in the course of the attack. Those effects 
are only conceivable - analogous to  a  spot intervention - when the forward  transaction is 
effectively  delivered  at  the  maturity  date.  An  effective  delivery  of speculative  forward 
2)  In the follwing a forward intervention strategy similar to the one suggested in chapter 5.4. is assumed. 
The proposal provides  for  simultaneous  intervention obligations in  the  spot and  foward  markets.  For the 
interaction of spot and foward interventions see box I in chapter 5.4. 
94 transactions with the central banks, however, can be regarded as being extremely unlikely 
because it always automatically involves a loss for the speculant of an amount equal to the 
inter currency interest rate difference as represented in the swap rate.  The proposed inter-
vention strategy obliges the central banks to unlimited foward interventions only when the 
foward  rate  has  reached  the  lower  intervention  point of a  currency.  With  a  remaining 
asymmetrical  spot  intervention  obligation  for  the  weak currency  country,  to  activate  the 
symmetrical foward intervention mechanism the attacked central bank is forced to establish 
a positive interest rate difference in favour of its own currency, because otherwise it would 
be the spot rate that first touches the lower intervention point and thereby release only the 
asymmetrical spot intervention obligation. Within the 'new EMS' the furthermore co-existing 
spot intervention mechanism of the 'old EMS' proves to serve as an efficient mechanism of 
coordination for the national interest rate policies. It guarantees for a positive interest rate 
difference in favour of the attacked currency as a first line of defence against a speculative 
attack,  because such a difference is a precondition to activate the symmetric foward  inter-
vention mechanism.  Thereby, for  the central banks and  speculants the tables are turned in 
the course of a speculative attack: 
•  For central banks,  the liquidity and reserve effects arise from  the beginning.  They 
are forced  to face the  'costs' of their spot interventions during the entire course of 
the  attack.  Spot interventions,  therefore,  are viewed  to  be self-defeating  from  the 
market's perspective.  In  contrast to  the central bank's dilemma with  self-defeating 
spot interventions, the indirect financing costs of the speculants arise only at the end 
of a  speculative attack.  This  temporal  non-congruence of cost-taking  between  the 
central banks and the speculants is a major reason for the inherent unsustainability of 
spot intervention strategies as a defence mechanism against speculative attacks. 
•  With forward interventions this temporal non-congruence of cost-taking is reversed 
in  favour of the central banks.  No  'costs' in  terms of exessive liquidity and reserve 
effects arise in  the course of an  attack.  A spot transaction of the central banks can 
only  become  necessary  to  deliver  a  foward  cuntract  and  would  be  inevitably 
connected with a corresponding loss-taking by the speculants.  An actual delivery of 
foward  interventions is,  therefore,  unlikely to  happen  in reality.  The central banks 
95 are no longer forced to opt out as a consequence of unavoidably arising liquidity and 
reserve  effects.  The vicious  circle  of inherently  implausible  spot  interventions  is 
broken;  with  forward  intervention  strategies  the  speculants  have  to  defray  the 
inevitable losses instead of the central banks. 
This mechanism alone should prove to be sufficient to  stimulate arbitrage transactions 
to  stabilize  the  exchange  rates  already  before  the  lower  forward  intervention  point  is 
touched.  Even if the central banks have to deliver the foward  intervention at the maturity 
date,  they  can  sterilize  the  associated  liquidity  and  reserve  effects  in .  the  spot  markets 
without being restricted by limited sterilization capacities. The central banks can ensure the 
supply of spot amounts in hard currency to deliver its initial foward intervention by so-called 
agressive forward  interventions.  The agressive foward intervention is then transmitted into 
the  spot  market  by  the  contracting  banks  covering  their  unintentional  arising  foward 
positions.  The  intervening  central  banks  are  thereby  prolongating  their  initial  forward 
positions. At the same time, the money base and reserve effects of the forward intervention's 
delivery- by which the speculants are unavoidably taking a loss - is neutralized. 
Variant 2:  Instead of contracting his speculative forward transactions with the central 
bank, the speculant is contracting it with bank A: 
I  Tab.  2A-211  I  Speculant  I  Bank A  I 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
2.  Variant 
l.Step: 
Saeculative fpward deal  300M  100 FF  100 FF  300M 
one month foward sale of 100 FF  (in onr=  mmlh)  (in onr=  IDCJillh)  (in onr= monlh)  (in onr=  manth) 
against 30 DM to bank A 
Thereby  an  unintentional  uncovered  forward  position  arises  for  Bank  A.  The bank will 
routinely offset the currency risks involved by contracting a contrary spot deal in combina-
tion  with  a  swap.  If the  central  bank  has  not  been  able  to  take  on  the  foward  position 
directly from  the speculant,  it can obtain the same result by 'contracting both, the spot and 
the swap transaction with bank B: 
96 I  Tab.  2A-2/2  I  Bank A  I  Central Banks  I 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
2.Step: 
Covering bank A  30DM  100 FF  100 FF  30DM 
a) spot purchase of 30 DM  (in two days)  (m two days)  (in two days)  (m two days) 
against 100 FF to bank A  ---·-·- ··---------- ----- --------
100 FF  30DM  30DM  100 FF 
b) swap: spot sale of 30 DM  (in two days)  (in two days)  (in two days)  (in two days) 
against 100 FF to the central bank  30DM  100 FF  100 FF  30DM 
and re-purchase in one month  (m aa: mootb.)  (in (IIJC mootb.)  (in aa: mootb.)  (m aa: mootb.) 
Bank  A,  therefore,  has  balanced  its  position  in  terms  of currencies  and  maturities.  The 
bank's function was only the neutral transmittance of the uncovered forward position from 
the  speculant to  the central bank.  Again,  the central bank has  succeeded in  taking on the 
counter position of the  speculant not· in  the  spot  market but in the forward  market.  The 
further course of the speculative attack then exactly corresponds to variant 1.  However, if 
the  central  bank  does  not  succeed  in  taking  on  the  swap  part  of the  bank's  covering 
transactions,  it will have to  face the consequence of an isolated spot intervention.  In order 
to nevertheless escape the self defeating dynamics of spot interventions, the central bank can 
fall back on the above described instrument of aggressive forward interventions. Its use will 
be  required  anyway  if the  attack  is  performed  as  an  on-balance-sheet  attack  from  the 
beginning. 
B)  The Dynamics of Forward Interventions in On-Balance-Sheet Attacks 
When  speculative attacks are performed in  the  spot markets,  the central banks do not 
have the opportunity of directly contracting the speculative position in  the forward market. 
In  order to  nevertheless avoid spot interventions,  they are forced to intervene preventively 
in  the forward  markets.  As  in case of the above mentioned agressive foward interventions, 
the  central  banks  thereby  ensure  the  necessary  spot  supply  in  hard  currency  to  meet the 
speculants'  demand  by  the  spot and  swap  transaction  of the banking  system  covering the 
foward  intervention and  thereby  transmitting  it into the  spot  market.  By  that,  the central 
banks avoid the dilemma of self-defeating spot interventions.  In  contrast to  forward  inter-
ventions in  off-balance-sheet attacks,  however, they are forced to refinance the speculative 
hard currency investments. 
97 Step 1: The central bank 'aggressively' intervenes in the forward markets by purchasing 
the attacked currency forward against hard currency from bank B: 
Tab.  2B-1  Central Bank  Bank A 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
l.Step: 
Aggressive fgrward intervention 
300M  100 FF  one month foward sale  100 FF  300M 
against 30 DM to bank A 
(in ClOD  IDOIIlh)  (in ClOD  IDOIIlh)  (in ClOD  DDilh)  (in ClOD  mon!h) 
Thereby  the central  bank has  established  its forward  position  while at the  same time an 
unintentional uncovered currency position arises for the contracting bank A.  Of course the 
bank will routinely offset its uncovered position by combining a contrary spot with a swap 
transaction. 
Step 2: With bank A covering its open foward positon, the speculant matches the spot 
transaction while the swap part is contracted with bank B: 
Tab.  2B-2  Bank A  BankB  Speculant 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
2.Step: 
CD"'ljng bank A  100 FF  300M  300M  100 FF 
a) spot sale of 30 DM  (ill two.)  (ill two.)  (Ill &Will T.,.a>  (ID~Topa) 
agaiDst 100 FF to the speculant  -- -- -- --
300M  100 FF  100 FF  300M  b) swap: spot purchase of 30 DM 
(Ill two.)  (ill two.)  (ill two.)  (ill two.) 
apinst 100 FF from bank B  100 FF  300M  300M  100 FF 
aad re-purchase in one month  (IDcmD.-h)  (IDcmDsall)  (111.-....-11)  (IDa. ....-II) 
Thereby the speculant has established his desired long spot position in hard currency. Bank 
A has  transmitted the central bank's intervention from the forward into the spot market. It 
has,  therefore,  made available the  spot supply in  hard currency required by  the  speculant 
without the necessity of spot interventions by the central bank. 
Step 3: Both, the speculant and bank B,  invest their spot amounts to earn interest: 
Tab.  2B-3  Bank A  BankB  Speculant 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
3.Step: 
illiJvalmelJ!. fa. llJt. SDeCUitJIII  300M  300M  300M  300M 
one month investment of 30 DM at bank B  (Ill two.)  (IDa. sal!)  (111.-sall)  (ill two.) 
blliJ•llMlJ!. by bqn/c B  -- -- -- -- -- --
100 FF  100 FF  100 FF  100 FF 
oae month investment of 100 FF at bank A  (ill two.)  (Ill am sal!)  (iD.-sall)  (ill two.) 
98 By  that,  the  speculant  reduces  his  financing  costs  to  a  level  equal  to  the inter currency 
interest rate  difference.  His speculative  return  calculation  then  corresponds  to  one of an 
off-balance-sheet forward speculation.  For bank B the investment of its spot FF amount is 
necessary in order to balance the maturity inconsistency between the spot and the foward leg 
of its swap position. 
Step 4: The resulting expansion of the non-bank liquidity aggregates have to be refinan-
ced by the central banks: 
Tab.  2B-4  Central Bank  Bank. A  Bank.B 
Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment  Receipt  Payment 
4.Step: 
lklinqncing  r(30 DM)  r(30 DM)  r(30 DM)  r(30 DM) 
a) refinlncing of the DM investment  (l.t.-)  (c.b. -rl  (e.b._,-)  (..r.-) 
b) refiDancing of the FF investment  -- -- -- -- -- --
r(lOO FF)  r(lOO FF)  r(lOO FF)  r(lOO FF) 
t..r.-)  (e.b. -rl  (c.b._,-)  <•·-l 
Those  refinancing  transactions  become  necessary  only  in  case  of investments  in  assets 
underlying a reserve duty. The additionally arising demand for central bank money to meet 
the required additional reserve holdings has to be financed by the central banks. The central 
banks are even facing a de facto obligation to refinance the speculative investments because 
of the  otherwise  automatically  occurring  exessive  interest  rate  increases  in  the  domestic 
money  markets. 
An  on-balance-sheet  attack,  therefore,  can  successfully  be  combated  by  agressive 
forward  interventions of the  central banks.  The only difference between the dynamics  of 
forward interventions in speculative off-balance-sheet attacks and foward interventions in on-
balance-sheet  attacks  is  the  minor  expansion  of the  non-bank  liquidity  which  has  to  be 
refinanced  by  the  central  banks.  Still,  the  direct  money  base and  reserve  effects  can be 
avoided and the cost-taking in the course of an attack is passed on to the speculants. Thereby 
the inherent self defeating dynamics of speculative attacks is turned against the speculants 
and not - as  with  spot intervention strategies - against the intervening central banks. 
99 Final remarks: Unlimited forward intervention obligations have proved to be a credible 
defence mechanism against speculative attacks.  For the central banks no costs arise which 
could  finally  force  them  to  give  up  their  exchange  rate  and  intervention  promise.  This 
credibililty itself should be sufficient to prevent the development of speculative attacks.  If 
nevertheless attacks of the markets occur, the central banks with forward interventions will 
have the power to outplay the  speculants.  Forward interventions,  therefore,  prove to  be a 
necessary instrument for the EMS in order to establish a sustainable and credible exchange . 
rate and intervention promise. 
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